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Fall 1983

Seymour Martin Lipset
William Schneider — The Decline of Confidence in American Institutions

Roger B. Porter — Economic Advice to the President

Joseph Cooper — Postscript on the Congressional Veto

Richard Ned Lebow — The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly

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From the Editor:

In this issue. . .

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET and WILLIAM SCHNEIDER document the sharp decline in public confidence that has occurred for all major American institutions since 1965. They conclude, however, that the change in attitudes is directed toward the performance of institutions, and has not resulted in a rejection of the American social, political, or economic systems themselves.

ROGER P. PORTER reviews how economic advice to the president has been organized over the last thirty years. He discusses alternative approaches for improving the coordination of economic advice and concludes that a cabinet-level council emphasizing multiple advocacy has the greatest potential.

JOSEPH COOPER gives a brief reaction to the Supreme Court decision (*Immigration and Naturalization Service* v. *Chadha*) that declared the legislative veto unconstitutional.

RICHARD NED LEBOW attempts to show that there is no evidence to support the thesis that the Soviet Union put missiles into Cuba because Khrushchev doubted Kennedy's resolve. Lebow argues against the notion that the principle policy lesson of the crisis is that timidity invites challenge while resolve deters.

MARTIN SHEFTER analyzes why patronage plays a larger role in the politics of cities and states in the Northeast than in those of the West. He contends that the structure of the late nineteenth century party system had a different impact on the ability of reformers in these two regions to overturn the patronage system.

CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS attempts to explain why the Greek military regime, which ruled from 1967 to 1974, failed to acquire legitimacy for itself.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Decline of Confidence in American Institutions

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
WILLIAM SCHNEIDER

On 15 July 1979, President Carter delivered a dramatic television address to the American people on the subject of the energy crisis. Shortly into his remarks he broadened his topic and drew attention to "a subject even more serious than energy or inflation . . . a fundamental threat to American democracy." That threat, he said, was a "crisis of confidence . . . that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will." He pointed to "a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media and other institutions . . ." and emphasized that "the gap between our citizens and our government has never been so wide. . . ."

Jimmy Carter thus became one—albeit the most prominent—of many commentators who have noted and expressed concern over the declining confidence shown by the American public in their political, social, and economic institutions and leaders. The evidence of this decline appears in many public opinion polls; they indicate that a sharp downturn in public confidence in a wide variety of institutions began in the mid-1960s and continues to the present. Political scientist Jack Citrin of the University of California, writing in 1974, foreshadowed a point to be reiterated five years later by Jimmy Carter, then still unknown: "The current decline in trust in government and the public's seeming loss of confidence in a wide range of social institutions are expressions of a pervasive sense of malaise."[1] What, then, is the evidence for this decline, and what are its characteristics?

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET is the Caroline S.G. Munroe Professor of Political Science and Sociology, senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the author of scores of books and articles on American society and politics. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This article is adapted from their new book, *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind* (The Free Press).

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The Rise and Fall of Confidence

In 1965 and 1966, Robert Lane, a political scientist at Yale University, published two articles in which he discussed public attitudes toward American social and political institutions from the late 1930s—when scientific polling began—down through the early 1960s. He found that, on a number of different indicators, Americans had become more positive about the operation of their society in general and of their political system in particular. From a relatively low point during the 1930s in the midst of the Great Depression, Americans became increasingly affirmative about their society, until by 1965 the great majority of those interviewed by various pollsters were giving consistently positive evaluations. Lane interpreted the growth of favorable replies as a function of increasing affluence and higher levels of education. As he noted, with the end of the Depression and continuing prosperity on the one hand, and with an increase in the proportion of the population that had completed high school or had gone on to college on the other, more and more Americans said they liked their society and believed its political system was honest, effective, and responsive.[2]

As it happened, the early 1960s turned out to be a high-water mark in the history of the American public's attitudes toward their key social, political, and economic structures. The explosion of protest against U.S. participation in the Vietnam War, as well as other conflicts stemming from the rise of militant social movements concerned with the status of women and various minority groups—blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians—apparently changed the prevailing perception that Americans had of their country. One public opinion survey after another registered a steady decline in the public's confidence in the country's institutions and in the people running them. As one major pollster, Daniel Yankelovich, noted in 1977:

> We have seen a steady rise of mistrust in our national institutions. . . . Trust in government declined dramatically from almost 80% in the late 1950s to about 33% in 1976. Confidence in business fell from approximately a 70% level in the late 60s to about 15% today. Confidence in other institutions—the press, the military, the professions—doctors and lawyers—sharply declined from the mid-60s to the mid-70s. More than 61% of the electorate believe that there is something morally wrong in the country. More than 80% of voters say they do not trust those in positions of leadership as much as they used to. In the mid-60s a one-third minority reported feeling isolated and distant from the political process; by the mid-70s a two-thirds majority felt that what they think "really doesn't count." Approximately three out of five people feel the government suffers from a concentration of too much power in too few hands, and fewer than one out of five feel that congressional leaders can be believed. One could go on

[1] Jack Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review* 68 (1974): 987.

[2] Robert E. Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in the Age of Affluence," *American Political Science Review* 59 (1965): 874–75; and "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," *American Sociological Review* 31 (1966): 649–62.

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FIGURE 1
Confidence in Government, 1958–80


Questions asked in survey:
"Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?"
"Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?"
"How much of the time do you think you can trust government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?"
"Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?"
Percentage
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1958
1964
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
The government wastes a lot of money
Government is run for the benefit of a few big interests
There are quite a few crooks in government
You cannot trust the government to do right most of the time

Source: Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952–78* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 257–59. 1980 figures are from Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, 1980 American National Election Study (Wave C-3), distributed by Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

and on. The change is simply massive. Within a ten- to fifteen-year period, trust in institutions has plunged down and down, from an almost consensual majority, two thirds or more, to minority segments of the American public.[3]

Trends of Confidence in Government

It is not difficult to find examples of Yankelovich's generalization from a variety of poll sources. One of the most widely reported shifts has been the level of political trust expressed by the American public. The Survey Research Center (SRC)—since 1970, the Center for Political Studies (CPS)—of the University of Michigan has been asking a series of "trust in government" questions in its biennial national election surveys since 1958. The trend lines for four of these questions are shown in Figure 1. (In each case, the figures show the percentage giving the "distrusting" response.)

[3] Daniel Yankelovich, "Emerging Ethical Norms in Public and Private Life" (unpublished paper, University Seminar, Columbia University, 20 April 1977), 2–3.

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Political Trust

Trust in government changed little between 1958 and 1964. Over that six-year period, the average increase in "mistrust," as measured by the four questions in Figure 1, was 5 percent. During the subsequent six years, from 1964 to 1970, there was a virtual explosion of anti-government feeling. Mistrust on the four items increased by an average of 17 percent during this period, up 8 percent between 1964 and 1968 and another 9 percent from 1968 to 1970.

Those years were, of course, a period of intense political controversy and polarization in the United States. The 1964 presidential election was an unusually sharp ideological confrontation, with charges of extremism raised against the Republican candidate. The era of student protest began with the Free Speech Movement at the University of California at Berkeley in September 1964, followed in short order by President Johnson's decisive escalation of the Vietnam War in February 1965, the first racial disorder in Watts, California, in July 1965, and the Gulf of Tonkin crisis in August 1965. From 1964 to 1970, the percentage of Americans saying that "people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes" rose from 47 to 59; those replying that "the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves" rather than "for the benefit of all the people" increased from 29 to 50 percent; and the proportion who felt that "you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right only some of the time" or "none of the time," rather than "just about always" or "most of the time," went up from 22 to 44 percent.

However, political cynicism did not increase very much during this period on the fourth SRC political trust question. The proportion who believed that "quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked" (rather than "not very many" or "hardly any") changed only slightly, from 29 percent in 1964 to 32 percent in 1970, an increase hardly comparable to the enormous increase in cynicism measured by the other items. By 1972, the attitude that most government officials are crooked had increased a bit more, to 36 percent. As one might guess, the Watergate affair soon corrected the noticeable lag in this political trust item. By 1974, following the Watergate revelations, the proportion who felt that most government officials are crooked had risen to 45 percent. It then declined slightly to 42 percent in 1976 and 40 percent in 1978. By 1980, however, the figure had reached 47 percent, even higher than the level recorded just after Watergate.[4]

[4] There is one additional question included by the Michigan Center for Political Studies in its "political trust" series: "Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?" This item is not reported in Figure 1 because its evaluative content is less clear than that of the other four questions. Some respondents have offered the cynical reply that the people running the government "know exactly what they are doing," and it is not clear how these responses were coded in the earlier surveys. This question is the item least strongly intercorrelated with the other four in the series. However, it does show the same general trend as the others, i.e., increasing mistrust after 1964. See Arthur H. Miller, "The Institutional Focus of Political Distrust" (paper presented at the Annual

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As for the other three "distrust" attitudes, the marked increases that occurred between 1964 and 1970 were sustained by the Watergate experience. Between 1970 and 1974, the percentage of the public saying that the government wastes a lot of tax money rose from 69 to 74; those replying that the government is run for the benefit of a few big interests grew from 50 to 66 percent; and the proportion saying that the government cannot be trusted to do what is right most of the time went up from 44 to 62 percent. Most of these increases occurred between November 1972 and November 1974, the period of the Watergate revelations.

Nor did the situation improve during the Carter era. The level of distrust remained about the same in 1976 as it had been in 1974. Between 1976 and 1978, despite President Carter's election pledge that he would restore faith in government, the indicators of mistrust increased again from an average of 61 percent to an average of 63 percent. President Carter's alarm about the public's loss of confidence was justified by the fact that, by 1978, the level of mistrust had reached its highest point to date on three of the four indicators in Figure 1. The president's dire warnings, however, had no apparent effect: in the fall of 1980, every one of the four indicators showed the highest level of mistrust since the series began in 1958. These questions were eliciting a cynical response from an average of 67 percent—two out of every three Americans—just before Jimmy Carter was turned out of office.

On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that most of the increase occurred long before Jimmy Carter took office. The Michigan Center for Political Studies computes its own "Trust in Government" index, which includes the four questions from Figure 1. According to the Michigan index, trust in government fell from +42 in 1964 (i.e., a net trusting attitude) to +2 in 1970 and 1972. The drop between 1972 and 1974 was again severe, from +2 to −26 (net mistrusting). After 1974, things did not get much worse, but they did not get any better either; the Michigan index was −31 in 1976 and −33 in 1978.[5]

Political Efficacy

The Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC)/Center for Political Studies (CPS) has tracked a number of additional items related to political trust since the inception of its biennial election surveys in 1952. Several of these are described as measures of "political efficacy," or "subjective competence." These indicators relate to respondents' estimation of their own personal capacity to comprehend and influence political events. The factor differentiating these items from the pure "political trust" questions described above is that the efficacy questions

Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 31 August–3 September 1979), Figure 1, p. 6.

[5] Warren E. Miller, "Crisis of Confidence II—Misreading the Public Pulse," *Public Opinion* 2 (October/November 1979): 11.

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focus on the self. The key phrase, "people like me," recurs in the standard "agree/disagree" efficacy tests and draws attention to the strongly subjective content of these measures: "*People like me* don't have any say about what the government does"; "Voting is the only way that *people like me* can have any say about how the government runs things"; "I don't think public officials care much what *people like me* think"; "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that *a person like me* can't really understand what's going on." [Emphasis added.]

Political efficacy is strongly correlated with education. This fact was demonstrated cross-nationally in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's "Five Nation Study," and it has been confirmed in the Michigan series.[6] As the level of formal education increases, so does the sense of efficacy or subjective competence. In other words, the better educated the individual, the more likely he or she is to *disagree* with each of the four statements above. Philip Converse, for instance, has shown in an analysis of the 1966 SRC survey that the percentage agreeing with the statement, "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think," declined steadily with education. Acceptance ranged from 77 percent among those with no formal education to 68 percent among those with some grade school education, 53 percent among those who had completed grade school, 48 percent among those with some high school education, 32 percent among high school graduates, 16 percent among those with some college education, and 10 percent among college graduates.[7] Apparently education raises a person's "subjective competence" by raising his or her self-esteem.

If a sense of political efficacy is truly imparted by the educational process, then one would expect the perceived efficacy level of the population to rise as its level of formal education goes up. As the population becomes better educated, more people should feel "efficacious." Alternatively, if perceived efficacy is not developed in the educational process but is a product of the status system, then the overall level of efficacy should remain fairly constant over time, as *relative* positions in the status order and the political influence system do not change. Converse describes these two hypotheses as the "education driven" model and the "pecking order" model of efficacy. Each yields an empirical prediction: the first, that the sense of efficacy will rise with education, and the second, that efficacy will remain constant as education improves.[8]

What actually happened is not predicted by either model. The trends from 1952 to 1980 for the four efficacy items noted above, plus two others, are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 traces agreement with the three "internal efficacy" measures, as they are labeled by CPS. Figure 3 shows agreement with what CPS

[6] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 204–208, and Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse, eds., *The Human Meaning of Social Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 322–37.

[7] Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," table 2, 326.

[8] Ibid., 326–27.

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FIGURE 2
Internal and External Efficacy, 1952–80



Source: see figure 3.

calls measures of "external efficacy." In all cases, agreement with the statement is assumed to indicate a *low* sense of efficacy.

Between 1952 and 1960, the four originial efficacy measures show a slight negative trend, where declining agreement signifies an increasing sense of efficacy. The evidence over this eight-year period is consistent with the "education-driven" model. But three of the four measures reverse direction beginning in 1964. Agreement with the statements that "people like me don't have any say about what the government does," that public officials don't "care much what people like me think," and that politics and government are sometimes "so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on" all *increased* beginning in 1964; that is, the sense of political efficacy in the aggregate declined, despite rising levels of education. (The percentage of respondents who had gone to college rose from 15 percent in the 1952 survey to 22 in 1960, 25 in 1970, and 37 in 1980.) The American public's sense of political efficacy fell after 1960 for reasons apparently independent of education.

Those reasons are probably the same ones underlying the declining levels of political trust in Figure 1. In that figure, political trust fell by an average of 4 percent from 1958 to 1964 and 17 percent from 1964 to 1970. In Figures 2 and 3, the average decline in political efficacy was 3.5 percent between 1956 and

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FIGURE 3



Source: Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-78* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 259-61. 1980 figures are from Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, 1980 American National Election Study (Wave C-3), distributed by Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

1964 and 8 percent between 1964 and 1970. The political efficacy items seem to be, in Converse's terms, both "cognitive" and "affective." They involve a perception and an evaluation of both the *self* and the *system*. Thus, when respondents are offered the statement "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," their answers reflect the respondent's opinions of (a) people like themselves and (b) what the government does. It is the cognitive component that rises with education. The evaluative one is mostly a response to events and conditions. If "what the government does" seems to bear no relation to how people feel, then more and more people will agree that they have no say.

The most explicitly evaluative efficacy measure, "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think," showed the strongest increase from 1964 to 1970: 11 percent, from 36 percent agreement in 1964 to 47 percent in 1970. On the other hand, the most cognitive efficacy indicator, "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on," moved up by only 6 percent.

The fourth efficacy measure, "Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things," changed in the opposite direction from the other measures. Agreement with this "internal efficacy" indicator actually fell, from 73 percent in 1964 to 60 percent in 1970. Converse

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argues that this item "has pulled out of line rather markedly in response to phenotypic events" and should not be included with the other items in an efficacy scale.[9] More and more Americans disagreed with the view that "voting is the only way that people like me can have any say," even though their sense of political efficacy was declining according to the other indicators. This viewpoint seems to reflect the growth in more active forms of political participation, particularly protest, during the 1960s. Notably, disagreement with this item—the view that "people like me have ways other than voting of influencing what the government does"—increased much faster among better educated Americans than among the poorly educated. The "voting" indicator is an efficacy measure that focuses primarily on "inputs" (what citizens do). The other items, which relate more directly to "outputs" (what the government does, whether public officials care), all share a trend of declining trust.

That trend continued into the 1970s. Reactions to the "voting is the only way" and to the "politics is too complicated" statements did not change much between 1970 and 1980. These two measures are, as noted, the most cognitive and the least output-related items. But support for the comment "People like me don't have any say about what the government does" rose from 36 percent in 1970 to 45 percent in 1978, in tandem with acceptance of the statement that public officials "don't care much what people like me think," which increased from 47 to 51 percent over this same period. In 1980, however, the latter figure remained high at 52 percent, while the view that "people like me don't have any say. . ." declined a few points, to 39 percent, from the high figure reached in 1978.

The Michigan Center for Political Studies added two new measures of "external efficacy" beginning with their 1968 survey (see Figure 3). Both are explicitly evaluative and showed steadily increasing levels of agreement from 1968 to 1980: "Generally speaking, those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly" (53 percent agreed in 1968, 71 percent in 1980), and "Parties are only interested in people's votes, but not in their opinions" (46 percent agreed in 1968, 59 in 1980). Thus, Warren E. Miller of the Michigan CPS has argued that "internal efficacy" hardly changed during the 1970s, while "external efficacy" ("how much others—public officials, congressmen, and the political parties—care about what 'people like me think' ") has declined along with trust in government.[10]

[9] Ibid., 329. However, Warren E. Miller of the Center for Political Studies continues to include the "voting" item in his "internal efficacy" scale. See Miller, "Crisis of Confidence," 12. But William M. Mason, James S. House, and Steven S. Martin reach the same conclusion as Converse, "Dimensions of Political Alienation in America: Theoretical and Empirical" (unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, February 1981): "The voting item is 'double-barreled' in its manifest content and reflects a mixture of different dimensions of alienation. Thus it is most appropriately dropped from consideration in future work on political alienation in America" (p. 65).

[10] Warren E. Miller, "Crisis of Confidence," 12–13.

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FIGURE 4

Perceived Responsiveness of Government, 1964–80, and Citizen's Duty, 1952–80


Perceived Responsiveness Items
"Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do—a good deal, some, or not much?"
"How much do you feel that political parties help to make the government pay attention to what the people think—a good deal, some, or not much?"
"And how much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think—a good deal, some, or not much?"
"How much attention do you think most Congressmen pay to the people who elect them when they decide what to do in Congress—a good deal, some, or not much?"
Percentage "A Good Deal"
100
80
60
40
20
0
Elections
Parties
Congressmen
Government
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980

Source: see figure 5.

Perceived Responsiveness of Government

An additional battery of questions asked by CPS since 1964 also shows declining confidence in government. These, dubbed "perceived responsiveness of government" indicators by CPS, are shown in Figure 4. They deal with how responsive political institutions are seen to be to "what people think." These measures involve no self-perception and are, therefore, not cognitive in nature: "Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides to do something—a good deal, some, or not much?" The proportion saying "a good deal" declined from 32 percent in 1964 to 11 percent in 1974, while those replying "not much," increased from 24 to 28 percent. Similar trends can be observed from 1964 to 1974 in responses to questions dealing with how much "political parties help to make the government pay attention to what the people think," how much "having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think" and how much attention "most Congressmen pay . . . to the people who elect them when they decide what to do in Congress." In each case, the proportion answering "a good deal" fell by an average

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FIGURE 5


Citizen's Duty Items
"It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win." (Agree/Disagree)
"So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not." (Agree/Disagree)
"If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it." (Agree/Disagree)
"A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with." (Agree/Disagree)
Percentage Agree
100
80
60
40
20
0
Shouldn't vote if don't care
Local elections not important
Doesn't matter whether I vote
Not important to vote if party can't win
1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980

Source: Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-78* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 261-64. 1980 figures are from Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, 1980 American National Election Study (Wave C-3), distributed by Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

19 percent over the ten-year period, while the number replying "not much" rose by an average of 7 percent.

Like the trust measures, these "responsiveness" indicators remained about the same between 1974 and 1976. However, between 1976 and 1978, the data show a slight gain in the "perceived responsiveness of government" for all subjects except Congressmen. This is the best evidence that Jimmy Carter's election accomplished something in the direction of restoring confidence in government. By 1980, however, the effect had worn off and perceived responsiveness reached an all-time low on three out of the four measures in Figure 4.

Similar findings were reported by Cambridge Reports, Inc., in response to the statement: "Most politicians don't really care about people like me." Sentiment for this view increased from 56 percent in late 1974 to 63 percent in late 1975. The trend then reversed to 59 percent agreeing in 1976 and 55 percent in 1978.

Citizen's Duty

Finally, Figure 5 indicates almost no change from 1952 to 1980 in the "citizen's duty" items asked by the Center for Political Studies. The vast majority of respondents in 1980, as in 1952, rejected the views that "it isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win" (87 percent dis-

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agreed in 1952, 92 percent disagreed in 1980), "so many other people vote in the national elections, it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not" (87 percent disagreed in 1952, 91 percent disagreed in 1980), and "a good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with" (81 percent disagreed in 1952, 86 percent disagreed in 1980). The public continued to be divided over the statement, "if a person doesn't care how an election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it" (53 to 45 percent agreement in 1952, 58 to 41 percent disagreement in 1980). Thus, there is no evidence of increasing cynicism about democracy or the citizen's role in it.

Confidence in the Political System

Nor does it appear that the public has lost its basic confidence in the American political system. In the 1976 CPS survey, several questions dealt with the basic soundness of our political system, as distinct from attitudes about political leaders and public officials. Where trust in the latter two remained quite low (see Figure 1), belief in the soundness of the political system was very high. For instance, respondents were offered a choice between two statements: "I am proud of many things about our form of government," or "I can't find much in our form of government to be proud of." Over three quarters (76 percent) said that they were proud of our form of government, while 19 percent chose the negative response. To be sure, these answers were slightly more negative than they had been in 1972, where CPS asked the question for the first time. In 1972, this question was put to respondents in the pre-election wave of interviewing; the first option (". . . proud of many things. . .") was chosen over the second (". . . can't find much . . . to be proud of") by 82 to 15 percent. The choice was presented to most of the same interviewees again in the post-election wave, and the margin was about the same (83 to 13 percent). Since the 1972–76 period included the Watergate scandals, it is not altogether surprising that the number of Americans who said they could not find much in our form of government to be proud of had grown by a few points. But they were still outnumbered four to one by those who said they were proud of many things about our system.

A question asked by the Roper organization revealed a positive trend in attitudes toward the political system during the 1970s. In June 1974, at the peak of the Watergate controversy, Roper asked respondents to select one of four characterizations of "our political system": "basically sound and essentially good," "basically sound but needs *some* improvement," "not too sound, needs *many* improvements," or "basically *un*sound, needs fundamental overhauling." Fifty percent said that our political system is "basically sound" (8 percent "basically sound and essentially good" and 42 percent "basically sound but needs some improvment"). Roper repeated the question in February 1977. In the latter poll, the proportion saying that our political system is "basically sound" had grown by fully twenty points, to 70 percent (13 percent "basically sound and essentially good," 57 percent "basically sound but needs some improvement"). Those replying that the political system is "not too sound, needs many improve-

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ments" fell from 28 to 20 percent between 1974 and 1977, while the proportion choosing the most negative response, "basically unsound, needs fundamental overhauling," declined sharply, from 19 to 7 percent. February 1977 was the first month of Jimmy Carter's presidency, and the effect of his election appeared to show up in the replies to this question as well as to the other items reported above. The new president alleviated the intensity of Watergate-induced cynicism.

The four years of the Carter administration and the election of Ronald Reagan had little effect on these attitudes. If anything, positive feelings declined slightly. When Roper presented the same question to a national cross section in February 1981, 67 percent replied "basically good," (14 percent "basically sound and essentially good" and 53 percent "basically sound but needs some improvement"). The percentage who felt that the political system is "not too sound" was 20, of whom 8 percent chose the "basically unsound" response. Seemingly, neither the Carter "malaise" nor the promises associated with a new president affected the public's assessment of the "soundness" of the political system. In any case, that assessment remained relatively high.

The 1976 CPS survey also included the following query: "Some people believe a change in our whole form of government is needed to solve the problems facing our country, while others feel no real change is necessary. Do you think a big change is needed in our form of government, or should it be kept pretty much as it is?" About one quarter of the respondents (24 percent) said that we need a "big change" in our system of government, while an additional quarter (26 percent) replied that we need "*some* change" (the latter response was coded on the original questionnaire forms, presumably as a volunteered answer). Almost half (44 percent) felt that the system should be kept pretty much as it is.

The 50 percent of the sample who said that at least some changes were needed was then asked, "What kinds of changes in our form of government are you thinking of?" The answers most frequently given were criticisms of government waste and inefficiency ("let's streamline the system," "run government like a business," "too much spending," etc., mentioned by 11 percent of those who wanted a change); changes in the types of people involved in politics ("need more blacks in politics," "get different people in," etc., indicated by 4 percent); and criticisms of present-day politicians as untrustworthy and insincere (made by 4 percent). Thus, the reforms in the "system" that critics wanted were mostly changes in leadership and in the way the system is run, not changes in the underlying institutional structure. It appears that the trend of declining trust in government is focused on the performance of government and the behavior of public officials, and not on the system itself or the institutions and norms associated with it.

Confidence in Business: Trends

What was happening to attitudes toward business as trust in government was declining? Were government and business perceived by the public as naturally

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opposed forces, so that as faith in the one declined, confidence in the other went up? Or did they both share the general trend of declining trust in institutional leadership?

One polling organization, the Opinion Research Corporation (ORC), has been tracing attitudes toward business for about as long as the Michigan CPS has been dealing with trust in government, that is, since the late 1950s. ORC has administered a battery of six questions concerning large companies every two years since 1959. No other series of questions about business has been asked so regularly over such a long period of time. Two of the statements in the ORC series are worded favorably to business and four are worded unfavorably. Figure 6 shows the trends in the percentages agreeing with each statement.

The trend lines indicate that there was no significant increase in anti-business sentiment in the early 1960s. Indeed, there is evidence of a slightly pro-business trend between 1959 and 1965, as agreement with the two positive statements rose: "Large companies are essential for the nation's growth and expansion" (from 60 percent in 1959 to 67 percent in 1965), and "the profits of large companies help make things better for everyone who buys their products or services" (from 82 percent in 1959 to 88 percent in 1965). The period 1961 to 1965 also witnessed a slight decrease in the expression of anti-business sentiment on the four negative indicators.

The period from 1965 to 1975, however, was one of enormous growth in anti-business feeling. Every biennial ORC survey during this period saw a significant increase in the percentage of the public agreeing with each of the anti-business statements. By 1973, a majority of the public had come to feel that "for the good of the country, many of our largest companies ought to be broken up into smaller companies." And, in 1975, about 80 percent agreed with statements that "in many of our largest industries, one or two companies have too much control of the industry," "as they grow bigger, companies usually get cold and impersonal in their relations with people," and "there's too much power concentrated in the hands of a few large companies for the good of the nation." In 1965, by contrast, these same statements met with agreement from only 52–58 percent of the public. The two positive statements about business showed a corresponding trend of declining agreement. This was particularly true in the case of the statement that "the profits of large companies help make things better for everyone," where agreement fell from 67 percent in 1965 to 41 percent in 1975.

The year 1977 saw a bit of relief from the post-1965 anti-business trend. For the first time in ten years, i.e., in five sequential polls, the percentages expressing anti-business attitudes declined, albeit only slightly (about 5 percent). Other survey questions about business, for which the trend lines do not go back as far as those in Figure 6, also reveal a positive shift around 1977; the evidence on these questions will be considered below. This modest recovery appears to parallel the slight improvement in sentiments about governments in 1977, the first year of Jimmy Carter's presidency, as documented above. But as the 1979 ORC data reveal, the recovery did not persist. The slight inceases in public support

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FIGURE 6
Attitudes Toward Business, 1959–81



Source: Opinion Research Corporation.

for business between 1975 and 1977 were reversed in 1979, and in most cases attitudes were more negative than they had been in 1975.

Ronald Reagan's first half-year in office was associated with a second improvement in attitudes toward business, but the recovery in 1981 was even more modest than in 1977, an average decline in anti-business sentiment of 3 percent. Thus, the view that "the profits of large companies help make things better for everyone" gained 2 percent support between 1975 and 1977, lost 6 percent between 1977 and 1979, and then regained 2 percent in 1981. Backing for the opinion that "there's too much power concentrated in the hands of a few large companies for the good of the nation" went down 6 percent from 1975 to 1977, moved up 8 percent between 1977 and 1979, and subsequently fell off 3 percent in 1981.

Comparison of Anti-Business and Anti-Government Sentiment

With the data that are available, it is possible to compare anti-business and anti-government trends. An index of anti-government sentiment was calculated by taking the average percentage expressing such attitudes on the four SRC/CPS questions shown in Figure 1. (These four trust-in-government questions were asked by SRC/CPS in 1958, 1964, 1968, and in every even-numbered—i.e., federal election—year thereafter.) An index of anti-business feeling was developed by taking the average anti-business percentage for the six ORC items in Figure 6. For the two items expressing views favorable to business, the percentage disagreeing was used. For the four negative statements, the anti-business

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FIGURE 7
Average Trends in Anti-Business and Anti-Government Sentiment, 1958–81



Source: Anti-Business Sentiment: Mean, Six Items (ORC, Odd Years).
Anti-Government Sentiment: Mean, Four Items (SRC/CPS, Even Years).

response was to agree. (The ORC questions were asked every two years, in odd-numbered years, from 1959 through 1981.) The resulting trends are shown in figure 7.

This figure illustrates how anti-business and anti-government sentiment have been rising together for fifteen years. Massive increases in hostility toward both institutions began to appear in the 1960s. As indicated earlier, anti-government sentiment rose sharply between 1964 and 1970 and then moved up slightly in 1972. The Watergate period witnessed another burst of hostility between 1972 and 1974. The anti-government trend leveled off in 1976, then rose a bit in 1978 and quite a bit more in 1980, to reach an all-time high of 67 percent.

Anti-business sentiment in Figure 7 tends to lag just behind anti-government sentiment. Attitudes toward business were, as noted, improving slightly until 1965. They fell a bit in 1967 and then became substantially worse after that. Anti-government feeling reached 62 percent in 1974, the year of Watergate; anti-business feeling peaked a year later, in 1975, during the mid-decade recession. The leveling-off of antipathy to government in 1976 was matched by a modest recovery in attitudes toward business in 1977. Both effects quickly wore off in 1979 and 1980, as inflation intensified. In 1979, anti-business sentiment was at its highest level since 1959. And in 1980, anti-government feeling was higher than at any time since 1958. Antagonism to business, however, fell off slightly in 1981.

Overall, anti-government sentiment climbed from an index number of 28 per-

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cent in 1958 to 67 in 1980. That represents a 139 percent rate of increase over twenty-two years. The rise in anti-business feeling was less severe, from an index number of 39 percent in 1959 to 58 percent in 1981, a 49 percent rate of growth over twenty-two years. The notable parallelism in the two trends suggests that feelings about business and government may have been part of the same syndrome, an apparently broad loss of confidence in the leadership of our major political and economic institutions.

Attitudes Toward Industries and Firms

Further evidence of the generality of the decline may be found in the shift in attitudes toward many specific industries and major firms. Historically, levels of public confidence have tended to differ considerably from industry to industry and from firm to firm; but the trends in support over the last two decades have moved in tandem with the larger changes in the public mood that have just been examined.

The best evidence of this comes again from the Opinion Research Corporation, which has been doing regular polls on corporate and industry reputations for over twenty years. The biennial ORC studies have been probing company reputations since 1957 and industry images since 1965. The eleventh survey, taken in 1977, included data on thirty-two industries and sixty-nine companies. Respondents were first given a pack of cards with names of industries on them (aerospace, airline, aluminum, automobile, etc.). The interviewers then made the following request:

> You probably know some of these industries better than others. Would you sort them on this card according to how well you feel you know each industry. In making your choice, take into account any of the ways you may have learned or heard about the industry.

The alternatives included "know very well," "know a fair amount," "know just a little," and "know almost nothing." A second request was then made of the respondents:

> Now I'd like to know how favorable or unfavorable your opinions or impressions are of each industry. Would you please sort the cards here according to your overall impression of each industry. Take into account any of the things you think are important. Keep in mind we want your overall opinion.

Responses were coded "very" or "mostly" favorable, "very" or "mostly" unfavorable, "half and half," or "no opinion."

Finally, the same two requests were made about the considerably larger group of companies: how familiar the respondent was with each company, and whether respondents felt favorable or unfavorable, on the whole, toward each one. The only difference between the company and the industry inquiries was that the response, "never heard of the company," was allowed, and those totally

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FIGURE 8

Industry and Company Familiarity and Favorability Ratings

Average Familiarity and Favorability Ratings: 8 Industries and 22 Companies, 1959-77*

Familiarity question:

"You probably know some of these (industries/companies) better than others. Would you sort them on this card according to how well you feel you know each (industry/company). In making your choice, take into account any of the ways you may have learned or heard about the (industry/company)." (Know very well/know a fair amount/know just a little/know almost nothing) Familiar = "Know very well" + "Know fairly well"

Favorability question:

"Now I'd like to know how favorable or unfavorable your opinions or impressions are of each (industry/company). Would you please sort the cards here according to your overall impression of each (industry/company). Take into account any of the things you think are important. Keep in mind we want your overall opinion." (Very favorable/mostly favorable/half and half/ mostly unfavorable/ very unfavorable) Favorable = "Very favorable" + "mostly favorable"



*Industries: Aluminum, Automobile, Chemical, Electrical Equipment and Appliances, Food and Food Products, Oil and Gasoline, Steel, and Tire and Rubber. Companies: Amoco, Dow, du Pont, Eastman Kodak, Exxon, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, Goodyear, Gulf, IBM, Mobil, Monsanto, RCA, Reynolds, Sears, Shell, Texaco, Union Carbide, U.S. Steel, and Westinghouse.

Source: Opinion Research Corporation.

unfamiliar with a company were not asked their favorability toward it. The results are shown in Figures 8, 9, and 10.

Eight industries were included in virtually every ORC poll from 1965 to 1977: aluminum, automobile, chemical, electrical equipment and appliances, food and food products, oil and gasoline, steel, and tire and rubber. Similarly, ORC has inquired about twenty-two companies on a regular basis from 1959 to 1977, including the following major national firms: Alcoa, American Telephone and Telegraph, Amoco, Dow Chemical, du Pont, Exxon, Ford, General Motors, IBM, Mobil, Sears, Shell, Texaco, and Union Carbide.

Figure 8 shows the average familiarity with and favorability toward these eight industries and twenty-two companies in each survey. The most striking impression from this figure is the sharp decline in popularity of both industries and companies after 1965. Average favorability toward the eight industries fell from

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FIGURE 9

Industry Favorability Ratings, 1965-77



Source: Opinion Research Corporation.

68 percent "very" or "mostly" favorable in 1965, to 62 percent favorable in 1967, 59 percent in 1969, then a steep decline to 46 percent favorable in 1971 and 35.5 percent in 1977. Fully one-third of the public, or half of those favorable to these industries in 1965, had lost confidence by 1977.

Since sentiment toward companies can be traced back further, to 1959, the timing of the loss of confidence in them can be more precisely specified. Approval of the twenty-two companies referred to above remained high for the first four biennial surveys: 69 percent "favorable" in 1959, 70 percent in 1961, 70 percent in 1963, and a high of 73.5 percent in 1965. The decline began after 1965: 70.5 percent positively inclined in 1967, 69.5 percent in 1969, 59.5 percent in 1971 (a drop of ten points), 58 percent in 1973, 48 percent in 1975 (another ten-point decline), and then a slight increase to 50 percent favorable in 1977.

Thus, a significant loss of faith in industries and companies took place between 1965 and 1975—precisely the same years when anti-business attitudes, as shown in Figure 6, and political distrust, as shown in Figure 1, were increasing most rapidly. The collapse of confidence in business appears to have been quite broad; it applied to business in general and to every major part of the business community.

The familiarity trends in Figure 8 show a surprising decline between 1965 and 1971 in the percentages of the public who claimed to know the average industry and company "very well" or "a fair amount." It suggests that familiarity is partly a "confidence" measure. The decreasing sense of acquaintanceship on the part

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FIGURE 10

Company Favorability Ratings, 1959-77



Source: Opinion Research Corporation.

of the public may indicate an increasing sense of remoteness from business and industry. Knowing little or nothing about a firm or industry may be a result of increasing disfavor, not a cause of it.

It is no accident that the trend line showing average favorability toward companies in Figure 8 is always higher than the line showing average positive feeling toward industries. The public tends to be more sympathetic toward specific firms than toward industries as a whole, as Figures 9 and 10 show. Thus, in 1977, 25 percent of the public felt positively toward the oil industry. But 39 percent expressed positive attitudes toward Amoco, 40 percent toward Texaco, 41 toward Exxon, 42 toward Shell Oil, and 43 toward Mobil and Gulf. The favorability rating of the automobile industry was 37 percent in 1977. But over half of the public, 53 percent, had a positive impression of General Motors and 54 percent felt the same way about the Ford Motor Company. The electrical appliance industry won a 41 percent favorability rating; the comparable figures for General Electric and Westinghouse were 63 and 61 percent, respectively. Thirty-nine percent of the public were positive about the aluminum industry, but 47 percent liked Alcoa and 52 percent approved of Reynolds. The chemical industry was near the bottom of the popularity list in 1977, with 25 percent favorable; but the figures for Dow Chemical (45 percent), Monsanto (49), and du Pont (51) were about twice as high.

Since almost every one of these companies had been heard of by over 90 percent of the public in 1977, the difference in these reactions is not likely to have been caused by the exclusion from the favorability ratings of those who had

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never heard of the companies. These figures testify to the generality of the confidence phenomenon. It does not seem that negative experiences with specific companies have produced bad feelings about entire industries and about business in general. Such a causal ordering would require that favorability be lowest in the case of specific firms; that is clearly not the case. Instead, the more general the category, the lower the level of approval.

Although specific companies tended to be more popular than their respective industries, the fall-off in support over the period studied was still universal. Texaco, Shell, Exxon, Amoco, and Sunoco all went down 20–30 percent in the favorability ratings between 1967 and 1977. General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler lost 15–25 points. General Foods, Quaker Oats, Campbell's Soup, and Kellogg's declined 12–20 percent. Such familiar trade names as IBM, Xerox, Westinghouse, and General Electric fell by 15–22 percent. Such less familiar ones as Allied Chemical, Monsanto, and Union Carbide also lost favor, by 15, 10, and 17 percent, respectively. Even "Ma Bell," AT&T, saw its positive rating drop by 31 points between 1967 and 1977, while its minor competitor, General Telephone, also went down in public esteem by 24 percent. The company that usually was the most highly regarded firm on the list—Sears, Roebuck—fell from 81 percent favorable in 1965 to 72 percent favorable in 1977. Not a single industry out of twenty-five and not a single firm out of fifty actually improved its public reputation between the late 1960s and the late 1970s.

Attitudes Toward Labor Unions

There is some evidence to indicate that labor also shared in these trends. Unfortunately, no survey organization has regularly asked a large battery of questions concerning the labor movement comparable to those asked about government and business over the past twenty years. Four polls, those of Gallup, Harris, National Opinion Research Center, and Opinion Research Corporation, have inquired from time to time about approval or disapproval of labor unions and about confidence in labor leaders. These surveys show a by-now familiar drop-off in support after 1965. The Gallup question is: "In general, do you approve or disapprove of labor unions." Approval declined continually from 71 percent in 1965 to 55 percent in 1981, while the proportion disapproving rose from 19 to 35 percent. Those expressing "a great deal of confidence" in the leaders of organized labor in twenty-four Harris and NORC surveys taken between 1966 and 1981 fell from 22 percent in 1966 to 12 percent in 1981. On the average, labor leaders ranked lower in the Harris—NORC surveys than leaders of all the other major institutions.

Conclusion

The evidence examined so far reveals a sharp decline of public faith in government, business, and labor since the mid-1960s. The marked parallelism of the

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confidence trends indicates that the loss of faith occurred most rapidly between 1964 and 1975 and that it applied very broadly to all three institutions and their leaders. Nor has the situation improved significantly since 1975. The business recovery and the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976–77 seemed to lift public spirits a bit, but only temporarily. Negative feelings resumed at the end of the decade as hyperinflation set in. By 1981, anti-government, anti-business, and anti-labor sentiment had all reached record high levels and most polls taken during the ensuing economic recession indicated a continuation of the trend.

National surveys conducted between 1981 and 1983 measuring confidence in institutions have produced contradictory results, although they all agree that confidence has remained low. Harris and National Opinion Research Center (NORC) polls reported a continuing decline, while one taken by the Center for Political Studies (CPS) indicated an upswing. Responding to five questions designed to measure alienation from the society and polity, Harris reported as of February 1983 that "a record high 62 percent of Americans have expressed sad and bitter alienation toward those running the society and feel powerless to do anything about it."[11] Similarly, confidence in the leadership of ten major institutions, both public and private, surveyed by Harris since 1966 and by NORC since 1973 using the same format, reached all-time lows in surveys taken by Harris in late October and early November 1982 and by NORC in February to April 1983. The average level dropped by two percentage points in Harris between the fall of 1981 and 1982, and by the same percentage in NORC between the spring of 1982 and 1983.[12] The proportions expressing "A great deal of confidence" in "the executive branch of the federal government," fell much more than the average in both polls, down from 24 percent in 1981 to 16 percent in 1982 in Harris and from 19 percent in 1982 to 13 percent in 1983 in NORC.

These results are countered, however, by a poll taken by CPS in November 1982. In response to four questions designed to measure confidence in government, the Michigan pollsters found an increase in trust in government, which, with the exception of blacks, "occurred equally across most demographic groups."[13] It is difficult to explain the variations in the findings between Harris and NORC and CPS other than the fact that they asked differently worded questions and that CPS focused on evaluations of the way the federal government operates, while the others dealt with confidence in institutions or the way respondents felt themselves treated by society. Still, it should be noted that the

[11] Louis Harris, "Alienation Rises to Record Highs," *The Harris Survey*, 17 March 1983, 1. For a full text of the Harris questions and a discussion of the earlier results, see S. M. Lipset and William Schneider, *The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor and Government* (New York: Free Press, 1983), 110–11.

[12] For a review and analysis of the studies of confidence studied by Harris, NORC, and other polls, see Lipset and Schneider, *The Confidence Gap,* 13–96. See also Louis Harris, "Public Confidence in Institutions is Down," *The Harris Survey*, 25 November 1982, 1–3.

[13] Arthur Miller, "Is Confidence Rebounding?" *Public Opinion* 6 (June/July 1983):17.

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proportion giving cynical responses compared to trusting ones in the 1982 CPS survey remained lower than that found in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Those expressing cynicism about government continued to far outnumber those voicing trust, by an average of 24 percent, compared to 10 percent in 1972.

Public criticism appears to be directed at the performance of these institutions and their leaders: their competence, trustworthiness, and integrity. There is no evidence of any serious downturn in people's evaluation of their own political competence ("internal efficacy") or any loss of faith in the structure and norms of the political system as a whole ("civic duty," confidence in the political system). The business data suggest that people's hostility is directed at the performance of institutions generally (large companies and industries) rather than specific companies and firms. Thus, the decline of confidence appears to be general in nature but not fundamental or systemic: the system is good, but it is not performing well because the people in charge are inept and untrustworthy.

What, if anything, can be done to improve confidence in government? Americans have not turned against the political system itself. They still see it as fundamentally good. The problem in their eyes lies in inadequate, inept, and even corrupt leadership. Such sentiments suggest that any effort to change the low level of confidence in government must focus not on changing public attitudes, as President Carter proposed in his July 1979 speech, but on making government more responsive and effective in dealing with the key problems of society. As Arthur Miller has pointed out:

> Current distrust of authorities and institutions does not necessarily mean that citizens want a change in the basic democratic form of government. On the contrary, their discontent means that government is perceived as functioning in a manner which deviates from their normative expectations of honesty, competence, efficiency, equity and responsiveness.[14]

In other words, the problem is not primarily attitudinal. It is essentially substantive. More intelligent and skillful leadership and more effective government are necessary before confidence in government can be restored. The problem is, they may not be sufficient. That is because a number of important interests in our society have a stake in maintaining public doubts about government. These interests include the press and especially the broadcast media, which have found that "bad news" is more effective than "good news" in competing for the attention of the mass audience. Politicians may also try to foster a defeatist attitude as a form of self-justification: "I haven't done particularly well in solving the nation's problems because they are complex and beyond the control of *any* political leader." Finally, if the ideological polarization of our two major parties continues—Democrats to the left, Republicans to the right—they will be less and less likely to find areas of consensus, to agree on solutions, or to accept each other's apparent successes.

[14] Arthur Miller, "Institutional Focus of Political Distrust," 47.

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Even if things do get better, we are saying, the political system has developed certain inhibitions against spreading the news that it is really so; indeed, certain groups may have an incentive to sustain the belief that things are worse than they really are. As Warren Miller has put it: "The continuing sense of malaise may also flow from the rather pervasive mood of concern, if not pessimism, that has been consistently conveyed both by the elected leaders and by the articulate, self-selected activists and spokespersons for various causes over recent years."[15] Thus, in order for the trends in political confidence to reverse, things will not just have to get better; they will have to get better in such a clear and palpable way that the public will pay no attention to the inevitable voices of cynicism and disbelief.

[15] Warren Miller, "Crisis of Confidence," 60.

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Economic Advice to the President: From Eisenhower to Reagan

ROGER B. PORTER

Economic advice to the president over the last thirty years has varied widely, reflecting the decision-making styles of the president and his leading administration officials. Any brief survey can, at best, only suggest broad characteristics and trends. A comprehensive study, rich in the details of economic policymaking over the past seven administrations, awaits presidential scholars and economic historians.

A description and assessment of the substantive economic policy advice provided the president and its contribution to the decisions presidents ultimately have made are also beyond the scope of this article. The purpose of this article is two-fold: first, to review the development of three entities or types of institutional arrangements that have characterized economic policy advice to the president over the past thirty years; and second, to discuss three organizational issues concerning the president and economic policy decision-making.

This article draws from scores of interviews conducted over the past four years with senior economic policy officials in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations and from research in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries.[1] Its focus is on structural arrangements for providing economic policy advice to the president. It necessarily includes only brief summaries of each administration.

[1] The list of interviewees includes Arthur Burns, Walter Heller, the late Arthur Okun, Alan Greenspan, Paul McCracken, William Simon, John Connally, and Herbert Stein. These interviews were conducted over the period from 1977 to 1981.

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The concentration here on structural arrangements should not obscure the fact that all advice ultimately comes from people, not institutions. The positions officials hold have a certain legitimacy attached to them and provide a foundation on which to build. Likewise, decision-making processes and institutional arrangements influence the access of policymakers and the opportunities available to them. But in the end, individual competence, personality, and prior relationships also weigh heavily in the balance. Individual effort, excellence, and entrepreneurship are as important as systems and structure.

The Council of Economic Advisers

The Employment Act of 1946 created a three-member Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to advise the president, and a newly created Joint Economic Committee of Congress, on economic policy matters.[2] President Truman did not request creation of the council, and it rates only passing mention in one of his two-volume memoirs.[3] The three members were equal in authority over the council's operations and over a small professional staff.

Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953 reconstituted the Council, establishing the chairman as preeminent.[4] Responsibility for employing staff, specialists, and consultants was transferred from the Council to the chairman, as was the formal function of reporting to the president on the Council's views and activities.[5]

There was a modest increase in the size of the Council staff under Walter Heller at the onset of the Kennedy administration, but the characteristics and functions of the CEA have remained remarkably constant. The three council members and the staff of twelve to twenty professionals are drawn dispropor-

[2] Employment Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 23), Section 4.

[3] Harry S Truman, *Year of Decisions* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 493–94. The council is not mentioned in the second volume of his memoirs, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956). The relatively modest role of the council during its early years is reflected in the sparse references to its activities found in the major works to date on the Truman years. See Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S Truman* (Berkeley, Calif.: Berkeley Publishing Corporation, 1973); Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Bert Cochran, *Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973), 193, 216; Cabell Phillips, *The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession* (London: MacMillan Co., 1966); Margaret Truman, *Harry S Truman* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1973), 308, 449, 451; Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945–1948* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1977), 170, 339–41.

[4] Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953, (67 Stat. 644). See also Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 9 of 1953 Concerning the Council of Economic Advisers, June 1, 1953, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), 355–359. The chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers is an Executive Level II official. The other two members of the council are Executive Level IV officials.

[5] The position of vice chairman of the council was abolished.

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tionately from academia. There is a high turnover among staff members. Most remain with the council no more than two years.[6] This high turnover rate limits the institutional memory of the staff. However, many of the Council members previously served as a junior or senior economist on the staff. Arthur Okun, for example, was successively a senior staff member, a council member, and finally chairman of the Council. Of the thirteen CEA chairmen, eight previously served with the Council in some capacity before their appointment as Chairman.[7] Party affiliation has had little influence in the selection of the staff. The Council has been extremely successful in attracting well-trained and highly motivated professional staff.

The CEA has avoided assuming operational responsibilities and instead has served exclusively as a staff arm to the president. While its members regularly testify before the Joint Economic Committee and other congressional committees, it is clearly the servant of the chief executive and not of the Congress. It has had three principal functions. First, it forecasts trends and the future pattern of overall economic activity. Second, it provides an economic analysis of issues for the president. (In the past two decades, microeconomic issues have consumed more and more of the CEA staff time and the staff has become somewhat more specialized.) Finally, it prepares an annual economic report to the Congress.[8]

Presidents have sought the advice of the CEA with varying frequency over the post-World War II period. While the principal function of the CEA has been expert analysis, it has, from time to time, served as a coordinator of views for the president. In almost every administration, the CEA has participated in many, and has chaired some, interagency committees. But the CEA was not originally intended or designed to serve as a coordinator or broker. Executive departments and agencies view the CEA as an advocate, not as a broker. It is viewed not as an advocate for a constituency, such as farmers or labor unions, but as an advocate for the view of professional economists—it usually favors markets and opposes subsidies. It has no "constituency"; rather, it has a "client," the president. This is true for both Democratic and Republican administrations. In interagency dicussions, CEA members take positions and press for particular policies as avidly as other department or agency representatives.

[6] See the Annual Report to the President on the Activities of the Council of Economic Advisers published with the *Economic Report of the President* that is transmitted to the Congress each January in accordance with the Employment Act of 1946.

[7] Leon Keyserling, Raymond Saulnier, Gardner Ackley, Arthur Okun, Paul McCracken, and Herbert Stein had all served as council members before their designation as chairmen. Charles Schultze and Murray Weidenbaum had previously served as staff members at the council and had held significant posts elsewhere in the executive branch as director of the Bureau of the Budget and assistant secretary of the treasury for economic policy respectively.

Edwin Nourse was the first chairman and Arthur Burns the first Republican appointee. Only Walter Heller, Alan Greenspan, and Martin Feldstein were appointed chairmen without previous Council service after it had become an established entity.

[8] See Edwin G. Nourse, *Economics in the Public Service* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953), 107.

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There is general agreement among former CEA chairmen that the Council should stay small and avoid administrative responsibilities. They generally oppose a more active role for the CEA in coordinating or brokering. A highly qualified expert staff has served the Council well in the past and presumably will continue to do so in the future.

Interdepartmental Committees

Interdepartmental committees, councils, and groups (formal and informal) have played a central role in marshalling analysis and coordinating views on economic policy issues. Almost every president, usually early in his administration, talks of reviving the cabinet as an institution and indicates his intention to hold regular and frequent cabinet meetings.[9] Yet most presidents eventually regard the full cabinet as an unsatisfactory forum for considering major policy issues. Few problems engage either the interest or the expertise of all cabinet members. The sheer work volume and time demands suggest the wisdom of focusing their expertise rather than using the entire cabinet for serious deliberation of policy issues.

Regular participants in cabinet meetings held by the last six presidents uniformly describe them as mainly exercises in exchanging information and getting direction from the president.[10] Reports on how the administration's program is faring in the Congress, an account of the latest foreign mission of the secretary of state or the prospects for successfully concluding current negotiations with foreign countries, a description of the current state of the economy and the principles underlying the administration's economic program, are representative of the agenda items that are standard fare at cabinet meetings.

The most systematic use of the cabinet as a body occurred during the Eisenhower administration, when the cabinet met 230 times during his eight years as president (an average of nearly 29 meetings each year). This compares with 366 National Security Council meetings during the Eisenhower years.[11] Both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter indicated that they planned on weekly cabinet meetings. This fairly soon shifted to every other week and then to once every four to six weeks. Carter held 74 Cabinet meetings in his four-year presidency.[12]

[9] See Robert B. Semple, Jr., "Nixon Rules Out Agency Control by Staff Aides," *New York Times*, 14 November 1968; James Reston, "Half-Speed Ahead," *New York Times*, 15 December 1976; Dom Bonafede, "The Carter White House—The Shape Is There, But No Specifics," *National Journal* 8 (1976): 1799.

[10] Emmet John Hughes, *The Living Presidency* (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972), 335; Theodore Sorensen, *Decision Making in the White House* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 58.

[11] Minutes, Cabinet Meetings, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abiline, Kansas.

[12] Edward Walsh, "Carter's Cabinet Holds 'Emotional' Farewell Session," *Washington Post*, 4 December 1980.

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Ronald Reagan, drawing from his experience as governor of California, came to the White House committed to holding regular and frequent cabinet meetings. During the first two years of his presidency, Ronald Reagan held cabinet meetings fairly frequently. He held 27 cabinet meetings in 1981 and 20 in 1982.

During the Eisenhower years, a small cabinet secretariat was established with responsibility for the cabinet meeting agendas, papers, and minutes, and for overseeing the implementation of any decisions made.[13] While the Eisenhower administration likely generated more documents relative to cabinet meetings than most administrations, one does not get the feeling from reading the papers and minutes that full cabinet meetings were where the most important decisions were made. Options were not seriously discussed. The papers prepared were more for informational purposes than to help structure a debate. Cabinet meetings were occasions for setting a general tone—conveying what was going on, what the general philosophy on budget matters was, and so on.

The cabinet itself has generally not had committees under the direction of a cabinet secretariat or cabinet office. In the Reagan White House, the Office of Cabinet Administration (which, along with the Office of Policy Development, coordinates the activities of the cabinet councils), is an exception to this pattern. Most presidents have established various independently operating cabinet-level committees and councils. Some councils have been created by statute (the National Security Council, the Energy Resources Council, and the Council on International Economic Policy);[14] others by executive order (the Economic Policy Board);[15] others by presidential memorandum (the Council on Economic Policy, the Agricultural Policy Committee);[16] or letter (the Council on Foreign

[13] Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., *The President's Cabinet: Issues and Answers*, Special Publication, American Society for Public Administration, May 1976, 106–11; Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower As Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 113–124.

[14] The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496; 50 U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). The Energy Resources Council was established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1241; 42 U.S.C. 5818). The Council on International Economic Policy was established by statute in the International Economic Policy Act of 1972 (86 Stat. 646). This statutorily authorized the council, which had been created by presidential memorandum the previous year. See Memorandum Establishing the Council on International Economic Policy. January 19, 1971, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 41.

[15] The President's Economic Policy Board was established by Executive Order 11808 on 30 September 1974. See *Public Papers of the Presidents: Gerald R. Ford, 1974* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 207.

[16] The Council on Economic Policy was established by presidential memorandum on 2 February 1973. The Agricultural Policy Committee was established by presidential memorandum on 11 March 1976. See *Public Papers of the Presidents, Gerald R. Ford, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), 606.

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Economic Policy);[17] or by mention in a presidential message (the Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability).[18]

The evolution of councils and committees dealing with economic policy issues reveals some interesting patterns. Early in his administration, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at the urging of Arthur Burns, created the Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability (ABEGS) as "essentially a committee advisory to the Council." It was designed as "a forum at which thinking on economic policy of the various departments and agencies . . . [could] be compared and coordinated."[19] It originally consisted of eight cabinet-level departments and agencies and was subsequently expanded to ten.

A year and a half later, ABEGS was joined by another high-level interagency body, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP), which also met regularly to discuss and coordinate foreign economic policy issues. These two bodies remained active for the remainder of both Eisenhower administrations. They were supplemented by many other committees—such as the Cabinet Committee on Small Business, the Trade Policy Committee, the Committee for the Rural Development Program, the Committee on Government Activities Affecting Prices and Costs, the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth (chaired by the vice president), the President's Special Committee on Financial Policies for Post-attack Operations, and the Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Federal Urban Area Assistance Programs—to name just a few.

John F. Kennedy, who considered the Eisenhower decision-making process too highly structured, not only quickly dismantled the National Security Council apparatus, but also abolished ABEGS and the Council on Foreign Economic Policy. In their places he encouraged less formal arrangements. Several new committees were created in 1961 to deal with specific economic problems. These ranged from an ad hoc committee on housing credit to a White House committee on small business; from an advisory committee on labor-management policy

[17] The Council on Foreign Economic Policy was established by a letter from President Eisenhower to Joseph M. Dodge, 11 December 1954, Dodge Series, Correspondence Subseries, Box 1, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abiline, Kansas.

[18] Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953, stated: "In order to make the work of the Council of Economic Advisers more effective at the top policy level of the executive branch, I am also asking the heads of several departments and agencies, or the repesentatives they may designate, to serve as an Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability, under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. . . . It is contemplated that the Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability, supported by the existing staffs of the various departments and agencies, will meet frequently, and through its Chairman will keep me closely informed about the state of the national economy and the various measures necessary to aid in maintaining a stable prosperity." Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 9 of 1953 Concerning the Council of Economic Advisers, June 1, 1953, *Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, 358.

[19] *Economic Report of the President, 1954* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), 122.

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to "new machinery for interagency cooperation in formulating fiscal estimates and policies"—later referred to as the "Troika," consisting of the chairman of the CEA, the secretary of the treasury, and the director of the budget bureau.[20] An Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy and informal arrangements under the direction of Carl Kaysen, deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs, handled most foreign economic policy issues other than monetary affairs.

On the domestic side, the Troika was joined by the broader Cabinet Committee on Economic Growth established in August 1962 and including the secretaries of the treasury, commerce, and labor, the budget bureau director, and the chairman of the CEA.[21] In June 1962, President Kennedy asked Douglas Dillon, his secretary of the treasury, to chair a Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments, that would consider broad policy issues and monitor overseas expenditures. The Committee originally included the secretaries of the treasury, defense, and commerce, the under secretary of state, the administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), the director of the bureau of the budget, the chairman of the council of economic advisers, and a member of the senior White House staff, initially Carl Kaysen.[22] Since the president wanted the committee to operate informally, he issued no executive order or other formal document to create it. The committee reported to the president, usually two or three times a year, on the U.S. balance of payments and the gold situation.

Under Lyndon Johnson, the relatively informal set of institutional arrangements that prevailed during the Kennedy years continued. The Troika and the "Quadriad" (the Troika plus the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) met regularly, formally preparing an economic forecast every three months that was sent to the president and personally reviewed with him if the Troika members felt some action was needed.[23] Interestingly, these were consensus memoranda hammered out so that all three members could feel comfortable signing them.

Soon after he became president, Lyndon Johnson established the Long-Run International Payments Committee (LRIPC), which prepared the U.S. position

[20] *Economic Report of the President, 1962* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), 197.

[21] Presidential memorandum on Establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Economic Growth, August 21, 1962. Presidential Office Files, Box 89A, Department of the Treasury File, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

[22] The Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments was later expanded in the spring of 1963 to include the special representative for trade negotiations, in the fall of 1965 to include the secretary of agriculture, and in November 1967 to include the secretary of transportation. See Henry H. Fowler, Memorandum for the President on the Addition of the Secretary of Transportation to the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, November 3, 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

[23] Arthur Okun, "The Formulation of National Economic Policy," *Perspectives in Defense Management* (December 1968): 9–12.

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papers for the Group of Ten discussions regarding the General Agreement to Borrow and other aspects of the international monetary system. In 1965, a group of high-level subcabinet officials from the Treasury and State Departments, the CEA, the Federal Reserve Board, and the White House staff began meeting regularly to discuss reforms of the international monetary system. The group, chaired by Frederick Demming, under secretary of the treasury for monetary affairs, was known as the Demming Group and was soon acknowledged as one of the most effective small interagency groups in Washington.

While the CFEP had served as a focal point for foreign economic policy issues in the Eisenhower administration, the National Security Council became the central focus of coordination during the Kennedy and Johnson years. A deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, first Carl Kaysen and later Francis Bator, shaped the work of the various interagency groups dealing with major foreign economic policy questions. Kaysen, then Bator, operated with an immediate staff of two professionals and became the key White House staffers on such issues as the balance of payments, trade negotiations, foreign aid, and international monetary problems. Both supplemented their own modestly sized staff by drawing on specialists in the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR), and the Departments of the Treasury and State. Both soon developed independent access to the president and worked directly with cabinet officers on many foreign economic issues.

At the end of the Johnson administration, the NSC's dominant role on foreign economic policy questions waned. The title of deputy was abolished with Bator's departure, and the job was divided between two officials. One dealt with foreign aid, the other with trade and monetary affairs. Other White House officials, the assistant secretary of state for economic affairs and the STR, played stronger roles.[24]

Richard Nixon brought to the White House a preference for formal interagency mechanisms and for increased staff capabilities at the center. He enlarged the National Security Council staff and expanded the committee structure that supported it. He also created the Urban Affairs Council, the Rural Affairs Council, and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy (established by executive order on 24 January 1969) chaired by himself and including the vice president, the secretaries of the treasury, agriculture, commerce, labor, and housing and urban development, the counselors to the president (Arthur F. Burns and Daniel Patrick Moynihan), the director of the budget bureau, the deputy under secretary of state for economic affairs, and the chairman of the

[24] For example, the key decision changing U.S. policy on trade preferences for developing countries was made through a White House assistant rather than the NSC staff. See President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, "Organization for Foreign Economic Affairs," mimeographed, 17 August 1970, Appendix C, "Some Previous Attempts to Coordinate Foreign Economic Policy," 269–271.

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CEA.[25] These committees were to serve as the principal mechanisms for shaping administration policies. In January 1971 they were joined by another cabinet-level body, the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP).

But Nixon was never very happy with this phalanx of committees and, over time, met with them less and less frequently. His appointment of John Connally in December 1970 as secretary of the treasury marked the second phase in Nixon economic policymaking. Nixon selected Connally in part because he wanted an economic "czar" to whom he felt comfortable delegating most economic policy decisions. In Connally, he found the czar he wanted. Formerly the meetings of the Troika, held roughly every other week, rotated among the offices of the three leading officials. Connally announced shortly after his arrival that henceforth they would be held at the Department of the Treasury.

Connally was succeeded as treasury secretary in the spring of 1972 by George Shultz, formerly secretary of labor and director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Shultz held the same title as Connally, but was by temperament more collegial in his approach.

In January 1973, Shultz was appointed assistant to the president for economic affairs (in addition to his Treasury portfolio) and made chairman of a cabinet-level Council on Economic Policy (CEP) designed to coordinate all economic policy decision-making.[26] While the Council formally met infrequently, Shultz personally succeeded in presiding over a process that involved most senior administration officials in issues that affected their interests.

As Shultz prepared to leave government in the spring of 1974, Nixon faced the choice of his successor. William Simon, Shultz's deputy at the Treasury and the energy czar, and Roy Ash, director of the Office of Management and Budget, were both anxious to succeed Shultz as the administration's leading economic figure. Rather than choose between them, Nixon selected Kenneth Rush, deputy secretary of state, as his counsellor for economic affairs, making him chairman of most of the interagency economic committees.

But within weeks after the appointment, Nixon had resigned and Gerald Ford had replaced the Nixon machinery with a new Economic Policy Board (EPB), chaired by the secretary of the treasury, but managed by an assistant to the president for economic affairs. It was designed to coordinate both foreign and domestic economic policy.[27]

Two overriding objectives guided the EPB's creation. First, Ford, anxious to differentiate his administration from his predecessor's, wanted visibly to enhance the role of departmental officials and reduce the public role of White

[25] Executive Order 11453, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 16.

[26] See *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon, 1973* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 3–4.

[27] For an account of the creation of the Economic Policy Board, see Roger B. Porter, *Presidential Decision Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 30–44.

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House aides. By establishing a new high-level entity chaired by the secretary of the treasury, he sent a clear signal that he intended to elevate the role of his cabinet officers. Second, the EPB replaced a plethora of specialized committees and councils with a single entity responsible for domestic and international economic policy. The board and its executive committee (the secretary of the treasury, the director of the OMB, the chairman of the CEA, the executive director of the CIEP, and the assistant to the president for economic affairs, later expanded to include the secretaries of labor, commerce, and state) soon established itself as the primary conduit for advice to the president on economic policy issues and maintained its central role throughout the Ford years.

Two and a half years later, Jimmy Carter abolished the Economic Policy Board and created an Economic Policy Group (EPG), initially cochaired by the secretary of the treasury and the chairman of the CEA. While the EPG existed throughout the Carter administration, its influence at the White House and with the president waxed and waned. Frequently, it struggled unsuccessfully with the Domestic Policy Staff for control of issues having a major impact on the economy. The EPG, with no firm White House base, was seldom a match for the relatively large Domestic Policy Staff—approximately seventy total staff members including twenty-five to thirty professionals. A regular channel and predictable pattern for handling major economic issues never emerged.

Fashioning an economic recovery program was at the top of Ronald Reagan's agenda as he took office in January 1981. During the transition period, an Economic Policy Coordinating Committee, headed by David Stockman, the OMB director-designate, was established. It included the administration's senior economic officials, as they were designated, and concentrated on developing a major series of spending and tax reduction proposals, which were initially announced on February 18 and supplemented on March 10.

From the outset, the Economic Policy Coordinating Committee (later frequently referred to as the Budget Working Group) was viewed as temporary. Stockman, and his quickly assembled OMB team, would initially have the lead, but Treasury Secretary-designate Donald Regan was promised that he would head a cabinet-level interagency council responsible for domestic and foreign economic policy that would emerge once the budget proposals were completed.

By the end of February the White House announced the creation of five cabinet councils chaired by the president with a cabinet secretary designated chairman pro tempore:[28]

Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs
(Secretary of the Treasury)
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment
(Secretary of the Interior)

[28] Statement by the Press Secretary on the Formation of the Cabinet Councils, February 26, 1981, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), 166-167.

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Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade
(Secretary of Commerce)
Cabinet Council on Food and Agriculture
(Secretary of Agriculture)
Cabinet Council on Human Resources
(Secretary of Health and Human Services)

Each council is managed by an executive secretary who is a member of the White House Office of Policy Development. The Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs (CCEA) includes the secretaries of the treasury , state, commerce, labor, and transportation, the director of OMB, the chairman of the CEA, and the U.S. Trade Representative. Other cabinet officers are invited to attend CCEA meetings when issues involving their departments' interests are under discussion.

The first two years of the CCEA's operation suggest that it has established itself as a viable entity. Its regular meetings (two to three times weekly) are attended by cabinet-level officials; it handles a steady stream of domestic and foreign economic policy issues; and it has established a phalanx of subcabinet level working groups to develop these issues for cabinet-level consideration.

The Role of Interdepartmental Committees

This brief sketch of economic policymaking arrangements in the last seven administrations highlights a number of important features regarding the role of interdepartmental committees. For example, there has been no real analog in economic policy to the National Security Council staff. The CEA, which was established at approximately the same time, is not an interdepartmental council, nor does its charter include coordinating advice to the president on economic policy issues.

Most councils or committees have not survived from administration to administration. The narrowly focused National Advisory Council on International Financial and Monetary Problems (NAC) and the informal Troika and Quadriad arrangements are exceptions.

Moreover, virtually every administration has created a number of cabinet committees to deal with specific issues. They have tended to proliferate over time for several reasons. By creating a new council or cabinet-level committee reporting directly to the president, a president may demonstrate concern and action, both to the participants and to the public. A president may establish such groups to help assuage the bruised feelings of a specific constituency. (The March 1976 creation of the Agricultural Policy Committee, chaired by the secretary of agriculture, was a symbolic action calculated to improve President Ford's sagging popularity in the farm community.) Most presidents view such groups as inexpensive ways of building political support and demonstrating some movement in addressing a problem. In addition, they are often the work of a skillful entrepreneur within an administration.

These committees have operated with little overall direction. When Gerald

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Ford succeeded Richard Nixon, he instructed William Seidman, his assistant for administration, to attend any cabinet-level meetings related to economic policy. Seidman set about trying to find out what committees existed and where they were meeting. After asking OMB and Treasury independently to prepare lists of cabinet-level committees dealing with economic policy issues, he discovered that there were more than a score of such committees.

Most of these committees have been chaired by the department or agency that has lead responsibility for the problem. The U.S. trade representative chairs the Trade Policy Committee, Treasury chairs the NAC, and OMB chairs the interagency committee on PL-480 allocations of concessionary agricultural exports to developing countries.

Few of these committees have had direct access to the president. Most have quickly become in effect subcabinet-level committees with cabinet officers not attending the meetings. The Economic Policy Board (which met 520 times at the cabinet level in two and a quarter years, averaging almost 5 meetings each week, and which President Ford used to make virtually all his economic policy decisions), was an exception to the pattern of most committees.

In the place of genuinely effective formal structures, most administrations have evolved a set of informal relationships among the leading officials. A version of the "Troika" has existed in every administration over the past quarter century. A rough division of labor between the three principal agencies has generally held. The Treasury Department has provided revenue estimates, OMB federal spending estimates, and the CEA has forecasted future patterns of economic activity.[29] For the most part, other agencies within the federal government have been, or were for many years, effectively excluded from Troika deliberations and from macroeconomic policy issues. The Departments of Labor, and Commerce, and others viewed as "constituency-oriented" by Troika members, did not play a major role. But in the 1970s this pattern began to shift as departments and agencies throughout the executive branch developed new internal capacities. The number of professional economists increased in virtually all departments. One recent senior administration official, who returned to government after more than a decade, described the change that had occurred:

> In the 1960s there were a lot of people who would have liked to get into the game but just did not have the staff. They were unsupported and when you weren't supported, you couldn't carry the issue. Nobody had a group of economists to evaluate all these issues for them. CEA had a monopoly on it along with a few people at the Treasury. What has changed today is that every agency has an economic policy and planning group and it is not easy to tear their arguments apart. CEA cannot blow people out of the water with the depth of its analysis like it could in the 1960s. Few people understood what the term "multiplier" meant in the 1960s much less were able to argue with CEA's arguments about a tax policy to stimulate the economy. When CEA said the effect of a specific tax action on investment was such-and-such there wasn't any other

[29] Okun, "National Economic Policy," 9–12.

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agency doing its own empirical work to argue with it. But now, Treasury may say, "No, it's Y." And Labor, "It's Z." The Labor Department has turned their economic policy planning group into a mini-CEA. There is no issue that they don't regard as absolutely vital.[30]

Finally, in surveying economic policymaking patterns over the past thirty years, one finds that interagency committees and groups have played a major role in organizing advice to the president on specific issues, but that most presidents have generally not relied principally on general purpose, formal entities. More frequently, presidents have relied on a trusted adviser or group of advisers settling many issues bilaterally with the interested parties. The increasing complexity of the economic policy arena and the growing interest and capability of departments and agencies to influence a wide range of economic policy issues, foreign and domestic, represent a challenge to this traditional pattern. The challenge is particularly acute for those concerned with developing a coherent and integrated administration program.

A White House Assistant for Economic Policy

The existence of senior White House aides with responsibility for economic policy has varied greatly from administration to administration. The Eisenhower White House had first Arthur Burns (before the Council of Economic Advisers was reconstituted and Burns was named as its chairman), then Gabriel Hague and Don Paarlberg. The Kennedy administration had no senior official whose principal duties were economic policy matters, although Theodore Sorensen, as White House counsel, coordinated some economic policy issues and attended the sessions of the Troika with the president. On the foreign economic policy side, Carl Kaysen coordinated several issues as McGeorge Bundy's deputy at the National Security Council. In the Johnson administration, Joseph Califano played a similar role to that Sorensen had played in the Kennedy years, and Francis Bator a similar role to that played by Kaysen.

Richard Nixon did not initially appoint a senior White House official to deal with economic policy issues, although Arthur Burns, as counselor to the president with cabinet rank, actively participated in White House economic policy discussions. In February 1970, Burns was appointed chairman of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System. It was not until January 1973 that a small White House economic policy office was established and Treasury Secretary George Shultz was given a second hat and a small West Wing outpost as assistant to the president for economic affairs. Following Shultz's departure in the spring of 1974, Kenneth Rush was appointed counsellor to the president for economic affairs and chairman of most of the major economic policy

[30] Quoted in Roger B. Porter, "Organizing Economic Advice to the President: A Modest Proposal," *American Economic Review* 72 (1982): 357.

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committees, including the Council on International Economic Policy and the Council on Economic Policy.

When Gerald Ford became president, he appointed L. William Seidman as assistant to the president for economic affairs and as executive director of the Economic Policy Board. Other than Rush's brief tenure, this was the first time that a White House economic assistant had been given responsibility for managing the process of policy development on economic issues. Hague and Paarlberg during the Eisenhower administration had responsibility for handling many day-to-day issues for the president, but they did not principally coordinate interagency processes.

Jimmy Carter made the explicit decision at the outset of his administration not to appoint a White House assistant for economic policy (a precondition for Charles Schultze accepting the CEA chairmanship). The Economic Policy Group replaced the Economic Policy Board. The secretary of the treasury and the chairman of the CEA were named cochairmen; and the executive director who was ultimately appointed had neither a White House office nor a title. Subsequently, Carter named first Robert Strauss and later Alfred Kahn as his inflation adviser and as chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability. They were not given responsibility for managing an interagency process, although they were given membership on the Economic Policy Group Steering Committee and did have reasonable access to the president.

Ronald Reagan has divided responsibility in his White House between a chief of staff, James Baker, with responsibility for overall administration and coordinating White House relations with constituencies outside the executive branch (the Congress, the press, interest groups, state and local government officials) and a counsellor to the president, Edwin Meese, with responsibility for policy development within the executive branch.

In practice, the division of labor is more apparent than real. Meese, Baker, and Michael Deaver, deputy chief of staff and a long-time Reagan confidant, are in almost constant contact and work closely as a team. (They are popularly referred to as "the Big Three" or "the Triumvirate"). The cabinet, councils, and overall policy development fall under the "Meese side" of the White House.

A somewhat different pattern has existed for dealing with foreign economic policy issues, which have frequently been treated apart from domestic economic policy problems. Joseph Dodge and Clarence Randall served as chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy during the Eisenhower administration and also simultaneously held the title of special assistant to the president. Likewise, Carl Kaysen and Francis Bator held the title of deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs while serving on the staff of the National Security Council under Bundy and Walter Rostow. Peter Peterson and Peter Flanigan also held White House staff titles while serving as executive directors of the Council on International Economic Policy. During the Carter administration, Ambassador Henry Owen managed preparations for the annual international economic summit conferences and coordinated some other foreign eco-

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nomic policy issues. He and his small staff were technically part of the larger National Security Council staff.

In summary, presidents have generally not relied heavily on White House economic policy assistants to organize the pattern of economic advice and decision-making to the same degree that they have for national security affairs or domestic affairs. Most have handled day-to-day concerns rather than overseeing a policy development process.

Developing Coherent Economic Policies

The Council of Economic Advisers has performed a valuable function for the president by introducing the viewpoints of professional economists, detached from departmental perspectives or operational responsibilities, into his deliberations concerning issues related to the economy. There is general consensus that the CEA should remain relatively modest in size (three members and fifteen to eighteen professionals), that it should continue to avoid administrative responsibilities, and that it should not have the principal responsibility for policy coordination. The review here of economic policy making patterns during the last three decades, however, raises three issues concerning the president and economic policy decision-making that merit consideration.

The first issue concerns the means for coordinating policy advice and achieving policy coherence. The president must seek to integrate policy. He wants the parts to bear some relationship to the whole since he is uniquely accountable for the comprehensiveness and coherence of his administration's policies. The aggregate of microeconomic and sectoral decisions can have a tremendous impact on the president's ability to influence the pattern of overall economic activity. Some machinery is needed to mesh macroeconomic and microeconomic concerns. There are at least four broad alternative ways of achieving such coordination and integration.

Creating A Super Department

Many countries have a Department of Economic Affairs or a Finance Ministry that combines in one what is normally performed by the U.S. Treasury Department, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers. Similarly, one of the central criticisms made by students of federal organization is that departments are too closely tied to particular constituencies and special interests. The recommended solution is creating "super departments" with comprehensive interests that will be able to resist the pleas of special interests. In 1964, the President's Task Force on Government Organization recommended creating a Department of Labor and Commerce. In 1967, the Heineman Task Force made a similar proposal. In 1970, the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization (the Ash Council) recommended that four main executive departments that handle highly interdependent economic

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matters (Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, and Transportation) be combined into a Department of Economic Affairs. Richard Nixon, in his State of the Union address on 22 January 1971, proposed a sweeping reorganization of the executive branch that called for four new super departments to join the four "inner cabinet" departments—State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice.[31]

Proponents of the large department concept point to several potential advantages. To the extent that those at the top of such departments exercise effective control of the department's activities, such a department would aid in the integration of policy. Those "who deal with common or closely related problems would work together in the same organizational framework." The department "would be given a mission broad enough so that it could set comprehensive policy directions and resolve internally the policy conflicts which are most likely to arise."[32] As the Ash Council pointed out: "The present organizational structure encourages fragmentation when comprehensive responses to social and economic problems are needed. Problems are defined to fit within the limits of organizational authority, resulting in piecemeal approaches to their solutions by separate departments and agencies."

Second, large departments would help the president provide overall direction to economic policy development. In Nixon's view: "As this single new Department joined the Treasury Department, the Council of Economic Advisers and the Federal Reserve Board in shaping economic policy, it would speak with a stronger voice and would offer a more effective, more highly integrated viewpoint than four different departments can possibly do at present."[33] Moreover, when the responsibility for realizing basic objectives is clearly focused in a specific governmental unit, that department can be held accountable for achieving them.

Finally, a large, comprehensive department could also ease the president's decision-making burden. Nixon noted: "Decisionmaking responsibility is often shifted to the Executive Office of the President because no official at the departmental level has the authority to decide the issues."[34] Thus, large departments may help in pushing some problems away from the president. As one seasoned executive office veteran remarked: "Our difficulty is that we clutch tightly to us every problem that appears on the horizon."

While there are several potential advantages—concentrating authority to resolve problems without the intervention of the president, focusing responsibility and thereby enhancing accountability, increasing the likelihood of comprehensive rather than piecemeal approaches to policy problems, and easing the decision-making burden on the president consistent with the concept of an

[31] See *Papers Relating to the President's Departmental Reorganization Program* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

[32] President's message, 25 March 1971, in ibid., 11.

[33] Ibid., 18.

[34] Ibid., 235.

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"economizing presidency"—the concept of a super economic department has several limitations.

Many who press for larger and more comprehensive executive departments do so in the belief that consolidation will undermine narrow departmental perspectives. Yet there is reason to question whether aggregating responsibilities within larger entities will produce the desired effect. Few would argue that the size and scope of the Department of Defense or the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare eliminated, or even significantly reduced, the power of special interests and specific constituencies. Aggregating functions into larger departments may transfer the resolution of certain disputes and the weighing of certain trade-offs from the White House to the office of the departmental secretary, but the competing narrow interests would still remain. Consolidations may result in fewer major decisions naturally flowing to the White House with no guarantee that the president's interests will prevail in those decisions made at the departmental level. From the president's vantage point, even large consolidated departments will have different outlooks, perspectives, and constituencies than his own. Moreover, as problems become more complex, it is increasingly difficult to concentrate authority in one place without the entity soon looking like the entire executive branch.

Designating a Super Secretary or Czar

As an alternative to the creation of a comprehensive Department of Economic Affairs, the president might either designate one cabinet official as a super secretary for economic affairs or effectively delegate responsibility for economic policy decisions to a czar.

John Connally, as Nixon's treasury secretary, had a public and private mandate from the president that extended well beyond his Treasury portfolio. Connally used this grant to dominate economic policy decision-making. As Connally explained their relationship:

> Most of the meetings that I had with the President were one-on-one. In the economic field, he made it clear that I was his chief economic adviser. Throughout my entire time there, it was a situation in which he clearly delegated the authority to me. I kept in constant contact with George Shultz, with Paul McCracken, with Arthur Burns. When we had all these meetings in Rome and London and Washington on the international monetary currency exchange rates, we were the only people who had any authority to do anything. There wasn't a finance minister in the room in any of those meetings, in my judgment, that could commit to anything. But the President had clearly said to me, "Just go ahead and do what you think you have to do." He just gave me almost unlimited authority and delegation of authority. Of course, I kept him fully informed all the way along.[35]

Later, unable to obtain favorable congressional action on his departmental

[35] John Connally, interview with the author, Cambridge, Mass., November 1979.

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reorganization proposals, President Nixon briefly instituted a system of super secretaries. Four cabinet secretaries were designated as super secretaries to have offices in the Old Executive Office Building and to coordinate the activities within jurisdictions that were similar to the four major departments proposed earlier. The experiment was short-lived. One of the super secretaries related that within three months after his designation, following a cabinet meeting the day after the resignations of H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, he was told that the concept had been scrapped.

The "czar" approach has many of the same potential advantages as the super department approach—resolving disputes without the intervention of the president, concentrating responsibilitiy and hence accountability, and clarifying the public perception of who speaks for the administration. Moreover, it may be congenial to a president who has limited interest in economic policy questions and is anxious to delegate authority to an individual.

But there are also problems. Just as it is difficult to effectively consolidate power under a super department, it is perhaps even more difficult to concentrate power in a czar. Bits and pieces of economic policy responsibility are scattered throughout the federal government because they are linked to other important governmental responsibilities. Decentralization of operating responsibilities will remain a central fact of life. This characteristic presents a formidable challenge to concentrating authority in any one set of hands. Moreover, the czar approach depends heavily on the individual selected. If such an official is to have any opportunity for success he or she must not only enjoy the confidence of the president, but must also be perceived by other department and agency heads, external groups, the press, and the Congress as having the clout and the powers of persuasion to be truly first among equals.

Thus far several difficulties have been identified with the super department and super secretary approaches. But a capacity for central oversight is badly needed. There is a need to raise issues to the presidential level when a personal decision is desirable. There is a need to assure that the president receives the views of the senior advisers whose responsibilities are most relevant to the issue.

Creating a National Economic Council Staff

One response to the frequently alleged parochialism of executive branch departments would be to create a centralized White House staff similar to the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council or the Nixon-Ehrlichman Domestic Council staffs. Such a staff would be large enough—consisting of perhaps forty or fifty professionals—that it would not only manage the flow of day-to-day communications between executive departments and the president, but would also pull the strands of a policy problem together and provide an assessment of relevant information and alternatives.

As Alexander George has pointed out, a centralized management approach sees the president as a "unitary rational decision maker, shielded from raw dis-

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agreements over policy."[36] This approach gives primary responsibility to the Executive Office of the President and to the immediate White House staff. It emphasizes careful, systematic examination of policy questions with control vested in individuals familiar with the president and his views. Executive branch departments and agencies might have substantial input on particular issues, but they would generally play a distinctly secondary role, since centralized management is designed to overcome what is viewed as departmental parochialism and inertia.

While such a staff can increase the president's control over the policymaking process, raise issues for his attention that might not necessarily reach the White House otherwise, and increase his likelihood of controlling the timing and announcement of a new policy or initiative, a large centralized management staff also involves substantial costs and risks for the president. A heavy reliance on the president's immediate staff will inevitably undermine morale and initiative in departments and agencies. Moreover, the objectivity of a presidentially oriented staff may be an illusion if the staff ends up mirroring and reinforcing perceived presidential inclinations. It cannot mobilize the same resources or reflect the range of concerns that exist in departments and agencies. Implementing a large number of issues requires the cooperation of departments and agencies who will withhold it if they feel alienated. Thus, centralized management widens the gulf between policy formulation and implementation, and the gulf between the president and the executive branch.

Establishing a Cabinet-Level Multiple Advocacy Council

A fourth alternative would be to establish a cabinet-level body designed to bring together regularly the leading economic policy officials within the administration to advise the president on a broad range of economic policy issues. The core of such a collegial enterprise would be the three elements of the Troika (Treasury, OMB, and the CEA), but its mandate would extend well beyond the issues traditionally considered by the Troika. It would include, as part of the core group, other leading administration officials—the secretaries of state, commerce, and labor, for example. Whatever the size of the "core group," its deliberations would include representatives from all departments and agencies that have a legitimate interest in an issue under discussion. This group of officials would have collective responsibility for advising the president on all major economic policy issues. Its emphasis would be to help departments see their responsibilities in a broader setting. It would mobilize the resources of departments and agencies rather than transcend them. Such an approach would involve combining the principles of multiple advocacy (that the president is

[36] Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Foreign Policy Making," *American Political Science Review* 66 (1972): 752.

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exposed to competing arguments and viewpoints made by the advocates themselves rather than having viewpoints filtered through a staff) and collegiality (a continuity among advisers who share responsibility with the president for policy development over a broad area).

There are many limitations of such a system in practice. Disparities in resources, talent, and abilities among the advocates can distort the process. As Theodore Sorensen has observed: "The most formidable debater is not necessarily the most informed, and the most reticent may sometimes be the wisest."[37] A genuine competition of ideas may be undermined by one or more advocates consistently dominating the process because of superior skills and resources. Moreover, there is no guarantee the advocates will represent all viable policy alternatives rather than lowest common denominator recommendations. Group norms stifling creativity and reflecting a single ideology may emerge. Such a system could consume enormous amounts of time, run the risk of leaks on sensitive issues, force a large number of decisions to the top, and weaken the ability of senior executives responsible for particular policy areas to "deliver" on commitments to their constituencies and to the Congress.

No structure can consistently transcend the abilities and limitations of its individual actors. But many of the collegial experiments in providing policy advice to the president have been undermined by structural deficiencies. Several organizational guidelines can help minimize the potential limitations of such a system in practice.

Unquestionably, the council's or committee's effectiveness depends on its having the president's imprimatur. Departments and agencies must perceive it as the president's vehicle. If the president permits individual officials consistently to circumvent the collegial process, departments will cease to take it seriously. Thus, such a system depends heavily on the president's commitment to it.

Equally important, an "honest broker" or process manager should control the council's operations. Such a manager must be perceived as dispensing due process and should not have other, competing responsibilities. He or she must be intelligent enough to be considered a peer by his or her colleagues and also must enjoy the president's confidence. The manager should find satisfaction in pulling the strands of a problem together rather than in driving the process toward a particular outcome. In seeking a balanced presentation to the president, he or she must be willing and able to reach for advocacy as an instrument of brokerage rather than undertaking brokerage because of orders from superiors. The honest broker should have what the Brownlow Committee called "a passion for anonymity."

The staff for such a council should be small and consist of generalists. A large staff can exercise greater quality control, but invariably such staffs have become specialized, have tended to ignore departments and agencies (and are viewed as

[37] Sorensen, *Decision Making in the White House,* 62.

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competitors by departmental staffs), and have been tempted to circumvent the process themselves.

Such a council should meet regularly and operate at the cabinet level. The clout of such a council will depend on the capacity of its members to speak authoritatively for their department or agency. If given responsibility for advising the president over a broad policy area, the council could help insure that a comprehensive approach is taken to a wide range of policy problems, that the president is not left to integrate interrelated issues on his own, and that senior departmental officials are likely to view problems in the framework of a context that transcends their own departmental responsibilities.

Multiple advocacy is a difficult system to operate. Its success depends on consistent presidential support. Powerful officials with access to the president may attempt to circumvent the collegial process to advance a particular interest. Multiple advocacy depends on having the "right" people to manage it. The other participants must view them as fair and even-handed in their coordination of policy development. The necessary combination of skills that an honest broker needs are frequently not found in those people most closely associated with presidential candidates. There are often powerful personal factors and political forces that guide a president-elect in the selection of his immediate staff. These people will have the most decisive influence on organizing the pattern of advice the president receives. In short, such a system depends on the president recognizing its value, appointing individuals with the requisite abilities (and temperament) as the managers of his policy development process, and demonstrating a clear commitment to such a system by not allowing individual officials to circumvent it.

The Relationship between Foreign and Domestic Economic Policy Formation

For most of the past thirty years, different processes have existed for considering foreign and domestic economic policy issues. Parallel cabinet-level committees have often existed—the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and ABEGS, the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. The most continuous informal arrangements—the Troika and the Quadriad—have concentrated almost exclusively on domestic economic policy questions. Not until the Council on Economic Policy under George Shultz during the Nixon administration and the Economic Policy Board under William Simon during the Ford administration have foreign and domestic economic policy questions been considered regularly by a single entity.

The creation of such bodies as the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and the Council on International Economic Policy has been the result of the conviction that international economic policy questions are important, merit high-level attention, and are being insufficiently addressed under the current

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machinery.[38] While Carl Kaysen and Francis Bator were with the National Security Council (NSC) during the 1960s, they effectively coordinated a host of foreign economic policy questions. But they were trained economists who were given the mandate to do so by their superiors, McGeorge Bundy and Walter Rostow, and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Under the Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft National Security Councils there was less interest in economic policy questions and on Kissinger's part a reluctance to delegate authority. Moreover, CIEP never acquired the clout to fill the gap adequately. With the abolition of CIEP, international economic policy coordination was once again partially returned under the NSC umbrella in the person of Henry Owen, who played a role similar to the Kaysen-Bator model. In the Reagan administration, responsibility has been shared by the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs, the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade, and the National Security Council.

The attraction for reestablishing a formal entity to advise the president on foreign economic policy questions remains strong. But there are two principal arguments for not establishing a separate foreign economic policymaking channel to the president. First, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish issues as either foreign policy, domestic economic, or foreign economic problems. The distinctions have blurred with the growing complexity of considerations and interests that presidents must weigh.

Second, the experiments with entities established to address foreign economic policy issues suggest that they have not succeeded in consistently engaging the president's interest and attention, largely because they have not been tied to a regular work flow with which he must deal.

However, a decision against creating a separate channel to advise the president on foreign economic policy issues still leaves open the question of whether foreign economic policy issues, to the extent they can be identified, should be tied to the national security or economic policy machinery. There are good arguments in support of both positions, and an excellent discussion of them is found in I.M. Destler's *Making Foreign Economic Policy*. Destler argues convincingly that the substance and politics of current foreign economic issues "encourage the conclusion that it is more realistic to build their coordination around economic policy officials and institutions."[39] The substance of most foreign economic policy issues relates more closely to domestic economic policy concerns than to foreign policy ones. Moreover, senior foreign policy officials have generally been able effectively to influence economic policymaking processes

[38] See Joseph M. Dodge, Report to the President on the Development and Coordination of Foreign Economic Policy, November 22, 1954, CFEP Office Series, Box 2, History CFEP (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abiline, Kansas; President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, "Organization for Foreign Economic Affairs," mimeographed, 17 August 1970.

[39] I. M. Destler, *Making Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), 220.

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more easily than economic officials have been able to penetrate foreign-policy-making processes.

A White House Economic Policy Assistant

A third issue meriting consideration is whether the president should appoint an assistant for economic affairs. While the positions of assistant to the president for national security affairs and assistant to the president for domestic policy now have a tradition extending back through at least four administrations, a White House assistant for economic affairs is less solidly entrenched. The pattern over the past thirty years is for Republican presidents generally to favor the idea and for Democratic presidents to consider the position unnecessary, although there is nothing partisan in the concept.

There is no compelling need for such an assistant to handle the president's day-to-day concerns related to economic policy issues. Several administrations have demonstrated that a national security assistant and a domestic policy assistant, aided by adequate staffs, can handle most of the day-to-day responsibilities of keeping the president apprised of current developments.

The issue of a White House economic assistant hinges in large part on the type of intergrating machinery, if any, the president should establish. The creation of a super department or the delegation of most economic policy decision-making authority to a czar reduces the need for a White House economic assistant. The establishment of a National Economic Council staff or a cabinet-level economic policy entity would create a need for such a White House assistant. A relatively large centralized staff to shape alternatives for the president on economic policy issues would obviously need a senior official to oversee it. Experience with cabinet-level coordinating mechanisms suggests the usefulness of a White House-based assistant to manage the process unencumbered by departmental or agency responsibilities.

There is the potential for tension between a White House economic assistant and the chairman of the council of economic advisers, but conceptually there is no necessary conflict. To the extent that the process works well, it provides the CEA chairman and council members with the opportunity to become involved in presidential deliberations across a broad range of issues that transcend macroeconomic policy. A White House economic assistant can also share the work load and help reduce CEA involvement in many activities that are not central to its mission, such as personnel appointments, dealings with special interest groups, and handling numerous small, but nondeferable items, that the president cannot ignore.

The role of the CEA is to provide substantive economic advice and analysis. A White House assistant, responsible for managing the process of providing the president advice, has a coordinating, facilitating role. He or she need not become a major adviser with regard to substantive questions, and indeed doing so may well reduce his or her effectiveness as a coordinator. There is the risk

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that a White House economic assistant may acquire a taste for shaping policy outcomes to the extent that the assistant becomes a regular competitor with the CEA chairman and other administration economic officials for the president's ear. But a White House assistant, who tends to managing the policy development process, can prove a great asset to his or her colleagues.

Presidents are inclined to devote their time and energies to those areas where they have the greatest interest and where they feel they have the greatest opportunity to influence events. Most presidents have spent disproportionate time on foreign policy matters, in part because of fewer domestic and congressional constraints, but also because their national security policymaking machinery has been relatively well developed. The National Security Council apparatus, for all its limitations, has generally produced good quality products—issue papers and options memorandums—for presidential consumption.

The consistent engagement of presidential interest in shaping major economic policies requires machinery that can effectively identify alternatives and generate quality analysis across a wide range of issues. The challenges of an unfavorable economic environment and the intertwining of foreign and domestic economic policy interests make it more crucial than ever that the president have the benefit of a structure that will enhance the prospects for developing coherent policies to address the economic problems facing the nation.

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Postscript on the Congressional Veto: Is There Life After Chadha?

JOSEPH COOPER

In the early summer of 1983, the Supreme Court finally confronted the constitutionality of the legislative veto and ruled against both simple and concurrent resolution forms of the device.[1] The Court's position is contained in Chief Justice Warren Burger's opinion in the Chadha case.[2] Burger asserted that actions or decisions taken under simple resolution or one-house forms of the veto are "essentially legislative in purpose and effect."[3] He noted, however, that simple resolutions are neither presented to the president for his approval nor passed upon by the other legislative branch.[4] He therefore concluded that simple resolution forms of the veto violate Article I of the Constitution because they involve the "exercise of legislative power" without "bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President."[5] By strong implication, concurrent resolution or two-house forms of the veto are illegal as well, since they also are not presented to the president. This conclusion was sustained by the Court two weeks after the Chadha decision, when it affirmed without comment

[1] The decision was handed down just as the article on this subject by myself and William West went to press. See "The Congressional Veto and Legislative Rulemaking," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (1983): 285–304.

[2] Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, *U.S. Law Week* 51 (21 June 1983): 4907–4918.

[3] Ibid., 4916.

[4] Ibid., 4910.

[5] Ibid., 4917–18.

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two other circuit court decisions against veto provisions in current laws, one of which involved a concurrent resolution form.[6]

As sweeping and definitive as the Chadha opinion is intended to be, it will neither diminish controversy over the legislative veto nor terminate reliance on the mechanism.

First, the reasoning of the Court in the Chadha case is highly challengeable. If decisions or actions undertaken through simple or concurrent forms of the veto are essentially or inherently "legislative," how can the Court allow them to be exercised by executive or administrative officials in any event? Burger's view is that somehow such decisions or actions become administrative once delegated. But then how can they be essentially or inherently "legislative"? Alternatively, if it is permissible to delegate legislative power within exceedingly broad limits and while specifying certain conditions, why cannot simple and concurrent resolution forms of the veto be accepted as conditions of delegation stipulated in the original enabling act? Indeed, not only has the Court rarely invoked the non-delegation of the legislative power provisions of the Constitution, it has even allowed the vote of a group of farmers to exist as a condition for the implementation of delegated authority.[7] The Court's decision in Chadha is therefore full of logical inconsistencies and appears biased in favor of executive power. Proponents of the veto in Congress are thus likely to continue to contest the constitutional issues, to seek to mobilize allies and support in the legal and academic communities as well as in the media, and to design new test cases when useful and appropriate.

Second, by declaring traditional forms of the legislative veto unconstitutional, the Court has laid the groundwork for heightened conflict between the legislative and executive branches. Immediately, the legal status of dozens of pieces of important legislation, involving substantial delegations of authority, is unclear.[8] Are the vetoes in these laws severable? Whatever the answer, the issue of whether delegated authority is to be continued and how it is to be controlled will have to be confronted in a host of policy areas. With regard to these pieces of legislation as well as to future proposals for legislation, the singular ability of the veto mechanism to accommodate the needs of congressional control and executive performance cannot be compensated for easily. The faith of the veto's critics that Congress need only act more responsibly by exercising its legislative and appropriations powers with greater precision is an illusion. In complex and turbulent areas of policy, attempts to rely on such advice are likely to have highly detrimental effects, such as: impair the ability of majorities to form behind

[6] See Richard E. Cohen, "Passing the Buck," *National Journal*, 9 July 1983, 1461. The two cases involved Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules.

[7] On all points in this section see Justice Byron White's appendix to his dissent in the Chadha case in *U.S. Law Week* 51 (21 June 1983):4930–33.

[8] For a list of current veto legislation, see ibid., 4930–33.

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presidential initiatives; result in circumscriptions of authority and limiting provisos that hamstring executive performance without doing much to enlarge Congress's ability to set or attain basic policy objectives; and breed conflict and renew power struggles between the authorizing and appropriating committees in both houses.

Third, since reliance on the veto has been a response to a pressing institutional need, not to a fanciful and unnecessary manifestation of laziness or venality, Congress will not readily give up on the mechanism. As recent events indicate, it will substitute joint resolution and waiting periods forms of the veto for simple and concurrent resolution forms.[9] Neither of these forms directly violates the Chadha decision. Joint resolutions are submitted to the president for his signature. The waiting period form delays the implementation of executive action, but congressional disapproval must take the form of regular legislation. In addition, in the case of rulemaking, the House and Senate may consider establishing special calendars, as the House of Representatives has done with respect to several other classes of legislation. In effect, this would institutionalize and streamline a joint resolution of approval form of the veto. However, since all these alternatives involve costs in terms of time, flexibility, or control that can be avoided under simple or concurrent resolution forms, members may also be expected to invent synthetic versions of or substitutes for traditional forms. Two examples can already be cited. Rep. Charles Pashayan (R-Calif.) has suggested a change in House rules that would allow a point of order to be raised against any appropriation to implement a rule disapproved by House resolution. Similarly, a number of members have suggested the passage of a law that would instruct the federal courts to regard any rule disapproved by either house to be contrary to legislative intent.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court's recent actions with respect to the veto are damaging, but not decisive. The Court cannot destroy by fiat what deeply rooted institutional needs advance. It cannot create a severe imbalance in constitutional interpretation and adaptive capacity and expect the political system to behave as if it had been brought back to equilibrium.

[9] Only a few days after the Chadha decision, the House, in reauthorizing the Consumer Product Safety Commission, subjected its rulemaking to control through both joint resolutions of approval and waiting period review. The intent was to allow the conference to make the choice. See Cohen, "Passing the Buck," 1461.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly

RICHARD NED LEBOW

The "lessons" of the Cuban missile crisis occupy a central place both in United States foreign policy and in international relations theory. For policymakers, the crisis confirmed a number of tenets about the utility of power in a nuclear world and the ways in which relations with the Soviet Union should best be managed. Theoreticians have thoroughly examined the case for generalizations about crisis decision-making, bargaining theory, and the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy. How valid are these lessons?

In recent years, a burgeoning revisionist literature has challenged the prevalent view that the crisis represented a necessary and successful response to a Soviet challenge of vital American interests.[1] John F. Kennedy has been charged with overreacting to the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba and even with provoking a confrontation with Moscow for domestic political reasons. Unfortunately, most of this literature is highly polemical and thus of little analytical value. There are some important exceptions, among them an article by James A. Nathan, "The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now," which raises some interesting questions about the policy implications of the crisis.[2] Nathan's article

[1] Among the best critiques are: I.F. Stone, "The Brink," *New York Review of Books*, 14 April 1966; Ronald Steel, "End Game," *New York Review of Books*, 13 March 1969; James A. Nathan, "The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now," *World Politics* 27 (1975):265-81; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Week We Almost Went to War," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 32 (1976):13-21; and Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (1980): 97-125.

[2] Nathan, "The Missile Crisis," 265-81.

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serves as a useful reminder of the superficial and tenuous base on which national leaders sometimes build their most deeply held beliefs about foreign affairs.

The scholarly literature is open to the same kind of challenge as its policy counterpart. The literature has also created dogma or confirmed it when such confirmation may have been unwarranted based on the evidence. Two striking examples of this are the deeply entrenched and related beliefs in the efficacy of deterrence and in the ability of political leaders to steer their states through the shoals of nuclear crisis. Soviet policy before the missiles were discovered has been interpreted as consistent with the former belief, while the success of Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in resolving the confrontation is often offered in support of the latter. The analysis of how these dogmas became accepted provides insight into the ways in which scholarship can be influenced both by cognitive predispositions and by emotional needs. Since such dogmas have important policy implications, the subject has more than just academic interest.

United States Warnings and Soviet Responses

Early in the fall of 1962, President Kennedy responded to reports that the Soviet Union was secretly deploying missiles in Cuba by issuing a series of stern warnings to Moscow. On September 4, he drew a distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons and proclaimed that "the gravest issues" would arise if the United States acquired evidence of "offensive ground-to-ground missiles or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."[3] On September 7, he asked for and quickly received congressional approval for standby authority to call up 150,000 additional reservists.[4] Less than a week later, on September 13, he used a press conference to commit himself to action should his earlier warning go unheeded.[5]

President Kennedy's warnings were also communicated to Moscow through private channels in order to reinforce their salience and to dissuade the Soviets from interpreting them as mere campaign rhetoric. On September 4, Attorney General Robert Kennedy told Anatolii Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, that his brother would not tolerate the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba.[6] Two days later, Theodore Sorensen repeated the message to Dobrynin, adding that in his judgment the November congressional elections would in no way inhibit the president's freedom of action abroad.[7] Chester

[3] *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 47 (24 September 1962):450.

[4] *New York Times*, 8 September 1962.

[5] *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 47 (1 October 1962): 481–82.

[6] See Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966), 19–10; and Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969), 24–26.

[7] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 667–68.

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Bowles also conveyed Kennedy's resolve to the Soviet ambassador at a meeting between the two men on October 13.[8]

The Soviets gave every indication of sensitivity both to American strategic interests and to the president's political needs. In their September 4 meeting, Ambassador Dobrynin called on Robert Kennedy to relay a confidential promise from Chairman Khrushchev that the Soviet Union would not create any trouble for the United States during the election campaign.[9] Dobrynin read the actual message aloud to Sorensen two days later. To Sorensen's rejoinder that Soviet buildup in Cuba had already aggravated world and domestic tensions, Dobrynin replied

> that he would report this conversation in full to the chairman and that he was aware himself of the political and press excitement regarding this matter . . . he repeated several times . . . that they had done nothing new or extraordinary in Cuba—that the events causing all the excitement had been taking place somewhat gradually and quietly over a long period of time—and that he stood by his assurances that all these steps were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to the security of the United States.[10]

On September 11, the Soviet government issued an official statement in response to Kennedy's warnings. While not specifically promising to abstain from introducing surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba—something that would have appeared an act of abject submission—the statement communicated this intent by denying that there was any need for the Soviet Union to shift its retaliatory weapons to Cuba in order to defend it.[11] Shortly thereafter, Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet official in Washington used by Khrushchev as his personal courier to the White House, conveyed a message directly from Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Anastas Mikoian. They assured Kennedy that "no missile capable of reaching the United States would be placed in Cuba."[12] On October 13, Dobrynin reiterated the Soviet position. He denied emphatically to Chester Bowles that his government had any intention of putting such missiles into Cuba.[13]

The Soviet statements, both public and private, appeared to indicate Soviet recognition of the nature and the gravity of the American warning. They can only be interpreted as assurances to Kennedy that Moscow understood and respected American strategic and political interests in Cuba. Graham Allison

[8] Abel, *Missile Crisis*, 50.

[9] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 24–26.

[10] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 667–68.

[11] *New York Times*, 12 September 1962.

[12] See Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 554; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 820. Sorensen noted that this message did not reach President Kennedy until after he became aware of the missiles in Cuba on 16 October.

[13] Abel, *Missile Crisis*, 50.

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has offered the judgment that both parties acted according to the rules of responsible diplomacy. He wrote:

> The United States formulated a policy stating precisely "what strategic transformations we prepared to resist." The Soviet Union acknowledged these vital interests and announced a strategy that entailed no basic conflict. This would also seem to be a model case of communication, or signalling, between the superpowers. By private messages and public statements, the United States committed itself to action should the Soviets cross an unambiguous line (by placing offensive missiles in Cuba). All responses indicated that the Soviets understood the signal and accepted the message.[14]

In retrospect, it is evident that Moscow had decided sometime in June to put missiles in Cuba. Their assurances to the contrary were designed to lull the Kennedy administration into inaction until the missiles were actually deployed. How could Soviet leaders have embarked upon such a course of action when it was almost certain to provoke a major confrontation with the United States whether or not the missiles were discovered before they became operational? More troubling still, why did Moscow continue to proceed with its strategic ruse even after Kennedy's several warnings, stepped-up American surveillance, and well-advertised military preparations clearly indicated that such a confrontation was a near certainty?

The Analysts Come to Khrushchev's Rescue

A bewildering array of hypotheses has attempted to explain Soviet policy in the Cuban missile crisis. Remarkably, practically all of these explanations start with the premise that Khruschev behaved rationally. Simple deductive logic suggests four generic explanations for Soviet policy that are congruent with rational decision-making. These assume that the gains justified the risks; that the gains justified the costs; that Khrushchev was deliberately misled by Kennedy; and that Khrushchev was inadvertently misled by Kennedy. Each of these explanations has in fact been advanced by at least one student of the crisis.[15]

Gains that Justify the Risks

According to this explanation, Khrushchev and the inner circle of Soviet policymakers fully realized the probability that their missiles in Cuba, if discovered,

[14] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 42. The same metaphor had previously been evoked by Denis Healey, former British defense minister, who exclaimed that Kennedy's handling of the crisis "could be cited as a model in any textbook of diplomacy." Quoted in Henry H. Pachter, *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence:* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963), 87.

[15] The Kennedy entrapment thesis is advanced in Leslie Dewart, "Goals in Conflict, Cuba, 1962," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 14 (1981):83–105. Space precludes treating his arguments, which, in any case, are the least convincing of all the various explanations of American and Soviet behavior.

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would provoke a crisis with the United States. They accepted this risk because they expected to reap considerable political and strategic gains if the missiles were not detected until they became operational.

Adam Ulam, who adopted this viewpoint, has conjured up a possible payoff.[16] He argues that Soviet leaders in the spring of 1962 "were seized with an irresistible desire" to solve the most grueling dilemmas of Soviet foreign policy. The introduction of nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba was a "bold stroke" to resolve all at once the German problem, the China problem, and the difficulties associated with Soviet strategic inferiority. Ulam described how this was to be done:

> Once in Cuba, the missiles would become negotiable, their removal conditional upon the United States meeting Soviet conditions on the German peace treaty and other pressing international issues. Appearing in New York in November, Khrushchev would present to the world a dramatic package deal resolving the world's most momentous problems: the German peace treaty, containing an absolute prohibition against nuclear weapons for Bonn; and a similar proposal in reference to the Far East, where the Soviets would demand a nuclear free zone in the Pacific and, under this guise, extract a pledge from China not to manufacture atomic weapons. . . . In addition, part of the price the Americans would pay for the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba could well be the withdrawal of their protection from Formosa. This would add an almost irresistible incentive for the Chinese at least to postpone their atomic ambitions.[17]

As Ulam acknowledged, Soviet expectations that Peking could be induced not to manufacture nuclear weapons were not altogether realistic. He speculated, however, that Moscow counted not only on the Formosa concession but on the general "atmosphere" created by their proposal to bring the Chinese around. He further reasoned that Khrushchev "must have thought" the Americans would actually be grateful to him because his gambit would resolve the German problem, remove the threatening prospect of China having nuclear weapons, and establish the political preconditions for a far-reaching Soviet–American disarmament treaty. Admittedly, the entire scheme rested on the ability of the Soviets to install their missiles in Cuba without the missiles being detected by the Americans. This was a reasonable risk, according to Ulam, because even if the Americans found out about the weapons, they probably would not respond with a nuclear strike.[18]

Ulam's explanation of Soviet behavior seems as farfetched as it is imagina-

[16] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 602–70, 661–71.

[17] Ibid., 669.

[18] Ibid. Ulam argues that "of course there was bound to be a wild wave of excitement and indignation in the United States at the revelation that sixty-four atomic missiles were pointed at the United States from Cuba, but since Khrushchev thought that he would make this revelation, he also believed its effect would immediately be countered by his simultaneous generous and far-reaching proposals, for accession to which he would remove the deadly weapons" (p. 669).

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tive. To sustain the thesis that expected gains balanced expected risks, he must postulate a potpourri of incentives that strain the reader's credulity, with regard both to their realism and to the likelihood that Soviet leaders would consider them as a coordinated package. Ulam claims—probably correctly—that "no other explanation . . . accounts for the risks undertaken by the Soviets at that precise moment."[19] For this very reason one must question the fundamental assumption on which his entire argument rests.

Gains that Justify the Costs

The Soviet decision to put missiles into Cuba could also be considered rational if Moscow acted in full knowledge or expectation of the consequences. This would mean that the actual outcome of the crisis more or less represented the objective that Moscow sought from the outset. Khrushchev himself advanced this claim. He insisted his government had information that the United States was preparing another assault on Cuba and sent in missiles in order to extract a no-invasion pledge from President Kennedy. "We shipped our weapons to Cuba," Khrushchev wrote afterwards, "precisely for the prevention of aggression against her! That is why the Soviet government reaffirmed its agreement to the removal of the ballistic rockets from Cuba."[20] Khrushchev also denied that this aim represented an ad hoc improvisation. Rather, he alleged, it was a policy that was "from the outset, worked out in the collective leadership."[21]

At least two Western analysts have accepted Khrushchev's explanation at face value. One, Edward Crankshaw, wrote in his preface to Khrushchev's chapter on the Cuban confrontation:

> It was clear at a very early date to most sensitive observers that Khrushchev's motives were more or less precisely as he describes them. In the West too much was made (though not by President Kennedy) of his humiliation in being forced to withdraw his missiles. The Chinese exploited this up to the hilt, and so did Khrushchev's adversaries at home. The fact remains that he achieved what he set out to do, though not quite in the manner he intended: he secured Castro's Cuba from the standing threat of invasion. And he achieved an understanding with President Kennedy, whose assassination was for him a profound and very personal misfortune.[22]

Most students of the crisis have dismissed Khrushchev's description of Soviet motivations as an unconvincing but understandable effort on his part to save

[19] Ibid., 669–70.

[20] Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament,* trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 509–14. See also excerpts from Khrushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviet, 12 December 1962, as printed in *The Worker*, supplement, 488–505.

[21] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 498–99.

[22] Ibid., 488. See also Stuart Chase, "Two Worlds," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 19 (1963): 18–20, who suggests that "it is not impossible" that Soviet willingness to withdraw their missiles from Cuba "was part of a plan, more political than military, to secure a pledge against invasion."

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face in the aftermath of a crushing foreign-policy defeat. Arnold Horelick has tartly observed that "to regard the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis as coinciding in any substantial way with Soviet intentions or interests is to mistake salvage of a shipwreck for brilliant navigation."[23]

Horelick and others have put forward a number of telling arguments in support of their view. First, they point to the obvious discrepancy between the magnitude of the means and the end that Khrushchev allegedly sought.[24] The Soviet Union sent Cuba at least 42 Ilyushin-28 bombers and an equal number of missiles. Soviet construction crews built nine missile sites, six of them for medium-range ballistic missiles and (MRBMs) and three for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). The latter were costly fixed installations; each had launch pads for four missiles together with their associated storage, fueling, and control facilities. Critics of Khrushchev's explanation find it difficult to believe that all of this was put into place with the avowed purpose of being abandoned shortly thereafter.

Second, the nature of the weapons systems that were introduced also casts doubt on Khrushchev's testimony.[25] The MRBMs had a range of 1,100 miles; the IRBMs, twice that. Between them, they could target almost any important population center or military installation in the United States. If a pledge not to invade Cuba was truly Khrushchev's goal, a less formidable strategic force—for example, one capable of hitting Miami or even parts of the southeastern United States—would have been preferable in every respect. The Soviets could have attained this capability with a limited number of MRBMs, which were semimobile missiles that were both less vulnerable than IRBMs and easier to deploy without detection.

Finally, there is the question of political cost. Despite Khrushchev's efforts to portray the crisis as something of a Soviet victory, other world leaders—notably communist leaders—concluded otherwise. The Chinese, Albanians, and, of course, the Cubans pointed out the utter meaninglessness of verbal assurances given by capitalist adversaries. They also criticized Khrushchev for both "capitulationism" and "adventurism." As a result of the Cuban fiasco, the Soviet Union lost prestige and influence within the communist camp at a time when Soviet leaders were particularly anxious to reassert their authority in order to counteract centrifugal forces at work within that bloc.

Furthermore, embarrassment abroad diminished Khrushchev's authority at

[23] Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics* 16 (1964): 365.

[24] See Horelick, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 365–68. See also Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategy Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 125–38; Leon Lipson, "Castro on the Chessboard of the Cold War," in John Plank, ed., *Cuba and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), 178–99; Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 43–45.

[25] This argument was put forward in Horelick, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 369–70; Horelick and Rush, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 128–33; and Allison, *Essence of Decision,* 44.

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home. In all likelihood, the missile crisis was one of the contributing causes of his subsequent downfall.[26] Although Khrushchev could not have been expected to foresee with precision all of these costs, it is difficult to believe that he and other members of the Kremlin inner circle could have been completely blind to them. In this regard it is important to remember that Kennedy made every effort to allow Khrushchev to save what face he could—something that could not have been predicted with any degree of confidence in advance. Had Kennedy chosen instead to seek Khrushchev's humiliation, the embarrassment and loss of prestige suffered by the Soviet leader and his country would have been greater still.

The price of Soviet withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba was simply too great for Khrushchev knowingly and willingly to have accepted it in advance. For this reason, some analysts have suggested as Khrushchev's objective a more far-reaching trade-off. Speculation has centered on missile trade involving Cuba and Turkey, an American withdrawal from other foreign military bases threatening to the Soviet Union, and even an American capitulation in Berlin.[27] While these trade-offs would have resulted in a more favorable payoff for the Soviet Union, they are still open to the criticism that the means were either disproportionate or inappropriate to the ends. Leaving the Cuba-Turkey deal aside, there is no evidence that the Russians ever considered any of these exchanges as their objective. Even the Cuba–Turkey trade, which was mooted by Khrushchev and other officials during the crisis, seems more a belated effort to make the best possible bargain in a bad situation.[28]

Was Khrushchev Inadvertently Misled?

This explanation is far and away the most popular in the literature. Its advocates advance two parallel lines of argument. A few stress the cultural and political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States and the ways in which these differences could have distorted both Khrushchev's perception of American resolve and Kennedy's perception of Soviet willingness to take risks.[29]

[26] See Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev's Decline to Collective Leadership*, trans. Helen Katel (London: Collins, 1969), 273–80; Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1981), 124–27.

[27] The Executive Committee (ExCom), Kennedy's ad hoc crisis management group, considered the possibility that the Soviets sought a trade-off of missile bases or an American concession on Berlin. Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, 230–33, advocated the Berlin hypothesis. Pachter, *Collision Course*, 26–27, and Abel, *Missile Crisis*, 47–48, also gave this hypothesis some credence. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 667, rejected the notion of a trade-off, as do: Horelick, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 366–69; Horelick and Rush, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 128–34; Lipson, "Chessboard of the Cold War," 192–93; and Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 43–45.

[28] This case was put forward by Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 44–45. Blema S. Steinberg also argued that Western concessions on Berlin was Khrushchev's goal in "Goals in Conflict: Escalation, Cuba, 1962," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 14 (1981): 83–105.

[29] See Albert Wohlstetter and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba*, Adelphi

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But more analysts argue that Kennedy's own behavior contributed to or even caused mistaken Soviet perceptions.[30]

Such efforts to explain Khrushchev's miscalculation begin with attempting to deny the credibility of Kennedy's several warnings. They do this by analyzing the political context in which Khrushchev would have assessed their meaning. Three aspects of this situation have been singled out as responsible for encouraging Khrushchev to doubt American resolve: Kennedy's personality; his record in office; and the peculiar characteristics of American electoral politics.

Americans display an extraordinary interest in the personal characteristics of their leaders. This seems attributable in part to their belief that the personality and character of the president have a decisive influence on national policy. Americans naturally assume that others view their political system in a similar light. For a number of American analysts, therefore, a natural starting point for understanding the events that led to the crisis is examining the personality and character of John F. Kennedy. What kind of impression had he made upon Khrushchev? In what ways did Khrushchev's judgment of him influence Soviet behavior?

There is a surprising consensus among American students of the crisis that Khrushchev underestimated Kennedy and that he believed the president was the kind of man who would shy away from hard decisions. According to Alexander George and Richard Smoke, among the most recent authors to echo this point of view:

> It is often remarked that Khrushchev viewed Kennedy as weak, inexperienced, and irresolute—a judgment seemingly derived from, or fortified by, the President's comparative youth, his handling of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and his performance in Vienna in June 1961. Nearly everyone who has examined the Cuban missile crisis argues that the Soviets were operating on an incorrect image of their opponent and were genuinely surprised when Kennedy reacted as firmly as he did. Clearly, this misestimate of their opponent could only strengthen their belief that the missile deployment would not entail excessive risks.[31]

The gravamina laid before Kennedy are his youth, performance at the Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, and the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Just what kind of evidence is there in support of the contention that these considerations influenced Khrushchev's assessment of Kennedy?

With respect to Kennedy's age, the contention rests with the second-hand report of an American visitor to Moscow to whom Khrushchev is alleged to

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Paper, no. 17 (London: International Institute for Stategic Studies, 1965): 21–21, and Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," *Foreign Affairs* 43 (1965): 691–707. See also Horelick, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 382.

[30] See Horelick, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 380–82; Horelick and Rush, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 142–43; Allison, *Essence of Decision,* 231–35; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press), 1974.

[31] George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,* 465.

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have confessed that he was troubled by Kennedy's youth. Elie Abel has cited this encounter and inferred from it that Khrushchev doubted Kennedy's resolve.[32] Abel offered no justification for his conclusion but presumably might argue that Khrushchev, a relatively unsophisticated man of peasant stock, found it difficult to believe that someone young enough to be his son could stand up to him in a test of will.

There is another hypothesis to consider. If Kennedy's age bothered Khrushchev, it may have been for the opposite reason. Rightly or wrongly, the young are notorious for their rashness and willingness to take risks that their elders might abjure. Khrushchev might have viewed a young president as less predictable, less compromising, and overly concerned with proving his virility and making a reputation for himself.[33] Charles de Gaulle levelled such a charge at Kennedy. While officially supporting the president during the crisis, the French leader hinted that immaturity had led him to overreact to the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.[34] Khrushchev himself seemed concerned that Kennedy would underestimate him because of his advanced age. Arthur Schlesinger reported that the Soviet leader confided to Kennedy over lunch in Vienna that "he envied the President his youth . . . if he were as young, he would be devoting even more energy to the cause but at the age of sixty-seven he was still not renouncing the competition."[35] This comment, Schlesinger noted, was made at a relatively unguarded moment during an otherwise tense summit meeting when the Soviet leader was "rambling on." As such, the comment seems at least as convincing a revelation of Khrushchev's feelings as the report that Abel cited, a report moreover, that equally supports this interpretation.

As for the Vienna meeting, the story that Khrushchev took Kennedy's measure and found him wanting originated with James Reston of the *New York Times.* Reston had the opportunity to observe Kennedy ten minutes after his final session with Khrushchev. Three and a half years later, he described his recollection of this encounter.

> He [the president] came into a dim room in the American embassy shaken and angry. He had tried, as always, to be calm and rational with Khrushchev, to get him to define what the Soviet Union would and would not do, and Khrushchev had bullied him and threatened him with war over Berlin.
>
> We will have to know much more about that confrontation between Kennedy and

[32] Abel, *Missile Crisis*, 37. Unfortunately, Abel did not identify the source. James Reston, admittedly on the basis of no evidence, also speculated that Khrushchev might have been influenced by Kennedy's age. See *New York Times Magazine*, 15 November 1964. George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 464, repeated Reston's charge.

[33] See Dispatch, Ambassador Charles Bohlen to Secretary of State, No. 1970, 27 October 1962, VP Security File: Cuba, Folder VI, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Quoted in Bernstein, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 114.

[34] See Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 362.

[35] Ibid.

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> Khrushchev, one now deprived of his life and the other of power, before we can be sure, but Kennedy said just enough in that room in the embassy to convince me of the following:
>
> Khrushchev had studied the events of the Bay of Pigs; he would have understood if Kennedy had left [Fidel] Castro alone or destroyed him; but when Kennedy was rash enough to strike at Cuba but not bold enough to finish the job, Khrushchev decided that he was dealing with an inexperienced young leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed. The communist decision to put offensive missiles into Cuba was the final gamble of this assumption.[36]

Clearly, Reston was careful to describe his analysis as unconfirmed speculation. Abel and some others, however, have seized upon it as if it were gospel and cited it as evidence in support of their contention that Khrushchev doubted his resolve.[37] Once again, Abel's judgment seems questionable.

Reston's account of the Vienna summit is the only one that suggests weakness on Kennedy's part. As Robin Edmonds has observed, all the eyewitness descriptions of the actual conversations between the two leaders indicate only plain speaking with neither man giving any ground.[38] Schlesinger, Sorensen, and Salinger all provide rather full accounts of the summit. According to Schlesinger, the conversations the first morning were "civil but tough. . . . Khrushchev had not given way before Kennedy's reasonableness, nor Kennedy before Khrushchev's intransigence."[39] On the second day, the more confrontational of the two, Kennedy was impressed by Khrushchev's vitality, debating skill, and candor but dismayed by his dogmatic approach. Schlesinger reported that afterwards the president asked Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson if it was always like this. Thompson replied: "Par for the course."[40]

Sorensen's account of the summit is similar. He confirmed that the grimmest talks concerned Germany and Berlin. Kennedy told journalists of Khrushchev's demands and of his own determination not to give in.[41] According to Sorensen, Khrushchev told reporters at the time that Kennedy was tough, especially on the

[36] *New York Times Magazine*, 15 November 1964.

[37] Abel, *Missile Crisis*, 37; George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 465.

[38] Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1973: The Paradox of Soviet Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 24–25. The Reston-Abel thesis is also questioned by Pachter, *Collision Course*, 64. He argued that Khrushchev would not have conducted his subsequent offensive in Berlin so cautiously if he had underestimated Kennedy at Vienna. Roger Hilsman challenged the thesis as well, arguing that "it seems more likely that the Soviet decision depended on more than one man's estimate of another, and that the cause of their failure to foresee the level of the American reaction runs much deeper." See Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1967), 191–92. For first-hand accounts of the Vienna meeting, see Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 543–50; Pierre Salinger, *With Kennedy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966), 175–88; Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 491–98.

[39] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 361.

[40] Quoted in ibid., 365.

[41] See Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 549.

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question of Berlin. Khrushchev volunteered that "he liked the President personally, his frankness, and his sense of humor—but Eisenhower had been more reasonable . . . and, until the U-2 incident, easier to get along with."[42]

The objection can be raised that the memoirs of the Kennedy inner circle, written after both the missile crisis and the assassination, may not be unbiased recollections. Khrushchev himself, however, confirmed their accounts in his own memoirs. Not only do his descriptions of the Vienna talks mesh nicely with the portrayals of Schlesinger, Sorensen, and Salinger, but so do his recollections of Kennedy's performance. He was impressed by Kennedy's preparation and grasp of international issues and above all by his frankness. In this regard, he found Kennedy a refreshing change from Dwight D. Eisenhower, even though their policy positions, especially on Germany and Berlin, were barely distinguishable. Kennedy, he reported, wanted him to agree to respect the political status quo in the Third World, something Khrushchev insisted flew in the face of reality and was in any case unacceptable to a good communist. Kennedy nevertheless pressed his case with verve. "This was to his credit," Khrushchev confided, "and he rose in my estimation at once. . . . He was, so to speak, both my partner and my adversary."[43]

Kennedy intimates reported that the president's somber state of mind was the result of his concern that the deadlock in Vienna meant a "cold winter" in Berlin and elsewhere. Be that as it may, they and Khrushchev are still in complete agreement that Kennedy, although taken aback by Khrushchev's vehemence, parried the chairman's verbal thrusts with skill and conviction and conveyed the impression of being a firm but thoughtful leader.

The third and most common charge raised against Kennedy is that his refusal to commit American troops to the faltering Bay of Pigs invasion undermined his credibility in Khrushchev's eyes. Henry H. Pachter asserted that this "compromised America's good-will abroad and . . . discredited her will power." As the seriousness of Kennedy's purpose became suspect, "the credibility of the American deterrent was jeopardized."[44] Abel drew an odious analogy between Cuba and Hungary: "Now Kennedy had not lifted a finger to crush Castro, whose regime must have been every bit as repugnant to Kennedy as the [Imre] Nagy regime had been repugnant to Khrushchev. Khrushchev may have reflected: the Americans certainly possess overwhelming power—but they have forgotten how a great power must behave."[45] Horelick reached the same conclusion:

> The ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion attempt of April 1961, while it may have demonstrated the depths of US hostility toward Castro, may also have suggested to Soviet leaders that US reluctance to engage its own forces directly in military action against

[42] Quoted in ibid., 550.
[43] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* 491–98.
[44] Pachter, *Collision Course*, 83–84.
[45] Abel, *Missile Crisis*, 36.

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> Cuba was so great that even the emplacement of Soviet strategic weapons on the island would be tolerated, or at least resisted by means short of the direct use of US armed forces. At the same time, the fact that the United States had attempted, even though ineffectually, . . . to overthrow Castro, both increased Castro's desire for Soviet military assistance and made such assistance seem legitimate to many third countries.[46]

This argument does have a certain appeal. However, it is only one of several possible interpretations of the impact of the Bay of Pigs fiasco on Kennedy's resolve and Khrushchev's perception of it. It is not necessarily the most convincing one. There is at least as much reason to believe the Bay of Pigs should have enhanced the Soviets' perception of Kennedy's resolve to face any challenge emanating from Cuba in the future.

The failure at the Bay of Pigs, for which Kennedy took full personal responsibility, had made Cuba, as Sorensen wrote, "the political Achilles' heel" of the administration.[47] Public opinion polls revealed considerable frustration and even anger at Castro's durability and the concomitant growth of Soviet influence in the Caribbean. Critics of Kennedy assailed his apparent inability to deal with Castro and, sensing a good issue, the Republican Senatorial and House Campaign Committees announced that Cuba would be "the dominant issue of the 1962 campaign."[48] Kennedy was, of course, aware of the political dangers posed by Cuba and for this reason sought to counter the charges of Senator Kenneth Keating and others that Soviet surface-to-surface missiles had been introduced on the island. Kennedy labelled these accusations irresponsible, but promised at his news conference of August 29 "to watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention."[49]

By all accounts, the political dimension of Cuba stiffened Kennedy's resolve both before and after the discovery of the missiles. Sorensen commented: "Once he had taken his stand on this issue, his public pledge to act thereafter was irrevocable."[50] Robert Kennedy offered a revealing vignette to this effect. During the blockade, he reported, his brother asked him why they were risking war with the Soviet Union. "I just don't think there was any choice," he replied, "and not only that, if you hadn't you would have been impeached." "That's what I think," the president agreed, "I would have been impeached."[51]

The real question here is not Kennedy's resolve but the extent to which the Soviet leadership was sensitive to the president's domestic political problem and how it was almost certain to stiffen his resolve on any question having to do

[46] Horelick, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 383. A number of authors advance their own variations on this hypothesis. See Horelick and Rush, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 142–43; Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 231; and George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 465–67.

[47] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 670.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Quoted in ibid.

[50] Ibid., 674.

[51] Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 67.

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with Cuba. Alexander L. George volunteered the judgment that "the kind of personal and political humilitation that the covert deployment of missiles would inflict upon the president could hardly have escaped Khrushchev's attention altogether when he planned and carried it out."[52] Not everyone concurs.

Roberta Wohlstetter speculated that Khrushchev "may not have been aware that the alarm expressed by the Republicans was something President Kennedy could not ignore."[53] Arnold Horelick suggested that Soviet leaders might have believed that "the Administration would be reluctant to expose the Soviet Union publicly on the eve of national elections out of concern for the unfavorable domestic political reprecussions that might be expected if the elections were held with the missiles still in Cuba and no Soviet commitment to withdraw them."[54] Graham Allison straddled the issue. He admitted that Kennedy's public statements should have indicated "a strong personal commitment that he would not likely be inclined, or able, to escape." But he quickly added an assertion that a rational Soviet official could have drawn the opposite conclusion:

> His argument could have been that the Kennedy administration was reacting to the provocations of domestic critics, that these statements were aimed at Republican opponents rather than at the Soviet Union, that American campaigns included numerous promises and statements that had no substance, and thus after the election, the administration would find some way to accommodate a Soviet fait accompli.[55]

These arguments ignore the fact that Kennedy reiterated and clarified his commitment through private channels, which he was hardly likely to have done if his real audience had been the American electorate. Nor would campaign oratory have been backed up by extensive naval and aerial reconnaissance, something the Cubans and Russians knew about. Above all, Kennedy was highly specific about the nature of his commitment. He almost certainly would have avoided specifics in a campaign promise that he had no intention of honoring. Instead, he took great care to state unequivocally and in public that he would not tolerate missiles capable of striking at the United States. It remains very difficult to believe that Ambassador Dobrynin and Moscow's experts on the United States were so ignorant and misinformed about American politics as to dismiss Kennedy's pledge as a meaningless campaign promise. It seems more likely that their advice was not solicited or that it was ignored.

[52] Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962," in Alexander L. George, David Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 90.

[53] Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," 701. This argument is also made in Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," *World Politics* 16 (1964): 455–67.

[54] Horelick, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 382. Of course, the opposite and probably more realistic conclusion might also have been drawn—that a full-blown international crisis on the eve of a national election was bound to assist the president at the polls, thus giving him a political incentive to expose the missiles.

[55] Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 235–37.

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Judging from his memoirs, Khrushchev appeared to have had a highly sophisticated understanding of American politics. While denying that elections made any real difference in policy, he acknowledged that public opinion is critical to their outcome. Concerning the 1960 election, Khrushchev reported that he knew perfectly well that any endorsement from the Soviet Union would serve as a disadvantage for a candidate. This fact did not stop the Americans from trying to use the Soviets to affect the election's outcome. He told of being asked by the White House to release U-2 pilot Gary Francis Powers just before election day. Khrushchev expressed his opinion on this to the USSR Central Committee:

> The United States Government has asked us to release Powers. Now is not the time to do it because the two presidential candidates are both trying to cash in on an improvement in relations. If we release Powers now it will be to Richard M. Nixon's advantage. Judging from the press, I think the two candidates are at a stalemate. If we give the slightest boost to Nixon it will be interpreted as an expression of our willingness to see him in the White House. This would be a mistake . . . . Therefore, let's hold off on taking the final step of releasing Powers.[56]

This is hardly the argument of a man who would have been unaware in an election year, as Roberta Wohlstetter claimed Khrushchev was, "that the alarm expressed by the Republicans (about Cuba) was something President Kennedy could not ignore."[57]

Perhaps Khrushchev's most telling revelation in this regard is that Henry Cabot Lodge sought him out in Moscow during the 1960 campaign to relay assurances the U.S.-Soviet relations would not suffer if Nixon was elected:

> He said Nixon was not really the sort of man he deliberately appeared to be at election rallies. "Mr. Khrushchev," said Lodge, "don't pay any attention to the campaign speeches. Remember, they're just political statements. Once Mr. Nixon is in the White House I'm sure—I'm absolutely certain—he'll take a position of preserving and perhaps even improving our relations.[58]

Khrushchev wrote that he was not convinced, and that the candidate's speeches did in fact reflect a "substantial difference in the shading of their political characters."[59] Khrushchev's obvious concern for the differences between the candidates as revealed by their speeches casts doubt on the hypothesis that he would have dismissed Kennedy's highly specific warnings as mere political rhetoric. If he refused to interpret Nixon's speechs in this light—even after being asked to do so by an emissary from the candidate—why would he do this with Kennedy's

[56] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* 487–90. Khrushchev later told Kennedy that the Soviet Union had voted for him "by waiting until after the election to return the pilots." Kennedy laughed and said, "You're right." Ibid., 491.

[57] Robert Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor."

[58] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* 489–90.

[59] Ibid., 488–89.

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statements when all the private communications he received from the president's emissaries emphasized the seriousness of his intent?

There is a further point to consider about the Bay of Pigs. The assumption of some analysts is that because Kennedy "faltered" once, he encouraged Khrushchev to believe that he would do so again. This is very simplistic psychology. One need have no knowledge of American politics, only of human nature, to realize that people who undergo one humiliation generally do their best to avoid a repetition of that experience. They are sometimes driven to the point of overreaction to guard against it. Some of the analysts who believe that the Bay of Pigs damaged Kennedy's credibility use this same argument in a different context—to explain the Soviet strategic buildup in the 1960s and 1970s. They reason that, having been humiliated in the missile crisis, the Soviets acquired a potent strategic arsenal in order to ensure that they would never have to back down again out of weakness. Accordingly, if this principle holds true for one superpower it should be equally applicable to the other.

There is also no reason to believe that Soviet leaders should have been any less sensitive than American leaders to the implications of a bruised ego. Russian history in the twentieth century might even have been expected to make them particularly aware of the problem. All Russian schoolchildren learn that World War I began because their country mobilized instead of acquiescing in Austria-Hungary's destruction of Serbia. Russia did so because five years before it had been humiliated by Austria-Hungary in the Bosnian annexation crisis. To suffer a second such defeat in the Balkans, Russian leaders reasoned, would not only risk revolution at home but would be tantamont to renouncing their empire's status as a great power. Why should American leaders have felt any less indignant about the prospect of another humiliation in Cuba?

The analysis to this point has attempted to show that Kennedy's youth, the Vienna summit, and the Bay of Pigs cannot convincingly be invoked to explain Khrushchev's miscalculation. There exists no real evidence to support the contention that these factors led Khrushchev to question Kennedy's resolve. Moreover, arguments to the reverse effect—that these considerations should have enhanced Soviet respect for Kennedy's resolve—are equally if not more compelling on the face of their logic. The other set of possible explanations for Soviet miscalculation, those based on the distorting effects of political and cultural differences, have not been developed into full-fledged arguments by the authors who incline towards them. With one exception, they have been mooted in passing without further elaboration.[60] The exception is the hypothesis that the

[60] Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates," 464–65, and Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks*, 21–22, speculate that the Soviets might not have been able to understand the strong domestic pressures on Kennedy to act. Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," tries to argue that Kennedy's warnings were perceived by the Russians as ambiguous, as does Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 234–35. Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor," 21, also suggests that since Khrushchev had issued and then retracted ultimatums on Berlin, he expected that Kennedy could do the same with regard to Cuba. Bernstein, "Cuban Missile Crisis," 114, cites an

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Soviet failure to comprehend the democratic process encouraged them to interpret Kennedy's several warnings as mere campaign promises.

The marginal appeal to American analysts of cultural and political explanations for Soviet miscalculation is both striking and significant. It almost certainly reflects the American predeliction, already noted, to explain policy decisions in terms of the personalities involved. However, the avowed goals of the analysts are to put themselves in Khrushchev's shoes and to see the world through his eyes. Is there any reason to believe that Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders would also have been so inclined to emphasize the role of personality in foreign policy?

Marxist theory would suggest not, since it minimizes the role of the individual in history and stresses instead the decisive influence of class. Class differences, not personal idiosyncracies or free will, are said to determine political differences among policymakers. Leaders from the same class background can be expected to behave in more or less the same way. To the extent that the world views of Khrushchev and his colleagues were conditioned by Marxism, they would have analyzed foreign policy—including the question of an adversary's resolve—from quite different perspectives than their American counterparts.

Khrushchev gave every indication of having such a Marxist orientation. Twice in his chapter on the Vienna summit he noted with apparent amusement the tendency of the bourgeois press "to play up personalities" and to explain foreign policy in terms of them.[61] Too much, of course, can be made of the operational distinctions between the Marxist and liberal analysis of foreign policy formulation. Khrushchev was not so much an ideologue to ignore the differences among American leaders, nor are Western analysts altogether insensitive to the influence of impersonal economic and social forces on a leader's policies. But it would be fatuous to deny that these different perspectives do exist and have affected the ways Soviet and American policymakers view the world. By attempting to explain Soviet miscalculations in Cuba almost entirely in terms of their judgment of John Kennedy's character, many American analysts reveal a certain cognitive innocence. They can fairly be charged with projecting their own cultural bias onto the Soviets and of interpreting Soviet policy in terms of it.

Attention to the impression that Kennedy as an individual made on Khrushchev appears to derive from another source, one that has more disturbing implications. James Reston and Elie Abel, the two commentators primarily responsible for focusing analytical attention on Kennedy's youth, his performance in Vienna, and his handling of the Bay of Pigs operation, did not conceive this emphasis on their own. They were put on this track by Kennedy himself. At a book and author lunch, Abel recounted the story of visiting the president in

observation by de Gaulle that the United States, never having lived with direct threats to its security, overreacted to the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba. The implicit argument here is that Khrushchev, as a European, failed to realize American sensitivity on this point.

[61] Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers,* 489–90.

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September 1961, shortly after the Bay of Pigs and the construction of the Berlin Wall. He told Kennedy of his interest in writing a book about the president's first year in office. "Who would want to read about disasters?" Kennedy asked in a despondent tone of voice. He confessed to Abel his fear that in light of these two debacles Khrushchev would think him a "pushover."[62] Kennedy had voiced the same concern to James Wechsler of the *New York Post* in a lengthy conversation during the Berlin crisis. What worried Kennedy, Wechsler reported, "was that Khrushchev might interpret his reluctance to wage nuclear war as a symptom of an American loss of nerve." The time might come, Kennedy speculated, when he would have to run the supreme risk to convince Khruschev that conciliation did not mean humiliation. "If Khrushchev wants to rub my nose in the dirt," he confided, "it's all over."[63]

Kennedy's concern for his credibility dominated his dealings with Khruschev as well as those of his Executive Committee (Ex Com). Sorensen reports that the first theory of the Ex Com to explain why Khrushchev put missiles into Cuba was that it was to test American will:

> Khrushchev believed that the American people were too timid to risk nuclear war and too concerned with legalisms to justify any distinction between our overseas missile bases and his—that once we were actually confronted with the missiles we would do nothing but protest—that we would thereby appear weak and irresolute to the world, causing our allies to doubt our word and to seek accommodations with the Soviets, and permitting increased communist sway in Latin America in particular.[64]

Kennedy himself told the American people in his television address that the missiles in Cuba represented a challenge that had to be answered "if our courage and commitments are ever to be trusted again by friend or foe."[65] Barton Bernstein, who has studied the most recently declassified materials on the crisis, has confirmed that for most of Kennedy's advisers the "courage and commitment" thesis remained the most convincing explanation of Soviet behavior.[66]

The Kennedy administration's postmortem of the crisis strengthened their view that Khrushchev had acted so brazenly because he had doubted American resolve. Arthur Schlesinger wrote:

> In a general sense the decision obviously represented the supreme probe of American intentions. No doubt a "total victory" faction in Moscow had long been denouncing the government's "no win" policy and arguing that the Soviet Union could safely use the utmost nuclear pressure against the United States because the Americans were too rich or too soft or liberal to fight.[67]

[62] *New York Herald-Tribune*, 16 March 1966; Stone, "The Brink."

[63] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 391.

[64] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 676.

[65] *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 47 (12 November 1962):715–20.

[66] Bernstein, "The Week We Almost Went to War," 16, citing Sorensen memoranda of the Executive Committee deliberations.

[67] Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 796.

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Theodore Sorensen reached the same conclusion—that the missile crisis was a test of the premise that the United States lacked the will to risk all-out war in defense of its vital interests. That premise having been proven wrong, "he [Khrushchev] was less likely to underestimate our will again."[68] Kennedy had stood firm, his courage had been vindicated, and the danger of war arising from insufficient Soviet respect for American resolve had been reduced. "Nuclear blackmail," Sorensen concluded, "was no longer an effective weapon in Berlin or anywhere else."[69]

However, the concern of Kennedy and his advisers for American credibility strikes the present author as extremely exaggerated. Here were the leaders of the world's most powerful nation, a nation that had faced down the Chinese in Korea and the Soviets in Berlin and was spending huge sums on a new generation of strategic weapons, fearful that their adversary had no respect for their resolve. The ostensible causes for their concern was Kennedy's failure at the Bay of Pigs and his acceptance of the Berlin Wall. But some members of the administration traced the problem even further back than this. Elie Abel has relayed the opinions of John McCone, a Kennedy intimate.

> [According to McCone,]. . . the United States led the Russians into that frame of mind by a whole series of things it had done—or failed to do. Kennedy, for example, let them get away with building the Berlin Wall. He allowed the Bay of Pigs landing to fail. McCone blames not only the Kennedy Administration but also the Eisenhower Administration before it for creating a "climate of inaction."[70]

Clearly, it would have required a strange cast of mind—and a certain arrogance as well—for the Kennedy administration to see the Berlin Wall as a test of United States resolve rather than a desperate measure to stop the exodus of millions of people from East Germany. Were the Americans really seen as weak by Khrushchev because they had failed to order their outnumbered and unreinforcible garrison in West Berlin to attempt to tear the wall down?

More bizarre still is the degree of "selective attention" revealed by the comments of Kennedy and his inner circle. Granted, there had been some major Soviet initiatives, like the Hungarian invasion and the Berlin Wall, that the United States felt constrained to tolerate, and even some outright policy failures, like the Bay of Pigs operation. But there was also a series of foreign policy successes in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia that stretched back to the opening days of the cold war. The most recent of these had been in Berlin where, according to most observers, American steadfastness had made Khrushchev back down. Horelick and Rush declared that "the USSR could discover the West's will to resist only by testing it. During the course of the Berlin campaign and probably by the end of 1961, the Soviet leaders became

[68] Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 724.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Abel, *Missile Crisis*, 35.

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sufficiently convinced of the quality of the West's will to resist."[71] Michel Tatu and Graham Allison have concurred.[72] Allison cited Robert McNamara, who publicly stated on more than one occasion that the Soviet Union had no need to probe the firmness of American intentions after the strong American stand in Berlin in 1961.[73]

Kennedy and most of his foreign policy advisers ignored the Berlin crisis and the impression that American resolve during the episode might have made on the Soviet Union. They acted as if there had been one failure after another between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis. So, for that matter, have most analysts. Taking their cue from the Kennedy administration, they arbitrarily overlook the success of Berlin in favor of the "failure" of Cuba. They cite this "failure" and Kennedy's alleged weakness in Vienna—the latter based on Reston's unsubstantiated surmise—to justify Khrushchev's gamble as reasonably conceived.

The most disturbing aspect of this "courage and commitment" thesis is the tautological nature of its confirmation. According to the thesis, Kennedy, a man seemingly consumed with the ideal of courage and deeply affected by his humiliation at the Bay of Pigs, appears to have projected his own feelings of inadequacy onto the nation's bargaining reputation. Khrushchev's missile ploy, which was open to a variety of possible interpretations, was then taken by him as a clear confirmation of his worst forebodings. Kennedy's view of the matter spread to the journalists around him, who adopted it in their analysis of the crisis. Academic analysts in turn accepted it uncritically because it helped to explain behavior that otherwise would have appeared irrational.

Without a shred of hard evidence to back it up, the "courage and commitment" thesis has become one of the most entrenched shibboleths of the confrontation. In turn, the thesis has provided the justification for the most enduring policy lesson of the crisis. For the corollary to the belief that questionable resolve invites challenge is the belief that unquestioned resolve deters it. This belief encouraged subsequent policymakers to view every foreign upheaval as a possible test of American will. It provided the most important strategic incentive for intervention in Vietnam and the willingness of more recent American leaders to take up the "Soviet challenge" in Africa and the Persian Gulf. It has helped to enshrine as dogma what Barton Bernstein calls the "potentially fatal paradox"—the belief that the United States might have to go to war to affirm the very credibility that is supposed to make war unnecessary.[74]

[71] Horelick and Rush, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 126.

[72] Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, 231–35, speculates that Khrushchev switched the focus of confrontation to Cuba precisely because of Kennedy's demonstrated resolve with regard to Berlin.

[73] Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 52.

[74] Bernstein, "The Week We Almost Went to War," 21.

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An Alternative Explanation of Brinksmanship

All the theories about Soviet policy examined here maintain that Soviet leaders behaved rationally. In other words, they acted in accord with either Soviet national interests, their own political interests, or a combination of the two. Starting from this premise, they elaborate one of four generic explanations congruent with this assumption to explain why Khrushchev and those around him accepted the risks associated with introducing Soviet missiles into Cuba. None of these explanations is particularly convincing. Their failure is certainly not attributable to any lack of imagination or diligence on the part of the analysts; indeed both characteristics typify so many of their efforts to reconstruct a rationale for Khrushchev's behavior. The problem lies instead with the assumption of rationality, which simply cannot be reconciled with Khrushchev's policy.

An alternative explanation should accordingly be based upon the assumption that Khrushchev had no plausible reasons for questioning Kennedy's commitment to keep offensive weapons out of Cuba. Such an approach immediately suggests a different line of analysis. Instead of trying to explain away the credibility of Kennedy's carefully worded warnings, the principal stumbling block of the explanations discussed here, an alternative explanation should show why and how Khrushchev convinced himself in the face of all the indications to the contrary that he could successfully put Soviet missiles into Cuba. This is also a formidable analytical obstacle, but one that may prove less difficult to overcome.

The present author's comparative research into international crises suggests a hypothesis that might clarify the mystery of Soviet policy in the Cuban missile crisis.[75] The origins of thirteen "brinkmanship" crises—confrontations in which a state challenges an important commitment of an adversary in the expectation that the adversary will back down—were studied to determine why policymakers pursued policies that risked war. The finding was that almost without exception, these crises could most readily be traced to grave foreign and domestic threats that leaders believed could only be overcome through an aggressive foreign policy.

The most important external threat was the expectation of a dramatic shift in the balance of power. In seven of the thirteen cases, brinkmanship was preceded by the widely shared perception among policymakers that a dramatic, unfavorable shift in the balance of power was imminent.[76] Brinkmanship in these cases was conceived as a forceful response to acute and impending danger, as a means of preventing or even redressing the shift in the balance of power before time ran out and such a response became unrealistic.

[75] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

[76] The crises were Korea (1903–4), First Morocco (1905–6), Bosnia (1908–9), Agadir (1911), July (1914), Berlin (1948), and Cuba (1962).

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A second motivation for an aggressive foreign policy derived from the weakness of a state's political system. In four of the cases—Korea (1903–4), Bosnia (1908–9), July (1914), and Arab-Israeli (1967)—domestic political instability or the frangibility of the state itself appeared instrumental in convincing leaders to provoke a confrontation. They resorted to the time-honored technique of attempting to offset discontent at home by diplomatic success abroad.

The political weakness of leaders as distinct from the instability of the political system as a whole provided a third incentive for brinkmanship, as individual leaders sought success abroad in order to buttress their domestic positions. Political weakness can also lead to confrontations because leaders feel too insecure to oppose policies they know to be highly risky or otherwise ill-conceived. One or the other of these manifestations of political weakness appears to have played a role in the origins of ten of the brinkmanship challenges.[77]

A fourth incentive for brinkmanship is associated with intraelite competition for power. This was a primary cause of three brinkmanship crisis and probably a secondary cause of several others. A bureaucratic subunit or political coalition can engineer a confrontation with a foreign power in the expectation that it will enhance its domestic influence or undermine those of its adversaries. Intraelite competition can also induce actors to pursue policies calculated to advance their domestic interests even though these policies have the side effect of provoking a crisis with another state. The Fashoda crisis (1898) is an example of the former and the Russo-Japanese crisis in Korea (1903–4) of the latter.

In practice, the expectation that an adversary would back down when challenged has often proved unwarranted. The cases revealed that most brinkmanship challenges were initiated without any good evidence that the adversaries in question lacked the resolve to defend their commitment; on the contrary, available indications most often pointed to the opposite conclusion. The commitments at stake appeared to have met the four conditions normally associated with successful deterrence: they were clearly defined; their existence was communicated to possible adversaries; the states making them possessed the means to defend them; and these states made reasonable efforts to demonstrate their resolve to do so. In only five cases—First Morocco (1903–4), Bosnia (1905–6), Rhineland (1936), Munich (1938), and Berlin (1948)—did the leaders of the state challenging a commitment have compelling reasons to suspect that their adversaries would back down. Even so, in two of these cases states had to drop their challenge because of the opposition they encountered. In every other case, the initiators had to back down or face war.

These findings indicate that a vulnerable commitment is not a precondition for brinkmanship. What counts is the initiator's perception—often faulty—that a vulnerable commitment exists. The cases also suggested the hypothesis that such poor judgment was related to the perceived need to pursue a brinkmanship

[77] The crises were Fashoda (1898), Korea (1903–4), First Morocco (1905–6), Bosnia (1908–9), Agadir (1911), July (1914), Korea (1915), Sino-Indian (1962), Cuba (1962), Arab-Israeli (1967).

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challenge. When policymakers became convinced of the necessity of achieving specific foreign policy objectives, they became predisposed to see these objectives as attainable.

The study documented this assertion in the July (1914), Korea (1950), and Sino-Indian (1962) crises. In all three confrontations, political leaders felt compelled to pursue aggressive foreign policies in response to strategic and domestic political imperatives. They convinced themselves that they could achieve their objectives without provoking war. Because they knew the extent to which they were powerless to back down, they expected that their adversaries would have to do so. Some leaders also took comfort in the illusion that they would emerge victorious at little cost to themselves if war developed.

German, American, and Indian policymakers maintained these beliefs, despite much evidence to the contrary both before and during the crisis. They resorted to elaborate personal and institutional defenses to avoid coming to terms with this information. The most prevalent defense mechanism was denial. Kaiser Wilhelm II and those around him used denial to discredit reports that Britain would intervene in a continental war. Dean Acheson, Jawaharlal Nehru, and their respective advisers resorted to denial to discount the possibility that their policies would provoke Chinese military responses. On an institutional level, denial took the form of structuring feedback channels to filter out dissonant information and to reinforce the preconceived notions of political leaders. In such a closed environment, events did little to disabuse policymakers of their unrealistic expectations. These cases point to the pessimistic hypothesis that policymakers with the greatest need to learn from external reality are the least likely to do so.

The Cuban missile crisis appears to conform, at least in part, to this pattern. By all American accounts, Soviet leaders had strong—even compelling—incentives to put missiles into Cuba. The most widely accepted interpretations of their action attributed Soviet policymakers' action to their need to redress the strategic balance.[78] As is well known, the Kennedy administration decided in the autumn of 1961 to tell the Soviets that it knew that their first-generation ICBM had proven a failure. This was done in the hope of moderating Khrushchev's bellicosity over Berlin. However, it put the Soviets on notice that the United States, through its satellite reconnaissance, realized the full extent of Soviet vulnerability to a first strike. Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba are therefore said by many analysts to have been conceived of as a "quick fix" to compensate in the short term for Soviet strategic inferiority.

The other cases of brinkmanship revealed a multiplicity of motives on the part of the initiator. Collectively, these cases held out the promise of sufficient rewards to make policymakers more willing to run whatever risks involved with

[78] See Horelick and Rush, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 141; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 200–202; Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, 231; Steel, "End Game," 229; Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 52–56; George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 461–62.

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a policy of brinkmanship. This may also have been true for Soviet leaders. Graham Allison has suggested that the missiles could have been perceived as the solution to a number of different problems confronted by influential groups within the Soviet hierarchy. In addition to offering a readily available means of coping with American strategic superiority, putting missiles in Cuba could have appealed to the foreign ministry as a way of dramatizing Soviet support for Castro and of demonstrating Soviet resolve to Peking, then contesting Moscow's leadership of the communist "movement." The missiles promised to achieve strategic goals inexpensively, freeing more funds for the industrial sector. If the ploy was successful, it would also give Khrushchev more "chips" to play in negotiations over Berlin. Finally, an aggressive policy promised to advance Khrushchev's political interests and those of his supporters, who must certainly have felt the need for a major success after the failure of their two Berlin offensives and their domestic agricultural programs. For all of these reasons, Allison suggested, a powerful coalition may have developed in favor of putting missiles into Cuba, a coalition composed of political leaders and bureaucrats who envisaged the move as the solution to their particular problems.[79]

To the extent that Khrushchev and those around him felt the need to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba, they also had a need to believe that they could do so successfully. Perhaps many of the explanations that have been offered to account for Moscow's misjudgment are better understood as rationalizations that may have been invoked by Soviet leaders to justify their decision and to dispel whatever anxiety they may have harbored about the risks it entailed. Subsequent to making their decision, they can have been expected to have become even less sensitive to information that suggested their policy would not succeed.

The timing of the Soviet decision is probably very important in this regard. All the available evidence points to the decision having been made sometime in the late spring or early summer of 1962, before any of Kennedy's warnings. Commitments, once made, influence receptivity to warnings.[80] In Korea, for example, the American commitment to unify the penninsula appears to have conditioned policymakers in Washington to dismiss Chinese threats of intervention as bluff because, if believed, the threats would have compelled a reversal in policy and with it a serious loss of prestige.[81] The same phenomenon may have occurred in the case of Cuba.

[79] Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 237–44.

[80] For a discussion of the literature supporting this view, see the following: Joseph de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Co., 1968), 146; Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 56.

[81] This argument is made in the following sources: Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 133–36; de Rivera, *Psychological Dimensions*, 143–44; George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 196–98, 463–64;

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By September 4, when Kennedy issued his first specific warning, the Soviets had already embarked on a clear course of action. They had secured Castro's approval for the missiles, had shipped men, building materials, and weapons to Cuba, and were well advanced with the construction of the actual missile sites. To have backed down at this point would almost certainly have endangered relations with Castro. If word of the fiasco leaked out, as it almost certainly would have, the Soviet Union would have also lost face with China, which had already charged Moscow with undue timidity. In addition, a withdrawal would have caused a serious conflict within the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev would have been pilloried by his enemies for embarking upon a harebrained scheme and then losing nerve in the course of its execution. Khrushchev could easily have reasoned that all of this might have been sufficient to result in his loss of power. But he must have realized that to persevere if Kennedy meant what he said held out the prospect of a full-fledged confrontation with the United States.

This is precisely the kind of decisional conflict that encourages what Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann have called "defensive avoidance."[82] Policymakers who perceive that serious risks are inherent in their current policies, but upon reflection are unable to identify an acceptable alternative, experience psychological stress. They become emotionally aroused and preoccupied with finding a less risky but nevertheless feasible policy alternative. If, after further investigation, they conclude that it is unrealistic to hope for a better strategy, they will terminate their search for one, despite continuing dissatisfaction with the available option. This results in a pattern of "defensive avoidance," characterized by efforts to avoid fear-arousing warnings.

Soviet leaders, being no more or less human than the rest of us, may well have responded to their decisional dilemma by "bolstering" the policy to which they were committed. If so, they could easily have exaggerated to themselves the positive conseqences of successfully deploying their missiles in Cuba. At the same time, they would have minimized the chance of any serious American reaction and would have made every effort to reinterpret or discredit information that suggested otherwise. In this regard, Ambassador Dobrynin, known by reputation as a man reluctant to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy in Moscow, may have facilitated their task by watering down the impact of the private warnings he received from members of the Kennedy administration so as not to offend or upset his political superiors. Soviet leaders could therefore have maintained their comforting illusions until reality rudely intervened in the form of Kennedy's announcement of the blockade. Fortunately for everyone, they possessed the psychological resources to recognize their miscalculation and respond with adaptive behavior.

Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, 176–78. Graham Allison has speculated that the fact that Kennedy's warnings came after the Soviet commitment may have had some effect on Soviet perception of them. See Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 234.

[82] See Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 48–57, 74, 107–33.

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Conclusion

The first conclusion that must be drawn from this analysis of Soviet policymakers is that American analysts really do not know how Soviet leaders assessed the risks associated with deploying missiles in Cuba or why they decided to accept these risks. Many of the theories offered in explanation are simply not credible. Others build their case from data that are equally supportive of quite contradictory inferences. All, including the present author's own explanation, lack evidential support. They are, at best, clever speculations about Soviet behavior consistent with the few established facts.

Although it was beyond the scope of this article to do so, it would have been relatively easy to demonstrate that American analysts' lack of knowledge extends to just about every other aspect of Soviet decision-making in the Cuban missle crisis. If this is true of Cuba, an event that took place almost twenty years ago and that has been extensively studied, how much truer it is of more recent Soviet initiatives, whose understanding benefits from neither the meager documentary evidence available on the missile crisis nor from the greater analytical detachment that develops in the fullness of time. In effect, imaginative analysts can readily devise an explanation consonant with their own intellectual or ideological orientation. When these interpretations gain sufficient acceptance, they are used to validate academic dogmas or actual foreign policies. Such a process occurred with Kennedy's "courage and commitment" thesis. It may be happening again with regard to interpretations of Moscow's projection of influence into Africa and its invasion of Afghanistan. Those, like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Richard Pipes, who recommended policies based on what these developments "reveal" about Soviet goals and risk taking, ought to show more respect for the tenuous nature of the West's understanding of Soviet foreign policy.

Second, none of the authors discussed here were prepared to consider that Khrushchev may have lacked plausible reasons for believing that Kennedy would fail to act in defense of his commitment. It nevertheless seems likely that Khrushchev, like so many national leaders before and since, engaged in wishful thinking—that he convinced himself that what he wanted to happen would despite the evidence to the contrary. The present author aside, only Howard Dinerstein has advocated this interpretation.[83]

The assumption of rationality on Khrushchev's part is all the more puzzling given the prevailing assessment of Khrushchev's personality. No major author has suggested that Khrushchev was a prudent man. He was attracted to grand gestures and acted impulsively. He gambled, often with little apparent chance of success. Cuba fits perfectly with this pattern of behavior. It should be seen in the same light as his bluff about the potency of Soviet strategic forces, his Berlin challenges, and his virgin lands program. Along with Cuba, these initia-

[83] Herbert S. Dinerstein, *The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 152–53.

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tives were probably the "harebrained schemes" that his politburo colleagues referred to at the time of his dismissal. Western analysts are therefore in the odd position of defending the behavior of a Soviet leader, a man who the Soviets themselves ridicule for his lack of judgment.

What accounts for this compulsion to portray Soviet policy as rational? Philosophers of science have observed that scientists tend to fit data into existing frameworks even if the framework does not do justice to the facts. Investigators deduce evidence in support of theory. Theory, once accepted, determines to which facts they pay attention. According to Thomas Kuhn, the several fields of science are each dominated by a "paradigm," an accepted body of related concepts that establishes the framework for research.[84] The paradigm determines the phenomena that are important and what kinds of explanations "make sense." It also dictates the kinds of facts and explanations that are to be ignored because they are outside the paradigm or not relevant to the problems the paradigm has defined as important. Paradigms condition investigators to reject evidence that contradicts their expectations, to misunderstand it, to twist its meaning to make it consistent, to explain it away, to deny it, or simply to ignore it.

Since 1950, deterrence theory has been widely accepted by political scientists. In a 1979 article on the subject, Robert Jervis called it "probably the most influential school of thought in the American study of international relations."[85] Put simply, deterrence consists of manipulating other actors' assessment of their interests and seeks to prevent a specified action by convincing the actor who might contemplate it that its costs exceed its rewards. Individuals or states who employ deterrence identify their interests and commit themselves to their defense. By demonstrating their ability and willingness to do so, they attempt to convince others that it is not in their interests to challenge these commitments. When these efforts succeed, the commitments in question are said to be credible.

Deterrence theory is based on the premise that policymakers behave in terms of a rational calculus that maximizes payoffs and minimizes costs. It therefore assumes that credible commitments will not be challenged unless an adversary does so deliberately to provoke a conflict. When deterrence "fails," analysts do not blame the theory, but the policymakers who attempted to implement it—somehow they did not succeed in imparting sufficient credibility to their commitment. Perhaps this explains what has happened with regard to the Cuban missile crisis. Analysts, working within the dominant paradigm, have gone to great lengths to make the case consistent with the theory. As a result, the paradigm has drawn their attention away from what may be a more interesting and important question about the crisis: Why and how were Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders so blind to reality?

[84] See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[85] Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31 (1979): 289–324.

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There is another explanation worth considering for this phenomenon. Deterrence is the major intellectual and policy bulwark against nuclear war. It is based on the comforting assumption that nuclear adversaries are so horrified by the devastating consequences of nuclear war that they will behave prudently toward one another. For this reason, the definition and communication of truly vital commitments can be expected to function as a reasonably efficacious strategy of conflict avoidance. To recognize that the one acute thermonuclear crisis to date was brought about by the irresponsible and irrational judgments of the leader of a nuclear superpower—perhaps by the entire inner circle of its foreign policymaking elite—would call into question the most fundamental assumption of deterrence. It may be that this is why so many investigators have sought to lay the onus for Khrushchev's miscalculation at Kennedy's feet by arguing that Kennedy's actions undercut the credibility of his commitment. By doing so, analysts have attempted to preserve intact the theory of deterrence and with it their emotional composure.

The way in which students of the crisis have exaggerated Kennedy's skill in managing the crisis offers some corroboration of the suspicion that Cuba has been used to shore up emotional defenses against nuclear war. As this author has tried to demonstrate elsewhere, analysts have studiously ignored the "group think" and other deviations from "open decision-making" that in fact characterized Kennedy's management of that confrontation. Their interpretations are reassuring because they imply that leaders can still act cooly and skillfully when subjected to the kind of stress generated by a nuclear crisis.[86]

One of the first serious analyses of the Cuban missile crisis was Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter's *Controlling the Risks in Cuba*, published in 1965.[87] In this landmark study, the Wohlstetters contended that Khrushchev's and Kennedy's performance provided a stunning counterexample to the pessimistic predictions of nuclear holocaust made by so many behavioral scientists up to that time. They also propagated the view that the crisis had come about because of miscalculations that were both understandable and correctable. The real problem, the Wohlstetters insisted, was that "each side in short tended to project its own psychology or certain stereotypes about the behavior of the other."[88] The review of the literature here suggests that this is even truer of the analysts; their interpretations of the crisis tell us at least as much about themselves as they do about Khrushchev and Kennedy. The Cuban missile crisis might be likened to a Rorschach test: the ink blots that constitute the few facts reveal little that is conclusive about Soviet policymaking, but the responses of political scientists to them say a lot about their anxiety concerning nuclear war. Unfortunately, the attempt by the analysts to deny the strong strain of irrationality that runs through even the most momentous policy decisions will not make such a war any less likely.

[86] Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, 291–305.
[87] See Albert Wohlstetter and Roberta Wohlestetter, *Controlling the Risks*.
[88] Ibid., 19–21.

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Regional Receptivity to Reform: The Legacy of the Progressive Era

MARTIN SHEFTER

Patronage plays a larger role in the politics of most cities and states in the northeastern quadrant of the United States than it does in the western half.[1] In this article, I attempt to account for this difference in the character of party politics in these two important regions of the country.[2] I will argue that these regional differences in American politics are an enduring legacy of the way political order was restored in the United States after the Civil War and Reconstruction. The "third" American party system was the central institution through which political stabilization was achieved after the upheavals of the 1860s and early 1870s, and patronage played a pervasive role in party politics in all regions of the nation at the time.[3] However, the party organizations

[1] See Raymond Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall), 127-29.

[2] In this article the "Northeast quadrant" (or simply the "Northeast") refers to the states east of the Mississippi River apart from those that joined the Confederacy, and the "West" refers to the states west of the Mississippi with the same exception. The structure of Southern politics is sufficiently distinctive that it will not be discussed in this essay.

[3] It would be helpful to indicate how some terms that are central to my analysis will be used in this article. "Patronage" is a divisible benefit that politicians distribute to individual voters, campaign workers, or contributors in exchange for political support. An electoral strategy that relies on the distribution of patronage to individuals is to be distinguished from one that elicits support by promising to provide collective benefits to, or by appealing to the collective values of, some or all segments of the electorate in question. See James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 110. Parties that pursue a patronage strategy may or may not be extensively organized and highly centralized. In the analysis below, parties that rely

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constructed in the cities and states of the West were, as a result of this process of stabilization, weaker and more narrowly based than their counterparts in the Northeast. Consequently, in the West during the Progressive Era, opponents of the patronage system were in a position to mobilize numerous voters who had never been attached to the norms and practices of the nineteenth century political order, and they were thereby able to overwhelm the regimes that governed the cities and states in that region. By contrast, in the Northeast, where party organizations were stronger and more broadly based, the Progressives were unable to destroy these organizations and reconstitute the electorate. Old-line party organizations in this region have to the present day managed to fight an extended, and partly successful, series of rearguard actions in defense of the patronage system against the successive reform movements that have attacked it during the twentieth century.

The Enduring Consequences of Party Organizational Strength

Before proceeding to explain why strong party organizations emerged in the Northeast but not in the West during the late nineteenth century and how the structure of that period's party system has had such an enduring influence on the character of American politics, it would be useful to present some evidence, shown in Table 1, to support these claims.

The units of analysis in Table 1 are the nonsouthern states that were admitted to the union prior to the collapse of the third party system in 1896. The three columns in the table list the states according to their ranking on three indicators. The first is the percentage of the state's urban population living in cities in which local elections were conducted on a partisan rather than on a nonpartisan basis in 1975.[4] These data provide a crude indication of whether reformers have been able to deprive political parties of the patronage they could obtain from controlling municipal governments.[5]

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heavily upon the distribution of patronage to mobilize support will be called "political machines" whether or not they command an elaborate and highly centralized electoral apparatus. See Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress,* 99. Parties that command a broadly based and tightly centralized electoral apparatus will be referred to as "strong party organizations," however they go about amassing support. See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 408. Finally, it is useful to distinguish between "corruption" and "patronage": a corrupt politician exchanges public benefits for private monetary gain (that is, for cash that goes into the politician's own pocket). Patronage, by contrast, involves the exchange of public benefits for political support or party advantage. See Huntington, *Political Order*, 70. Therefore it is possible for a city or state governed by a machine to have relatively moderate levels of corruption, and for a regime characterized by little patronage to be quite corrupt.

[4] More precisely, the denominator used in calculating the percentages reported in the first column of Table 1 is the total population of all cities in the state with more than 10,000 inhabitants, and the numerator is the total population of all cities of this size that have nonpartisan local elections.

[5] The most obvious alternative indicator for the extent to which the political parties in a state are patronage-oriented is the proportion of public employees in the state formally covered by a merit system. Numerous ways and means exist, however, for circumventing formal civil service rules, and

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TABLE 1

The Enduring Impact of Party Organizational Strength

Percent Urban Population in Partisan Cities, 1975		*Average Presidential Vote Turnout 1876-1892*		*Volatility Republican Vote 1876-1895*	
Ind.	97.9	Ind.	92.7	N.H.	1.24
Conn.	97.9	N.J.	92.2	Ind.	2.05
Penn.	96.8	Ohio	92.1	Ill.	2.08
N.Y.	90.2	Iowa	91.8	Ohio	2.46
Md.	84.4	N.H.	89.7	Del.	2.50
R.I.	76.2	N.Y.	89.0	Conn.	2.83
Vt.	55.2	W.Va.	87.5	N.J.	3.00
Mont.	50.6	Ill.	86.1	Iowa	3.10
N.J.	45.8	Conn.	82.8	Mass.	3.68
Ky.	42.3	Penn.	82.7	Maine	4.18
W.Va.	32.3	Md.	81.4	Mo.	4.28
Ohio	29.4	Wisc.	81.3	Vt.	4.28
N.H.	28.8	Kan.	80.1	Mich.	4.36
Minn.	20.8	Mo.	78.2	Md.	4.98
Ill.	14.8	Mich.	76.8	Ky.	5.46
Maine	14.8	Ky.	76.4	N.Y.	5.50
Kan.	8.6	Del.	76.1	Wisc.	5.77
Iowa	8.0	Mont.	74.2	Kan.	6.12
Mass.	4.7	Nev.	73.9	Colo.	6.31
Mo.	4.2	Vt.	73.4	W.Va.	6.40
Neb.	3.4	Maine	73.3	Penn.	6.46
Mich.	3.2	Calif.	72.4	Minn.	7.16
Ore.	2.7	Mass.	71.8	Mont.	7.80
Wisc.	1.1	S.D.	70.7	Ore.	7.80
Del.	0.0	Minn.	70.3	R.I.	7.88
Nev.	0.0	Wash.	67.3	Nev.	7.88
S.D.	0.0	Neb.	66.1	Neb.	8.92
Calif.	0.0	Ore.	64.9	Wyo.	11.50
Idaho	0.0	Idaho	63.1	Calif.	12.04
Wash.	0.0	N.D.	56.6	N.D.	13.60
N.D.	0.0	Colo.	55.5	S.D.	16.50
Colo.	0.0	R.I.	52.5	Idaho	16.50
Wyo.	0.0	Wyo.	47.7	Wash.	20.70

Sources: *The Municipal Yearbook, 1978* (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1978), 9-43; *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Bicentennial Edition, Part 2, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1975), 1071-72; *Guide to U.S. Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975), 397-437.

consequently there are states (such as New Jersey) whose public employees are fully covered by a merit system and yet whose political parties are highly patronage-oriented, as well as states (such as Utah) without a formal merit system whose party politics are not especially patronage-oriented. I selected the proxy used in Table 1 because it yields a ranking of the states that better conforms to that provided by more qualitative assessments of the role patronage plays in party politics. See, for example, Charles Adrian, *State and Local Governments* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967).

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In the second column, these states are ranked according to the average percentage of the eligible electorate that voted in the five presidential elections (1876–92) prior to the realignment of 1896. This is the period immediately preceding the attack on the patronage system launched by the Progressives, and electoral turnout in this period thus provides a measure of the breadth of support mobilized by the state's parties when there was as yet no impediment to the use of patronage.

The third column ranks the states according to the "volatility" of the Republican gubernatorial vote between 1876 and the last state election prior to 1896—that is, the average absolute change from one election to the next in the percentage of the total vote won by the Republican candidates.[6] These data provide a measure of the ability of the Republicans to hold on to their supporters in the face of third party challenges and national surges against it, and hence they provide an indication of how strong and reliable were the ties between the party and its mass base.[7]

There is a strong relationship between the regional location of states and their ranking on each of these three indicators. Thirteen of the eighteen Northeastern states, but only three of the fifteen in the West, rank at or above the median in the column of percentage of urban population living in cities with partisan elections. Thirteen of the eighteen states in the Northeast were among the top half of states in voter turnout in presidential elections between 1876 and 1892; the comparable figure for the western states again is three of fifteen. Finally, the Republican vote in gubernatorial elections between 1876 and 1895 was less volatile than the median value in thirteen of the eighteen Northeastern states; this was true of only three of the fifteen states in the West.

The ranking of states according to the percentage of their urban population living in partisan cities in 1975 is quite similar to their ranking on the two measures of the strength of their party organizations during the late nineteenth century. The method of paired comparisons indicates that in 68 percent of all pairs, the state that ranks higher in the first column of Table 1 ranks higher in the second column.[8] The comparable figure for the first and third columns is 64 percent.

[6] The mathematical statement of this is:

$$\text{Volatility} = \frac{\sum_{i=2}^{n} |X_i - X_{i-1}|}{n-1}$$

where X_i is the Republican percentage of the gubernatorial vote in election, i, X_{i-1} is the Republican vote in the preceding election, and n is the number of gubernatorial elections between 1876 and 1895.

[7] The volatility of a state's Democratic vote is largely a function of the volatility of its Republican vote, and therefore the ranking of the states according to the former is similar to their ranking according to the latter. Thus, the volatility of the Democratic vote is not displayed in Table 1.

[8] The methodology is based on E. Wood Kelley, "The Methodology of Hypothesis Testing" (unpublished manuscript, Cornell University, Department of Government).

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The data reported in Table 1 indicate that in the Northeastern states, where political parties had mobilized the broadest popular following and had constructed the strongest organizations when there was as yet no impediment to the use of patronage, politicans down to the present day have been better able to put up some resistance to successive waves of reformism. By contrast, in the western states, where politicans had failed to construct strong party organizations prior to the reformist challenges of the twentieth century, opponents of the patronage system have enjoyed greater success.

The Post-Reconstruction Political Settlement and Party Organizational Strength, 1876–96

The data in the section above suggest that patterns of politics prevailing today in the United States reflect in significant ways institutions that were established in the aftermath of the Civil War and the period of Reconstruction. This section analyzes some factors that can help explain why the Democratic and Republican parties of the late nineteenth century were better organized and more broadly based in the Northeastern quadrant of the country than in the states of the West.

A century ago, and today as well, cities and states were not autonomous political systems.[9] To explain why in the late nineteenth century strong, broadly based party organizations were constructed in the Northeast but not in the West, one must understand the relationship between, on the one hand, national political cleavages and coalitions, and, on the other, the structure of state and local politics in different regions of the country.

Following the Civil War and Reconstruction there occurred a process similar to the one that Charles Maier has described as following World War I in Europe.[10] In Europe at that time there was a great deal of turbulence as a consequence of wartime mobilization and the example of the Russian Revolution. Maier argued that in Europe conservative forces regrouped during the 1920s and restored order by creating corporatist institutions. Similarly, in the United States there was considerable turmoil during the late 1860s and early 1870s—in the South as a consequence of the Radical Republican effort to remake the political and social system of the former Confederate states, and in the North as a consequence of wartime mobilization and the example of Radical Reconstruction. In the United States during the 1870s there was also a regrouping of conservative forces and a similar extrusion of radical elements from the political system. But here political stabilization was achieved not through the creation of corporatist institutions, but rather through the reconstruction and institutionalization of the party system.

[9] Paul Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

[10] Charles Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

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The lead in fashioning the political settlement that ended the turbulence of the Civil War and Reconstruction periods was taken by professional politicians from the Northeast who moved into dominant positions in the national parties during the 1870s.[11] A major reason these politicians moved to the fore of both parties was that they developed a formula for uniting their respective parties, minimizing defections to potentially threatening third parties, and attracting the contributions the parties needed to run their campaigns. Elements of each party resisted this settlement, but it ultimately came to define the character of political debate in American politics.

As the nineteenth century progressed, both parties came to give less attention to the "Southern question."[12] Republican politicians continued to "wave the bloody shirt" and denounce "Southern outrages" in their campaign rhetoric, and as late as 1890 they threatened to introduce a federal presence in the South to protect the franchise of black men. But by the mid-1870s Republicans had basically abandoned the idea of using a military occupation to remake the social system of the former Confederate states. As for the Democrats, they continued to rail against "black Republicanism" and to champion "states' rights," but in the so-called New Departure they accepted the legitimacy of the three Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution. Republican and Democratic politicians came to give less attention to the plight of blacks in the South, in part because this issue lost some of its popular appeal as the Civil War receded in time. But attention also shifted because the emerging labor conflicts and agrarian radicalism in the North and West led businessmen allied with the two parties to regarded as potentially disruptive the extreme positions the parties had staked out on racial issues during the period of Radical Reconstruction.[13]

Many influential Democratic and Republican politicans also were prepared to arrange compromises on the issue of currency inflation or deflation—an issue that threatened to split the parties along sectional lines and drive large numbers of voters to third parties, and that had the dangerous potential of serving as a basis for an alliance between poor farmers in the South and West.[14] Both parties also took moderate positions on labor issues—for example, by supporting the creation of a Bureau of Labor Statistics—so as to avoid party splits along class lines.[15] Both parties also supported civil service reforms that satisfied the de-

[11] Morton Keller, *Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977), 561; David Montgomery, *Beyond Equality* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 386.

[12] Stanley Hirshon, *Farewell to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern Negro* (Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1968).

[13] C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951).

[14] Robert Sharkey, *Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959); Irwin Unger, *The Greenback Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[15] David T. Burbank, *Reign of the Rabble: The St. Louis General Strike of 1877* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966), 191.

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mands of merchants for increased economy and efficiency in government (particularly in the major customs houses and post offices), without reducing the total amount of patronage available to the parties or turning the bureaucracy into an autonomous center of power.[16]

Finally, the two parties agreed to disagree on whether tariffs should be high or low.[17] By focusing on the tariffs—an extremely important issue to the Northeastern business community—the Republicans could attach manufacturers firmly to their cause, and also appeal to laborers who worked in protected industries. The Democrats found the issue equally useful. Tariff reform appealed to merchants engaged in foreign trade, to the bankers who financed this trade, and to industries interested in cheaper raw materials.[18] To drive home their point that workers and farmers, as well as businessmen, had a strong stake in tariff levels, they argued that their party's stance on tariffs was consistent with its stance on ethnocultural and racial issues.[19] The Democrats argued that the efforts of the Republicans to place a surcharge on every item the worker consumed were similar to their efforts to dictate what he could and could not do on his Sundays and their efforts to elevate blacks to a position of equality with whites. Democrats asserted their party's commitment, by contrast, to "personal liberty" and limited government as the best defense against this meddling fanaticism. The Republicans sought to identify the indifference of the Democrats to the plight of American workers who lost their jobs as a result of goods produced by cheap foreign labor with their indifference to public morality and to the plight of blacks who were being deprived of their right to vote in the South.

The fact that the division between the two parties on the national level involved an issue that was more salient to important interests in the Northeast than in the West contributed to the emergence of strong, broadly based party organizations in the Northeast and to the failure of such organizations to be constructed in the Western states during the late nineteenth century.

Party Organizations in the Northeast

Democratic and Republican party leaders who sought to secure their control over municipal and state governments in the Northeast during the late nineteenth century had to deal with a number of problems. They had to manage ethnic tensions among their constituents and cope with competition from the labor movement for the loyalty of their working class supporters.[20] They also

[16] Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), ch. 3.

[17] H. Wayne Morgan, "The Republican Party 1876–1896," in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of U.S. Political Parties* (New York: Chelsea House, 1970).

[18] R. Hal Williams, "Dry Bones and Dead Language: The Democratic Party," in H. Wayne Morgan, ed., *The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970).

[19] Keller, *Affairs of State,* 252.

[20] Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

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had to worry about ward leaders who paid more attention to solidifying their own positions by distributing patronage to their personal followers than to mobilizing new voting groups that could help the party win elections. Another danger they faced arose from corruption on the part of subordinate politicians, since revelations of corruption—which was rampant in American politics in the years following the Civil War—could provide the other major party with an issue it could use to advantage.

There were two ways in which political actors during this period sought to deal with the problem of corruption: by strengthening public bureaucracies or by strengthening party organizations. The former alternative was the one advocated by Mugwump reformers. By establishing competitive examinations to control the hiring and promotion of public employees and by protecting civil servants against arbitrary dismissal, reformers sought to reduce the range of public benefits over which politicians would be able to exercise control, and thereby to diminish the variety and quantity of patronage that politicians would be in a position to sell.

Corruption also could be reduced by strengthening local party organizations because, as Henry Jones Ford has written, "the weakness of party organization is the opportunity of corruption."[21] A politician who is an independent political operator is more likely than one subject to the discipline of a party organization to seek quick financial gains in politics and to ignore the problems his rapaciousness creates for the party as a whole. To cite the most extreme case, it was the very weakness of New York City's Tammany Hall machine that contributed to the massive corruption of the Tweed Ring, because bribery or providing politicians with the opportunity to steal from the public treasury were the only ways in which Boss Tweed could exert any influence over his associates.[22] By strengthening and centralizing the organizations they led, top party officials sought to acquire the capacity to impose a measure of discipline on their members in less politically dangerous ways. Party leaders would then be in a position to compel ward politicians and public office-holders to take the long-run interests of the party into account by moderating (though not completely abandoning) their efforts to make money in office. In particular, they would be compelled to limit themselves to what George Washington Plunkitt termed "honest graft," rather than using any and all means to maximize their income in the short run, regardless of the consequences for the party as a whole.[23]

1971), ch. 3; Joseph Rayback, *A History of American Labor* (New York: Free Press, 1966), 125–26, 136–39, 169–73.

[21] Huntington, *Political Order*, 71.

[22] Seymour Mandelbaum, *Boss Tweed's New York* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), ch. 6.

[23] "Honest graft," as Plunkitt termed it, is the use by politicians of inside information and personal contacts to make money—as opposed to embezzlement and other forms of outright theft. See William Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1963), 3–6.

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Strengthening their party organizations would also address the other major problems confronting Democratic and Republican party leaders. By developing a more highly articulated structure at the ward level, the party would be better able to hold on to its followers in the face of competition from the labor movement and from politicians who relied on strident ethnic appeals. In addition, by centralizing control at the city level, party leaders could compel ward leaders to reward precinct workers on the basis of their contributions to the party's total vote, rather than on their personal fealty to the incumbent ward leadership, and to bring new voters into the party's camp.

If power within a party organization was to be centralized, its leader needed to acquire control over some resource crucial to the party's success, so that his subordinates needed him more than he needed any one of them. Party leaders accomplished this centralization during the late nineteenth century by entering into alliances with prominent members of the local business community. By forging such alliances, party leaders gained access to a legitimate source of campaign contributions, and, equally important, they acquired a measure of respectability that enabled the candidates they backed to win middle class votes. The Tammany organization in New York City provides a particularly clear example of this strategy of party leadership. John Kelly, who in the words of one contemporary "found Tammany a horde [and] left it a political army," strengthened and centralized the Tammany organization in the 1870s by allying with such wealthy Democrats as Samuel Tilden, New York's leading corporation lawyer, Abram Hewitt and Edward Cooper, iron manufacturers, and Augustus Schell, a director of the New York Central and a half dozen other railroads.[24] Similarly, Pat Maguire, under whose leadership the Democratic City Committee in Boston reached the peak of its power in the 1880s and 1890s, was allied with such Brahmins as Josiah Quincy III and Nathan Matthews.[25] Finally, Boies Penrose, who took control of the Philadelphia Republican machine in the 1880s, was himself a member of a socially prominent family.[26]

For their part, metropolitan elites were prepared to enter into alliances with state and local party leaders, and to collaborate in their efforts to strengthen the state and local organizations of the Democratic and Republican parties, because the national parties divided along lines that mirrored the central cleavage that divided northeastern businessmen. This cleavage was between low-tariff commercial and financial interests, and high-tariff industrial interests. By helping to centralize and to extend the popular base of the Democratic or Republican

[24] M. R. Werner, *Tammany Hall* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1928), 276; Mandlebaum, *Boss Tweed's New York*, 92; David Hammack, *Power and Society: Greater New York at the Turn of the Century* (New York: Russell Sage, 1982), ch. 5.

[25] Geoffrey Blodgett, *The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), ch. 6.

[26] Walter Davenport, *Power and Glory: The Life of Boies Penrose* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1931).

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party, as the case might be, these elites helped strengthen the very institutions that fought their battles in national politics and that worked to exclude from the national political arena issues that might lead to a dangerous alliance between southern and western agrarian radicals. At the same time, strong local party organizations could serve their interests in city politics because they had the capacity to place at least some limits on municipal corruption and expenditures, and to exclude from the local arena potentially threatening forces, such as the labor movement.

The highly organized political machines that were constructed during the late nineteenth century also served the interests of the subordinate politicians who were prepared to accept their discipline. Prior to the emergence of these party organizations, local politics had been a very freewheeling business. The precinct captains and ward leaders who worked for centralized machines, and the public officials who were elected with their support, enjoyed less autonomy than their predecessors; but they received a considerable measure of political security in return. Moreover, the construction of well organized and broadly based machines enabled these political functionaries, who commonly were recruited from the middle class or the upwardly mobile working class, to drive out competitors for the political leadership of the city's immigrant masses. Such competitors included gang leaders and volunteer fire captains who formerly had played major roles in partisan combat, and the union leaders who in the 1880s staged forays into electoral politics.[27]

In sum, in the states and cities of the Northeast, both politicians and businessmen found it in their interest to strengthen the local organizations of the national political parties during a period when they were in a position to make use of patronage for this purpose without arousing any substantial opposition. As a result, much of the electorate came to be linked to the polity through patronage-oriented party organizations, which had the capacity to induct successive generations of voters into this pattern of political activity.

Party Organizations in the West

In contrast to their counterparts in the Northeast, politicians in the territories and states of the West did not build highly structured and broadly based party organizations during the late nineteenth century. Strong party organizations

[27] In contrast to youth gangs of recent decades, nineteenth century gangs were composed of adults, and they participated in some of the rougher forms of partisan combat in the antebellum city. See Amy Bridges, *A City in the Republic: New York and the Origins of Machine Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch. 4. On the labor movement's entry into city politics in the mid-1880s, see Eric Foner, *Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), ch. 8, and Martin Shefter, "The Electoral Foundations of the Political Machine: New York City, 1884–1897," in Joel Silbey, et. al., eds., *The History of American Electoral Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

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failed to emerge during these decades partly because the West had only recently been settled, but also because politicians did not find it necessary to construct them in order to gain or retain power. In addition, the most important local political forces did not find that their interests would be served by strengthening the Democratic or Republican party organizations. The reason that politicians and local elites found it neither necessary nor especially advantageous to build strong party organizations ultimately concerned the West's peripheral status in both the economic and political systems of late nineteenth century America.[28]

The most important institutions in the economies of the western states and territories in the late nineteenth century were railroads (and in some states mining corporations) controlled by outsiders. In addition, the national parties, under whose labels politics was conducted, were controlled by politicans from the Northeast and were closely allied with economic interests from that region of the country.

These characteristics of the western states had two important consequences for the structure of party politics in that region. The first was that in efforts to gain office and remain in power, politicians could draw on the resources of "the company"—the railroad or mining corporation that overshadowed all other local institutions.[29] Railroads were particularly powerful because they commanded enormous resources, penetrated throughout the hinterland of the territory or state, and occupied a strategic position in the local economy. As a result, local businessmen and farmers found it was in their interest to promote the interests of the railroad. The railroad could provide the politicians with money to finance campaigns and with a network of agents scattered throughout the state—services that politicians in the Northeast constructed political machines to obtain.[30]

The second reason that politicians and their allies were not driven to engage in competitive party building was that the issue that most clearly divided the national parties up to the late nineteenth century—the protective tariff—was not the most salient one in the West. Westerners were not indifferent to the tariff, but prior to the crisis of the 1890s the issue of railroad regulation was more salient to merchants and farmers in the West. Their own prosperity and the prosperity of their communities was less a function of whether the goods they produced or sold were protected by a tariff than of whether they had access to rail transportation and of the freight rates they were charged. A striking incident illustrating this point with regard to farmers occurred in 1890 after

[28] See Walter Dean Burnham, "The System of 1896: An Analysis," in Paul Kleppner, ed., *The Evolution of American Electoral Systems* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 152–53, 168–69.

[29] Gerald Nash, *The American West in the Twentieth Century* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 44–45.

[30] Kenneth Owens, "Pattern and Structure in Western Territorial Politics," *Journal of Western History* 1 (1970): 373–90.

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California citrus growers secured an increase in the tariff on lemons. As soon as Congress raised the tariff, the Southern Pacific Railroad boosted the rate it charged for shipping lemons to the east coast, thus wiping out much of the benefit of the tariff increase.[31] As for western merchants, their chief concern was competition with businessmen in other cities. This competition was unaffected by tariff schedules, and was largely a function of relative transportation costs.

Because the issues of greatest salience to western merchants and farmers were not those that divided the Republican and Democratic parties nationally, cleavages on these issues cut across party lines. The railroads enjoyed allies and exercised influence in both parties, and there were anti-railroad forces in each. Consequently, conflicts between pro- and anti-railroad forces most commonly took the form of factional struggles within each party rather than of battles between the parties. For this reason, political elites in the West, unlike their counterparts in the East, were not driven to strengthen the organizations of the Republican and Democratic parties in the course of struggles over the issues of greatest concern to them.

But why did not the pro- and anti-railroad forces in each party attempt to overwhelm the opposing faction and seize control of the party by outmobilizing and outorganizing the other side? The answer to this question lies in part in the way conflicts over railroad issues divided states during the nineteenth century, and in part in the character of the institutions through which these conflicts were settled. The issue of railroad regulation divided states along geographic lines. For example, communities that were served by a single railroad line had an interest in strong regulatory statutes that would reduce railroad rates. Communities that were served by two or more railroads were less concerned about regulation to the extent that they could count on competition to keep their rates down. Communities not served by any railroad were opposed to rate regulation because railroads financed new construction with bonds whose repayment was financed by the profits made on their existing lines.[32] During the nineteenth century these conflicts between the proponents and opponents of railroad regulation were fought out in state legislatures and in party conventions. In both of these institutions, votes were allocated among communities on a population basis, and hence the pro- and anti-railroad forces would gain no advantage by working to secure large electoral majorities behind the legislators or delegates pledged to their cause. Rather than competing through a process of mobilization and counter-mobilization, then, the proponents and opponents of railroad regulation sought to gain control of legislatures and party conventions by striking compromises, by making deals, and by seeking to outmaneuver

[31] George Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 17.

[32] Ward McAfee, "Local Interests and Railroad Regulations in California During the Granger Decade," *Pacific Historical Review* 37 (1968):51–66.

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the other side. In this process of factional bargaining and maneuver, the railroad had the advantage of its ability to buy the votes of neutral delegates and even delegates pledged to its opponents. It is little wonder, then, that the western Progressives regarded political parties as tools of "the interests." Accordingly, they sought to destroy parties and return government to "the people" by establishing direct primaries and the initiative, referendum, and recall. In time, they were able to overwhelm the prevailing regimes in the western states by pursuing a strategy of mobilization.

Electoral Mobilization During The Progressive Era

The different trajectories of party development in the western and northeastern states during the late nineteenth century have had enduring implications for the structure of politics in these regions. Because political parties in the West were so loosely organized and narrowly based, reformers during the Progressive Era were able to deal them a crippling blow by bringing into the electorate voters who had not been mobilized by, or socialized into the values of, the prevailing regime. Reformers in the Northeast, in contrast, were not in a position to attract unaffiliated voters. As a result, locally dominant political machines suffered only temporary losses during the Progressive Era, and were able in large measure to reassert themselves after Progressivism declined. An analysis of the structure of the Progressive vote in California and New York—the largest western and eastern states—indicates the extent to which the electoral foundations of Progressive reform differed in these two regions.

California: Electoral Mobilization and Progressive Victory

The structure of politics in California during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth century conforms closely to the western pattern outlined above. Politics in California during this period was ridden with patronage, but the party organizations in the state were weak. The most powerful force in state politics during this period was not a party organization, but rather the Southern Pacific Railroad. The most influential political figure in California was not a party boss, but rather the head of the railroad's Political Bureau.

It was in this context that the Progressive Movement emerged in California with the announced purpose of securing the "emancipation of the Republican Party in California from domination by the Political Bureau of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and allied interests," in the words of the leading Progressive organization in the state, the Lincoln-Roosevelt League.[33] It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the origins of California Progressivism or

[33] Mowry, *The California Progressives*, 70.

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to recount its history, but suffice it to say that immediately after its founding in 1907, the Lincoln-Roosevelt League scored a remarkable string of victories. In the first gubernatorial campaign after the League was organized, the Progressives managed to take over the Republican Party and to elect their candidate, Hiram Johnson, as governor. The ease with which they won was a token of both the organizational fragility and the narrow popular base of the regime they overturned. In the 1906 gubernatorial election, the one immediately preceding the Progressive challenge, a majority of the eligible electorate—50.2 percent—failed to vote.[34] For these reasons, the Progressives were able to mobilize new voters into the electorate and put together a political coalition whose composition differed considerably from any that had previously existed in the state.

Table 2 indicates the sources from which Hiram Johnson drew his support in his two campaigns for governor.[35] In the case of Johnson's 1910 campaign, everyone eligible to vote that year either had voted for the Republican candidate in the previous gubernatorial election (1906), had voted for the Democratic or some minor party candidate that year, had not been eligible to vote in California in 1906, or had abstained from voting even though eligible to do so. All Johnson voters in 1910 had occupied one of these categories in 1906, and each is listed in Table 2.

The column of figures headed "Proportion Within Each Category Going to Johnson" indicates the proportion of 1906 Republican voters, Democratic or minor party voters, ineligibles, and abstainers who voted for Hiram Johnson in 1910. The column headed "Proportion of Total Johnson Vote Coming From

[34] Michael Paul Rogin and John Shover, *Political Change in California* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), ch. 2.

[35] The estimates, reported in the first column of Tables 2 and 3, of the movement of eligible voters between parties and into the active electorate in successive elections, were derived from county-level election and census data by using weighted least squares regression to estimate the cell entries of an inter-election transition matrix. See Irwin Galen and Duane Meeter, "Building Voter Transition Models from Aggregate Data," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (1969): 545–66; A.G. Hawkes, "An Approach to the Analysis of Electoral Swing," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, 132 (1969): Part 1, 68–79; J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4 (1973): 237–62; W.L. Miller, "Measures of Electoral Change Using Aggregate Data," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, 135 (1972): Part 1, 122–42. These estimates were then used to calculate the figures reported in the second column of Tables 2 and 3—the proportion of Johnson's or Hughes's total vote in election t coming from persons who voted for party$_i$ (including the "party of abstainers" and the "party of ineligibles") in the previous election, t-1. If this is denoted q_{ij}, then:

$$q_{ij} = \frac{p_{ij} V_i^{t-1}}{V_j^t}$$

where p_{ij} denotes the proportion of party$_i$'s supporters in election t-1 who voted for Johnson or Hughes in election t (that is, the estimates reported in the first column of Tables 2 and 3), V_i^{t-1} denotes the total raw vote received by party$_i$ in election t-1, and V_j^t denotes the total raw vote received by Johnson or Hughes in election t. A full description of this article's methodology is available from the author on request.

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TABLE 2

Sources of the Progressive Vote: California

Gubernatorial Campaigns of Hiram Johnson	*Proportion From Each Category Going to Johnson*	*Proportion of Total Johnson Vote Coming From Each Category*
Johnson 1910		
1906 Democrats and Minor Parties	.24	.25
1906 Republicans	.68	.48
1906 Ineligibles	.11	.08
1906 Abstainers	.10	.19
R^2 = .802		
Johnson 1914		
1910 Democrats and Minor Parties	.19	.09
1910 Republicans	.46	.18
1910 Ineligibles	.28	.51
1910 Abstainers	.27	.22
R^2 = .018		
Johnson 1914 (Allowing for intrastate regional differences.)		
1910 Democrats and Minor Parties	.25	.10
1910 Republicans	.46	.15
1910 Ineligibles	.28	.44
1910 Abstainers (South and Central Valley)	.06	.01
1910 Abstainers (North)	.48	.31
R^2 = .210		

Source: Voting data from Interuniversity Consortium for Political Research; size of eligible electorate interpolated from Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913), 2:169-79; and Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, vol. III, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), 112-17.

For clarity of presentation, standard errors are not reported along with the estimates in Tables 2 and 3. In no case, however, does one exceed .03, and in all cases the estimates are considerably greater than twice their standard errors.

Each Category" indicates the proportion of 1910 Johnson voters who in 1906 had voted for the Republican gubernatorial candidate, the Democratic (or minor party) candidate, had been ineligible to vote, or had abstained from voting. The figures in the first column, then, enable one to answer such questions as: What proportion of 1906 abstainers voted for Johnson in 1910? Those in the second column enable one to answer a somewhat different question: What proportion of Johnson's vote in 1910 came from 1906 abstainers?

The estimates reported in the first column of Table 2 indicate that the Progressives in 1910 were able to win extensive support among voters who had backed other parties in the previous election. Almost one-quarter of the 1910 voters who had supported the Democrats or a minor party in 1906 cast their ballots for Johnson in 1910. (At the same time, however, one-third of the 1910 voters who had supported the Republicans in 1906 refused to stay with the GOP

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after Johnson captured its gubernatorial nomination.) The estimates reported in the second column reveal how substantially the coalition the Progressives constructed in 1910 differed from the one that had elected the Republican gubernatorial candidate in 1906. An estimated 52 percent of those who supported Johnson in 1910 had not voted for the Republican candidate in the previous election. Approximately half of these had not participated at all in the previous election—8 percent of the 1910 Johnson voters had not been eligible to vote in 1906, and 19 percent had abstained from voting in 1906.

In 1914 the Progressives substantially reorganized their coalition, mobilizing yet more voters into the electorate. The 1914 Progressive campaign differed from the 1910 campaign in two ways that must be noted when interpreting the figures reported in Table 2. First, between the elections of 1910 and 1914 California granted women the right to vote—thus sharply increasing the number of newly eligible voters. The analysis below must assume that the structure of the female vote was not so completely different from that of the male vote as to render a comparison between the 1910 and 1914 elections meaningless. Second, in contrast to 1910, when he ran for governor as the Republican candidate, Johnson and his associates in 1914 bolted the GOP and organized the Progressive party. Johnson ran for a second term as the nominee of that new party.

Even with these qualifications, the extent to which Johnson remade his electoral coalition in his second gubernatorial campaign remains striking. Only 46 percent of the voters who had supported Johnson in 1910 voted for him again in 1914. And 73 percent of Johnson's votes in 1914 came from persons who had not voted in 1910. To be sure, the enormous drop in support for Johnson among those who had voted for him in his first campaign was influenced by the fact that he ran for reelection as a third party candidate and against a regular Republican. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that slightly more than half of the voters who marked their ballots for Johnson on the GOP line in 1910 refused to vote for him four years later when he ran on the Progressive line. Moreover, the enormous role that persons who had not voted in 1910 played in Johnson's 1914 coalition was substantially (though not entirely) a function of the advent of women's suffrage: 51 percent of those voting for Johnson in 1914 had not been eligible to vote four years earlier. This fact does not, however, provide grounds for dismissing these changes in the structure of the vote for Johnson as a consequence of mere changes in legal forms, because the decisions of the Progressives to establish an independent party and to enfranchise women were taken in full cognizance of their political significance: the new party was the mechanism through which the Progressives reorganized their electoral base, and the Progressives expected that they would benefit disproportionately from female suffrage. This expectation proved to be correct. Among those newly eligible voters who did participate in the 1914 election, Johnson won the support of 51 percent, his Republican opponent received the votes of 32 percent, and the Democratic and minor party candidates won 16 percent (46 percent of the newly eligible did not vote).

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Two other features of the 1914 election merit mention. First, a remarkable 22 percent of Johnson's 1914 vote came from persons who had abstained from voting in 1910 though eligible to vote that year. These voters evidently were mobilized into the active electorate by events transpiring between the two campaigns. Second, there is scarcely any relationship between Johnson's 1914 vote and the distribution of votes across counties in 1910 (the R^2 of the 1914 Johnson equation is a mere .018).

One possible explanation for this latter finding is that the assumption in the analysis above—that voter transition rates are uniform across all counties in the state—is false.[36] In fact, there are good reasons to believe that voter transition rates between 1910 and 1914 did vary in different regions of the state. In 1910, Johnson focused his campaign exclusively on the railroad issue. This issue had especially strong popular appeal in the agricultural counties of the Central Valley and Southern California. During his first term, however, Johnson made a strong bid for labor support, endorsing much (though not all) of the legislative program of the California Federation of Labor.[37] Johnson's stand on labor issues appealed to members of the working class, especially in the San Francisco Bay area, but it infuriated many of the conservative anti-railroad forces that had supported Johnson in 1910.

A second set of figures shown in Table 2 was estimated to test this hypothesis concerning changes in support for Johnson in different regions of California, and to find out more about the group of greatest relevance to this analysis—those who abstained in the 1910 election, but voted for Johnson in 1914. Separate transition rates were calculated for abstainers in the Central Valley and Southern California, on the one hand, and the remainder of the state, on the other.[38]

Two conclusions emerge from this procedure. First, the variance explained by the second Johnson 1914 equation is significantly higher than by the first, thus indicating that making a distinction between the rate at which abstainers in different regions of California moved into the electorate substantially increases one's ability to ascertain the sources from which Johnson drew his 1914 vote. Second, the figures reported in the second column of Table 2 indicate that very few of the 1910 abstainers who voted for Johnson in 1914 lived in the Central Valley or Southern California. Rather, they came almost entirely from the remaining counties, the bulk of whose population was concentrated in the San

[36] The low R^2 of the 1914 Johnson equation cannot be attributed solely to the doubling of the eligible electorate with the enfranchisement of women. The coefficient of determination of an equation estimating the sources from which the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in 1914 drew his votes is fairly high: $R^2 = .656$.

[37] Rogin and Shover, *Political Change in California*, ch. 2–3; Alexander Saxton, "San Francisco Labor and the Populist and Progressive Insurgencies," *Pacific Historical Review* 34 (1965): 421–38.

[38] This was accomplished by estimating a separate slope dummy for the 1910 Abstainer variable in the counties of the Central Valley and the South. See Eric Hanushek and John E. Jackson, *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 106–108.

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Francisco Bay area. It seems reasonable to infer that many of these new voters were members of the working class who had been unmoved by Johnson's 1910 anti-railroad campaign, but who were mobilized into the electorate by Johnson's strategy during his first term of appealing for working class support by securing the passage of labor legislation. The fact that many members of San Francisco's heavily Catholic working-class population were mobilized into politics through this appeal to their collective interests may help explain why the political orientations of immigrants in that city, and more generally in the West, differ markedly from those of more patronage-oriented working class voters in the East, though regional differences in the social structure of ethnic subcommunities almost certainly played a role as well.

The estimates reported in Table 2 indicate that a substantial proportion of Hiram Johnson's support came from voters who were newly mobilized into the electorate, or at most loosely tied to the previous regime, and who therefore were unlikely to be strongly attached to its norms and practices.[39] These voters provided the Progressives with the popular base from which they launched their frontal attack on the system of party and patronage politics as previously conducted in California.

Because the Progressives in California were able to mobilize an extensive and independent base of support for themselves, they were able to exert a strong influence on the way politics was conducted thereafter in the state. The voters who rallied to the Progressive cause formed the initial mass base for the "candidate-centered" or "issue-oriented" style of electoral politics that has been evident in the state since the Progressive Era. These voters enabled the Progressives to gain control of the state legislature as well as the governorship, and thereby to enact legislation that dealt a fatal blow to the state's weak Democratic and Republican party organizations.[40] Some of these "reforms" (such as the provision in the state's election law that enabled an office-seeker to run in the primary of more than one party) contributed to a decline in competition in general elections, and consequently to a decline in voter turnout at the end of the Progressive Era. And the destruction of party organizations in the state has meant that elites who have sought to protect the bureaucracy against the raids of patronage-seeking politicians have faced little effective opposition. (The success in the early 1940s of the neo-Progressive crusade launched by Earl Warren and his allies against Governor Culbert Olson's administration, which did attempt to influence the appoint-

[39] It should be noted that the procedures used in this article enable one to determine how much support a candidate received among abstainers in the election immediately prior to the one being analyzed. It is, of course, possible that some of these abstainers might have participated in yet earlier elections. One may reasonably assume, however, that such "in-and-outers" were less strongly attached to the norms and practices of the earlier regime than voters who consistently participated in elections. Such an assumption certainly is consistent with the findings of contemporary survey research.

[40] John Owens, Edmond Costantini, and Louis Wechsler, *California Politics and Parties* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 36.

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ment of civil servants, stands as a case in point.)[41] The destruction of party organizations in the state also has left California's political system vulnerable to penetration by outside forces. Some of these (such as the Democratic and Republican club movements of the 1950s and 1960s) helped foster and maintain an issue-oriented style of politics in the state. But California also is the home of the nation's first political public relations firm, and a number of the most successful politicians in California in recent years have been as adept at manipulating political symbols as they are at expounding political ideas.

New York: Party Organization and Progressive Defeat

The pattern of party development in New York during the late nineteenth century differed considerably from that of California. Two strong, centralized, and broadly based party organizations were constructed in New York during the last three decades of the century: the Republican state machine under the leadership of Roscoe Conkling and Thomas Platt; the Democratic organization under the leadership of Dean Richmond and David Hill in Albany, and Tammany bosses John Kelly and Richard Croker in New York City. During the two decades prior to the 1896 realignment, the volatility of the Republican gubernatorial vote in New York was less than half as great as it was in California, and the mean voter turnout in presidential elections was 16.6 percent higher. Moreover, the two major parties were considerably more successful in New York than in California in holding on to their supporters in the face of third party challenges—the mean third party vote in New York gubernatorial elections was 3.6 percent, compared to California's 10.9 percent.

Progressivism in New York, as in California, was a political movement of groups that did not enjoy privileged access to the leadership of the state's parties. But the character and course of Progressivism in New York differed considerably from the California variant because political parties in the two states were so different. Because New York's parties rested on an extremely broad popular base—84.3 percent of the eligible electorate voted in the election immediately preceding the one that elevated a Progressive, Charles Evans Hughes, to the governorship[42]—the Progressives were not in a position to seize control of the parties by mobilizing previously inactive voters behind their cause. Hughes was nominated and elected as governor in 1906 and 1908 not so

[41] Robert Burke, *Olson's New Deal for California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).

[42] The 1904 gubernatorial election in New York coincided with a presidential election, and hence is not perfectly comparable to the California gubernatorial election of 1906, which occurred in an off-year. The turnout in the off-year 1902 New York gubernatorial election, however, was 74.0 percent—still considerably higher than California's 1906 turnout of 49.8 percent. To eliminate the confounding effect of turnout fluctuations between presidential and nonpresidential years, the equations estimating the coefficients reported in Table 3 regressed elections upon one another in four year intervals.

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much because the Progressives overwhelmed the Republican Party's Old Guard leadership in a full scale battle, but because the Old Guard recognized that it would be prudent to acquiesce to Hughes's nomination to placate the party's Progressive wing, thereby preventing their defection and avoiding the consequent danger of a Democratic victory.[43]

The data reported in Table 3 indicate how greatly the coalition that elected Hughes in New York in 1906 differed from the one that elected Johnson to his first term as governor of California in 1910. Approximately three-quarters of Hughes's support came from voters who had cast their ballot for the Republican ticket in 1902. By contrast, less than half of Johnson's 1910 vote came from those who had voted Republican in the previous gubernatorial election. An estimated 15 percent of Hughes's support came from previous Democratic voters; the comparable figures for Johnson is 25 percent. But most significantly of all, Hughes received only 5 percent of his votes from previous abstainers; persons who had failed to vote in the previous election though eligible to do so composed almost four times as large a proportion of the coalition that elected Johnson to his first term in office (19 percent).

The contrast between the coalitions that elected Hughes and Johnson to their second terms is even more striking.[44] In interpreting the figures regarding Hughes's 1908 electoral coalition it must be kept in mind that Hughes's bid for a second term coincided with a presidential campaign. But even acknowledging this fact, the extent to which the vote for Hughes in 1908 was simply a party vote is extraordinary. The estimates reported in the first column of Table 3 indicate that the proportion of 1904 Democrats voting for Hughes in 1908 was too small to be discernible, and that an estimated 97 percent of 1904 Republicans supported Hughes in 1908. The figures reported in the second column indicate that 94 percent of Hughes's support in 1908 came from voters who had cast their ballot for the Republicans in 1904, none came from 1904 Democrats, 6 percent came from 1904 ineligibles, and none came from 1904 abstainers.

In sum, the Progressives in New York did not disrupt traditional voting patterns to the same extent as their California counterparts. Although other factors played a role as well, the failure of the Progressives in New York to build an independent base of support for themselves contributed to their inability to get the state legislature, which remained in the hands of old-line politicians, to pass the full range of anti-partisan reforms enacted by the Progressive-controlled legislature in California. Most importantly, Governor Hughes failed in his efforts to get the legislature to establish a system of primary elections.[45] Consequently, after the Progressive Movement waned, the Republican and Demo-

[43] Richard L. McCormick, *From Realignment to Reform: Political Change in New York State, 1893–1910* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), 221.

[44] It should be noted that the coefficients of determination of the 1906 and 1908 Hughes equations are very high, and that the estimates of the regression coefficients are quite precise.

[45] McCormick, *From Realignment to Reform*, ch. 8.

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TABLE 3

Sources of the Progressive Vote: New York

Gubernatorial Campaigns of Charles Evans Hughes	*Proportion From Each Category Going to Hughes*	*Proportion of Total Hughes Vote Coming From Each Category*
Hughes 1906		
1902 Democrats	.18	.15
1902 Republicans	.84	.76
1902 Ineligibles	.29	.04
1902 Abstainers	.09	.05
R^2 = .795		
Hughes 1908		
1904 Democrats	.00	.00
1904 Republicans	.97	.94
1904 Ineligibles	.49	.06
1904 Abstainers	.00	.00
R^2 = .931		

Source: Voting data from Interuniversity Consortium for Political Research; size of eligible electorate interpolated from Census Office, *Twelfth Census of the United States*, vol. I, part 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Office, 1901), 991-92; and Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913), 2:227-37.

cratic machines in the state were able to reassert themselves. In 1913, for example, Tammany boss Charles Murphy was able to secure the impeachment and removal from office of Governor William Sulzer, who had refused to follow completely Murphy's orders concerning the distribution of patronage.[46] In the decades following the Progressive Era not only did Tammany reach the zenith of its power in New York, but so too did the political machines in many cities and states in the Northeast.

This is not to say that the Progressives and subsequent reformers had no impact upon the conduct of politics and government in New York. By allying with upstate Republicans who sought to reduce the political weight of overwhelmingly Democratic New York City, they were able to secure the enactment of ballot laws that contributed to a rise in split-ticket voting, and voter registration laws that contributed to a decline in voter turnout by making it more difficult to vote.[47] In addition, the predominantly Irish leadership of New York's Democratic machines, and their predominantly white Anglo-Saxon Protestant counterparts in the Republican party, had little interest in sharing power with the

[46] Jacob Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).

[47] McCormick, *From Realignment to Reform*, ch. 9. On the other hand, the sharp conflicts and the roughly equal balance between upstate Republicans and downstate Democrats may have provided politicians in New York with a greater incentive to maintain the strength of the party organizations they had constructed in the nineteenth century than was the case in states whose politics were much less competitive after the realignment of 1896. I am grateful to Walter Dean Burnham for this observation.

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immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, who came to account for an increasing proportion of the population of the city and state during the early decades of the twentieth century. Hence, these party leaders did not make an all-out effort to bring the members of these groups into the electorate. This factor also contributed to a reduction in the popular base of New York's political machines relative to the size of the potential electorate.

The party realignment of 1928–36, however, mobilized hundreds of thousands of new immigrants into the electorate in New York, as in many other states.[48] Because patronage-oriented party organizations survived the Progressive Era in New York, they were available to channel the participation of many of these new voters, as well as to buttress the position of ethnic leaders who sought to live off politics—in the face of stiff competition in the 1930s and 1940s from their more ideologically-oriented rivals in the American Labor Party.[49] In addition, these organizations were able to transmit to large numbers of these new voters an understanding of politics—including a view of patronage—whose roots lay in the political conflicts, compromises, and institutions of the nineteenth century. In an attenuated form, a similar process occurred with regard to blacks in New York during the 1960s and early 1970s.[50]

Because reformers in New York and throughout much of the Northeast have enjoyed only episodic success in the electoral arena, they have concentrated their efforts on creating public agencies insulated from the influence of electoral politics—professionalized police and welfare departments, independent authorities, financial control boards, and the like. Politicians in the Northeast often have been willing to avoid intervening in these agencies in order to prevent the business community from financing, and the press from supporting, reform campaigns that may not prove to be fatal in the party organizations they lead, but nonetheless would prove costly and fraught with uncertainties.[51] In this way, city and state governments in New York and elsewhere have been carved up along functional lines, chunks of which have been distributed to various contenders for power. Patronage-oriented party organizations have thereby purchased from potential opponents acquiescence to their control of lower-level elective offices, portions of the judiciary, and some public works and regulatory functions of municipal governments.[52] As a result of this process (and related

[48] Kristi Anderson, *The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[49] Martin Shefter, "Political Incorportation and the Extrusion of the Left: The Organization of Ethnic Groups into American Urban Politics" (paper delivered at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1–4 September 1983).

[50] Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (New York: Pantheon, 1981).

[51] For an analysis of the factors that influenced the relationship between businessmen and politicians in cities see Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), ch. 18.

[52] Theodore Lowi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

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ones, such as the unionization of public employees), the scope of the patronage system has contracted and old-line party organizations have become considerably weaker in New York and elsewhere in the Northeast than they were three-quarters of a century ago. Nonetheless, machine politicians have been able to defend vestiges of the patronage system. Though they may no longer dominate the input and output arenas of government, in New York, and many other Northeastern cities and states, machine politicians remain forces with which other political actors must contend.

Political Parties as Mechanisms of Political Control

In the current political science literature, parties are viewed chiefly as institutions of representation. The analysis in this article suggests, however, that in addition to serving as institutions through which elites can be influenced by citizens, political parties can serve as mechanisms for political stabilization that enable elites to exercise control over citizens.[53] The "third" party system was the major institution through which political order was restored in the United States under conservative leadership after the enormous upheavals of the Civil War and Reconstruction. The national party system of the late nineteenth century organized into the political process issues that were highly salient to northeastern industrial, commercial, and financial interests, and organized out of politics issues that might have led to a coalition between southern and western agrarian radicals. The creation of such a national party system, moreover, had important implications for the ways in which political conflicts were expressed and resolved in different regions of the country.

In the Northeast, politicians and the elites with whom they were allied had an incentive to respond to the various threats they faced—including threats from each other—by using the resources of the national, state, and municipal governments to strengthen and expand the popular base of the local organizations of the Republican and Democratic parties. In this way, centralized party organizations enjoying widespread popular support were constructed in the Northeast when there was as yet no substantial bar to the use of patronage for the purposes of party building and political mobilization. As a consequence of this process, the ethnic working classes in the Northeast were brought into the political system under a patronage-oriented political leadership. This enduringly influenced their political outlook and helped "immunize" them to the appeals of more radical political movements.[54]

The party organizations constructed in the Northeast during the late nineteenth century eventually achieved a considerable measure of autonomy from

[53] Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control, and Popular Acquiescence* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1982).

[54] See Walter Dean Burnham, "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: The United States and Weimar Germany," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 3 (1972): 1–30; Seymour

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the businessmen who had earlier supported their construction. This development led many of these elites to attack political machines during the Progressive Era. The strong party organizations of the Northeast have generally been able to withstand such attacks—though not without costly struggles. As a result of this stalemate, old-line party organizations, and the elites who had joined in the attack on them, have found it useful to come to terms with one another. A major result of this pattern of party development in the nineteenth century and the subsequent accommodations between machine politicians and their erstwhile opponents in this century, is that old-line party organizations have been strong enough to withstand the efforts of a succession of ideological movements to penetrate the political arena. This, in turn, has helped reduce polarization and lower the intensity of political conflicts.

Cities and states in the West followed a very different trajectory of party development by virtue of that region's peripheral position in the political system and economic order of late nineteenth century America. Because the national parties did not divide on issues of primary concern to the West and because railroads played such an important role in the political and economic life of that region, politicians and their elite allies did not have an incentive to respond to the challenges they faced by seeking to strengthen the organization or the popular base of the Democratic and Republican parties. Therefore the Progressives were able to overwhelm the railroad machines, uproot the patronage system, and destroy whatever semblance of party organization had existed in the West by mobilizing into the electorate voters who had not previously participated in politics and who therefore had no attachments to the institutions and practices of the nineteenth century political order.

A major consequence of the weakness of party organizations in the West in the late nineteenth century, and their even greater weakness during the twentieth century, is that the intensity of political conflict has often been higher in that region than in the East. Thus, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, western farmers and laborers were considerably more prone than their eastern counterparts to desert to politically-oriented—and often quite radical—farmer and labor movements. In particular, the Farmers Alliance, the Populist Party, and the Socialist Party were substantially stronger in the West than in the East. And in more recent years, the relatively weak party organizations of the West have been far more vulnerable than those in the East to being taken over by political movements or the supporters of candidates on the left of the political spectrum, in the case of the Democrats, and on the right, in the case of the Republicans.[55] Consequently the level of polarization between the parties characteristically is higher in the western than in the eastern states.

Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 50–52.

[55] See, for example, James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer, "Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change," *American Political Science Review* 70 (March 1976): 37.

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The conclusion I would draw from these contrasting regional patterns is that strong, broadly based, patronage-fueled party organizations—such as those constructed in the Northeast as a consequence of the post-Reconstruction political settlement—can create a stable political order that is routinely amenable to the influence of elites, more reliably than a regime that does not encourage the great mass of citizens to direct their political energies through established party channels and into electoral politics. This is because the very process of channelling political participation through established institutions and into the electoral arena contains participation and limits its disruptive effects.[56]*

[56] Adam Przeworski, "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or is Mobilization the Source of Decay?" *American Political Science Review* 69 (1975): 49–67.

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Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy in Greece, 1967–1974

CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS

The 21 April 1967 military coup in Greece almost immediately became the subject of widespread scholarly concern. A profusion of studies surfaced dealing with the reasons that propelled the Colonels to assume direct political power in "the cradle of democracy."[1] Some of these studies analyzed the role of military professionalism[2]—considered by most scholars of civilian-military relations to be the most salient characteristic of modern military organizations—as a variable in determining the behavior of the armed forces with respect to intervention.[3] Another body of scholarly literature has at-

[1] The literature on Greece under the Colonels is large and diverse. Among the many studies see: Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1970); Constantine Tsoucalas, *I Elliniki Tragodia* (Athens: Olkos, 1974); John Katris, *Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power* (St. Louis: New Critics Press, 1971); D. George Kousoulas, "The Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 1967," *Orbis* 8(1969):332–58.

[2] For the purposes of this article, Bengt Abrahamsson's definition of military professionalism will be used. This definition includes: specialized theoretical knowledge accompanied by methods and devices for application: responsibility, grounded on a set of ethical rules; and a high degree of corporateness deriving from common training and devotion to specific doctrines and customs. See Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), 15.

[3] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization*; Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics of Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale

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tempted to assess the actions and intentions of the praetorian regime that came to power as a result of the April coup d'état.[4]

However, the intense scholarly interest displayed toward the Greek military during its stay in power (1967–74) came to a virtual halt as soon as the armed forces were forced to relinquish the levers of political authority on 23 July 1974. With the exception of a few works—primarily of historical nature—there has been little effort to provide a systematic analysis of the reasons that prompted the Greek army to return to the barracks as abruptly as it had seized the machinery of the Greek state seven years before.[5] This study seeks to fill the existing gap by examining the ability of the Greek military professionals, as political governors, to cloak their regime with a mantle of legitimacy. Legitimacy, defined by Harry Eckstein as "the extent that a polity is worthy of support," is vital to a regime's protracted stay in power, for it provides it with the moral right to govern—a right that an illegitimate or non-legitimate government lacks.[6] David Easton has underscored the importance of legitimacy in his comment that "it is a familiar axiom of political science that a government based upon brute force alone is not long for this world. . . ."[7]

Max Weber suggested a triptych of possible formulas for attaining regime legitimacy. These formulas include: charismatic leadership—referring to the ability of a leader to captivate the masses and win their support by the sheer force of personality; appeal to traditional beliefs and practices—denoting the restoration and use of past achievements and time-honored beliefs and practices; and the rational-legal formula—based on the creation of constitutional structures often replete with democratic ideals and provisions for individual liberty and equal protection under the law. One or a combination of these formulas, according to Weber, can provide bases for regime legitimation.[8] In addi-

University Press, 1977); George A. Kourvetaris, "Professional Self-Images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military," *American Sociological Review* 36 (1971):1043–58; and Kourvetaris, "The Greek Army Officers Corps: Its Professionalism and Political Intervention," in Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., *On Military Intervention* (Rotterdam: Mouton, 1971).

[4] Stephen G. Xydis, "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967–1973 (with a postscript)," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (1974): 507–38. See also a number of articles dealing with different areas of the military regime's policies in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

[5] Studies dealing with the military regime's performance include: Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); P. J. Vatikiotis, *Greece: A Political Essay* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974); and a series of essays on different aspects of the military government's policies in Clogg and Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule*.

[6] Harry Eckstein, *The Evaluation of Political Performance: Problems and Dimensions* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), 50.

[7] David Easton, "The Analysis of Political Systems," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, 4th ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), 80.

[8] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, Talcott Parsons ed. (New York: Free Press, 1947), 324–92. Eric Nordlinger also uses Weber's three legitimacy formulas as a basis of a theoretical framework in *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

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tion to these three, performance (the ability of a regime to perform noticeably better than the regime it supplanted in economic and social matters) can also serve as a basis of legitimacy.[9] Utilizing the Weberian formulas plus performance, this article will attempt to evaluate whether Greek military professionals, as political governors—given the nature of their profession, which, as Eric Nordlinger has noted, emphasizes "austerity," "obedience," "bravery," and "dedication to public service"[10]—had the ability to employ properly any or a combination of the legitimacy formulas to their advantage.[11] The article will attempt to help clarify the ongoing scholarly debate regarding the role of the military as political governor.

Charismatic Leadership

Weber defined charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men." This extraordinary characteristic, Weber maintained, gives that individual "exceptional powers or qualities" that could provide the basis for legitimate authority.[12] By definition, however, charisma is an idiosyncratic, personalistic, and extremely rare commodity seldom found in the collective, hierarchical, and law-and-order-oriented military structures. Instead, as Juan J. Linz has noted, because of the very nature of their profession the military fear charismatic leaders and tend to veto the accession to power of "any officer with clear political skills and potential for populist charismatic appeal."[13]

The sociological profiles of the leaders of the Greek military junta reveal the extent to which they possessed charismatic qualities. According to the verdict handed down by a special court appointed in late 1974 by the government of Constantine Karamanlis, twenty officers planned and executed the coup. Three

[9] Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 445–47.

[10] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 126.

[11] There are two opposing views regarding the role of military leaders as political governors: one advancing the argument that praetorians possess the ability and political sophistication to bring about social change; and another that sees them as incapable of mounting any social change at all. For the first view see: Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 603; and Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in J. J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 78. For the second position see: Henry Bienen, "The Background to Contemporary Study of Militaries to Modernization," in Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago: Alsine Atherton Press, 1971); Claude E. Welch, ed., *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

[12] Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, 358–59.

[13] Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 241.

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of them, Colonels George Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos, and Brigadier Stylianos Patakos—who subsequently led the military government that emerged—were charged as "instigators and leaders of the rebellion." Of the three protagonists, Papadopoulos, an artillery officer with alleged Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ties, was chosen by his co-conspirators as "leader of the revolution" a few days before the intervention.[14] Following the coup's successful outcome, Papadopoulos became minister to the prime minister—a key position with jurisdiction over the civil service and de facto "chief of staff" of the prime minister's office. In this respect, Papadopoulos imitated the example of Juan Perón in Argentina.[15] He became Greece's "strongman" and the "spokesman and embodiment" of what he called "the National uprising."[16]

Papadopoulos methodically consolidated his position by becoming prime minister while simultaneously holding a number of key ministerial portfolios, including defense and foreign affairs. Later on he added to his list the largely honorific post of regent by replacing General George Zoitakis, who was awarded the position following King Constantine's unsuccessful countercoup in December 1967. Eventually, Papadopoulos abolished the monarchy, proclaiming and subsequently having himself "elected" president in a July 1973 "contest" in which he was the sole candidate. By this time, the other two members of the triumvirate, Makarezos and Patakos—who held sensitive positions—were elbowed out and Papadopoulos became the undisputed "caudillo" of Greece.

Another member of the original group, Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrios Ioannidis (later promoted to brigadier general), engineered the overthrow of Papadopoulos in November 1973 and became the de facto leader of the new government without, however, holding a formal governmental position. Henry Tasca, U.S. ambassador to Greece, referred to Ioannidis as "incompetent"[17] while Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco denounced his regime as "the goddamnest government I have ever had to deal with."[18]

In spite of Papadopoulos's strenuous efforts to portray himself as a dynamic, God-sent thaumaturge expressing the will of the Greek people, he was not considered a charismatic figure.[19] Unlike Perón, who loomed large over Argentine popular politics, Papadopoulos did not have a popular following. In fact, in the

[14] Yiannis Boulepsis and Pericles Rodakis, eds., *1940–1975: Ta Ellinika Istorika Dokumenta*, 9 vols. (Athens: Demokratiki Kairi, 1978), 3: 1227–28.

[15] Perón became secretary of labor and social welfare in 1943. This key post enabled him to establish a power base that proved instrumental to his ambitions. See Robert J. Alexander, *The Peron Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 24–25.

[16] George Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas: Logoi tou Proedrou tis Kyverniseos Georgiou Papadopoulou,* 7 vols. (Athens: Government Printing Office, 1968–1972), 1:52.

[17] Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Tasca: The Inside Story," *Newsweek,* 2 September 1974, 34.

[18] Quoted in Lawrence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy*, No. 19 (Summer 1975): 49.

[19] In fact, some unusually gossiping and fun-poking Greeks spread rumors that Papadopoulos was a maniac who had served time in a mental institution.

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1974 electoral contest held following the restoration of civilian authority in Greece, candidates that ran under the banner of parties considered conciliatory to the fallen dictator and his colleagues received a mere 1.10 percent of the votes cast.[20]

The results of interviews with Greek civil servants provide complementary evidence suggesting lack of charismatic qualities among the military rulers.[21] The overwhelming majority of the respondents felt that the top military authorities lacked leadership qualities and relied exclusively on threats, suppression, and terror. One respondent referred to the Colonels as "a bunch of conspiratorial adventurers." Another commented: "There was no government in the true sense. There was a dictator and his collaborators, each of which had his own purposes."

This brief analysis of the sociological profiles of the main protagonists of the 1967 intervention in Greece suggests a lack of charismatic qualities among the military leaders. The rest of the officers involved in the coup were rarely visible and none of them was known to possess any significant degree of magnetism. This finding highlights Eric Nordlinger's assertion that military organizations "are far from being charismatic breeding grounds. . . ."[22] The potential usefulness of charismatic leadership did not serve the Greek military well in their efforts to seek legitimacy.

Traditional Beliefs and Practices

A second possible way to legitimize authority is through certain traditions that, in Weber's terms, rest "on the basis of the sanctity of the order and the attendant power of control as they have been handed down from the past. . . ."[23] In other words, by making an abiding commitment to adhere to time-honored practices, beliefs, and values, a regime can convince the populace that it is worthy of support. Military governments, as Nordlinger has argued, potentially may legitimize their rule on the basis of the traditional formula by either claiming that their regime is nothing more than a continuation of past successful and widely acclaimed praetorian practices, or by simply adopting and supporting traditional beliefs and values not necessarily associated with the military.[24]

[20] Although this figure increased to 6.82 percent in the 1977 elections, it again plummeted to less than 1.6 percent in the election of October 1981. Nicos Mouzelis, "On the Greek Elections," *New Left Review* 108 (1978):57–80. See also a series of articles on different aspects of the 1974 and 1977 elections in Howard Penniman, ed., *Greece at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981).

[21] The author conducted a series of in-depth interviews with retired and active Greek civil servants during the months of December 1978–January 1979 and May–June 1979. These people wished to remain anonymous.

[22] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 129.

[23] Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, 341.

[24] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 129–30.

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However, the very nature of praetorian governments renders legitimation on traditional grounds problematic for three reasons. First, in the majority of developing nations, praetorianism is neither a highly esteemed nor a historically rooted phenomenon. Second, the military leadership generally lacks the necessary political experience and sophistication to capitalize on the potential use of traditional values. Third, the need to present themselves as modernizers and generators of social change makes the military's effort to embrace traditional beliefs something of an attempt at an unholy marriage. Given these difficulties, military regimes tend to avoid legitimizing their rule along traditional directions. Even the few that make such an effort, as Nordlinger has concluded, rarely succeed.[25]

The Colonels' regime was in that minority that did pursue traditionalism. Once in power, they became conscious of the need for immediate acceptance and announced that their objective was to clean the "Augean Stables" and return power to the civilians at the earliest possible opportunity. However, in time it became apparent that the Colonels intended not only to prolong their stay in power, but also to lay the foundations of a permanent role for the military in the political life of the country. The alleged communist threat provided an excuse for intervention, but not a solid basis for a protracted military rule. Some other formula had to be found.

Apparently aware of the fact that the numerous praetorian moves in Greece's history generally had not been associated with progressive and highly acclaimed periods, the military rulers did not attempt to associate their regime with past interventions.[26] Instead, Papadopoulos and his colleagues sought to link their regime to ancient Hellenic and Christian values and practices, hoping that these would lay the basis of legitimate authority.

The Greek officer corps, which fought in the communist-inspired guerrilla war (1946–49), had long been an anticommunist stronghold. In fact, "Red fear" had been used as a justification for the April 1967 coup. It is thus not surprising that the military regime resorted to anticommunist slogans. Papadopoulos himself described dialectical materialism as "fatalistic determinism . . . that could very well be termed as a philosophy of slavery and antithetic to the philosophy of life. . . ."[27] Former Communist George Georgalas, the regime's foremost theoretician, referred to his former "faith" as a "dogma" that "totally annihilates and definitively abolishes economic, spiritual, and social democracy. . . ."[28] Communism, however, was not alone. Socialism, classic liberalism, anarchism, fascism, Leninism, and National Socialism, Georgalas maintained, also had "collapsed" because their "antithesis to life has become

[25] Ibid., 131.

[26] The military interventions of 1843, 1862, and 1909 are generally considered by scholars to be possible exceptions.

[27] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, 1:72.

[28] George Georgalas, *I Ideologia tis Epanastaseos* (Athens: Viper, 1971), 36.

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excessively great for them to be able to survive."[29] Hence, he asserted, there is need for a "new ideology," that would be based not on inflexible on "dogmas," but on "ideals." Such ideals, it was argued, are found "in the harmonic synthesis" of ancient Greek values and Christian ethics.[30] Papadopoulos, echoing his lieutenant's "philosophical" formulation, declared that the "purpose of the April Revolution" was to restore and realize the "diptych" of Helleno-Christian ideals that had been undermined by the "old political establishment" and communist subversion. The Greeks, Papadopoulos reasoned, were the inheritors of the "world's most perfect civilization" and the "only ones who enjoy God's favor." In short, "the Hellenes" have the ability and even the "obligation" to lead the world to new paths.[31] The armed forces, being "the flesh of the people's flesh" were therefore "the most sensitive bearers of the National conscience," and thus constituted the natural "propellent of a Revolution" capable of bringing about a "National Renaissance"[32] that others might want to emulate.

To realize this "national rebirth" the junta introduced a program that included five objectives: economic development, to bring Greece into the family of technologically and economically advanced nations; the creation of a modern, flexible, productive, and service-oriented and "antibureaucratic" administrative apparatus; the rebirth of education, to cultivate traditional Greek spiritual and political values, and to reach new heights of ethical vigor; the development of a "harmonious society," characterized by a synergy of social classes, and the minimization of contradictions and imbalances; and the development of conditions for a more healthy political life. Papadopoulos epigramatically labelled these goals "to pistevo mas [our credo]."

However, the messianic, vague, and contradictory nature of these pronouncements were followed by familiarly repressive political practices. The regime imposed and maintained strict press censorship, forbade political gatherings, and established an extensive network of informants that psychologically terrorized the population. Imprisonment and torture of political opponents became notorious.[33] Under the circumstances, the regime's rhetoric to synthesize the Christian command to "love thy neighbor as thyself" and ancient Hellenic traditions appeared a naked mockery that did not convince even the most naive and politically apathetic citizens.

Open opposition to the junta's efforts to link itself and its mission to traditional Helleno-Christian values first surfaced on 3 November 1968, the day of

[29] Ibid., 13-14.

[30] Ibid., 16.

[31] See Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, vol. 2.

[32] Georgalas, *I Ideologia tis Epanastaseos,* 7.

[33] For an extensive treatment and documentation of this subject, see James Becket, *Barbarism in Greece* (New York: Walker and Co., 1970); Pericles Korovessis, *The Method* (London: Allison and Busby, 1970); Amalia Fleming: *A Piece of Truth* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973); Council of Europe, European Commission on Human Rights, *The Greek Case, Report of the Commission*, 4 vols. (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1969).

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former Prime Minister George Papandreou's funeral. Spontaneous mass demonstrations were held in defiance of martial law that demanded early elections and the restoration of democracy. The refusal to accept the government's "credo" can also be seen in the scornful stand of the intelligentsia, in a series of bombing incidents, and in numerous arrests.[34] The fervor of opposition against the regime reached its climax in November 1973, when students at the Athens Polytechnic, subsequently joined by workers, staged an open revolt, with anti-regime slogans broadcast over a clandestine radio station. The government suppressed the revolt with tanks.[35]

Almost the entire political spectrum condemned the military's intervention and the regime's policies. The leading conservative, former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, criticized the Colonels from his self-imposed exile in Paris as "insincere" and urged them voluntarily to "withdraw from power."[36] George Papandreou, leader of the centrist forces, had blasted them in 1968 as "liars" who used the "myth" of communist threat to seize power.[37] The democratic Left was even more vocal. Andreas Papandreou, leader of the Stockholm-based Panhellenic Liberation Movement, castigated the regime as an anachronism instigated and supported by the powerful arm of American capitalism. As expected, the crisis-torn Communist Party of Greece in exile denounced the junta as a "monarcho-fascist" creation of American imperialism.[38] Last but not least, the numerous resistance organizations formed abroad and within Greece attacked the Colonels and struggled for their overthrow.[39]

Moreover, the political forces occupying the center to the left of the Greek political spectrum that surfaced following the regime's downfall have directly or indirectly blamed the military junta on the United States. These political forces

[34] For a detailed account concerning bomb explosions and arrests, see Boulepis and Rodakis, eds., *Ta Dokumenta*, 3: 978–86.

[35] For a complete report and documentation of the student uprising and the trial proceedings of the military leaders, see ibid., vols. 5–9; M. Papazoglou, *Phititiko Kinima kai Diktatoria* (Athens: Epikairotita, 1975).

[36] Eric Rouleau interviewed former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis on 29 November 1967. This interview is printed in its entirety in Solon Gregoriadis, *I Istoria tis Diktatorias*, 3 vols. (Athens: Kapopoulos, 1975), 1: 226–30.

[37] Former Prime Minister George Papandreou's comments were smuggled out of Greece in April 1968. For full text, see ibid., 231–233.

[38] For an analysis concerning the internal crisis and the subsequent split of the Communists into two competing parties (the Pro-Moscow KKE-Bureau of the Ex-Interior, and the Eurocommunist-oriented KKE-Bureau of the Interior), see, inter alia, Ilios Yannakakis, "The Greek Communist Party," *New Left Review* 54 (1969):445–60; Basil Kapetanyannis, "The Making of Greek Eurocommunism," *Political Quarterly* 50 (1979): 46–54; and Michalis Papayannakis, "The Crisis in the Greek Left," in Penniman, ed., *Greece at the Polls*, 130–52.

[39] The resistance organizations had been quite diverse and fragmented. For a comprehensive analysis see Marios Nikolinakos, *Antistasi kai Antipolitefsi* (Athens: Olkos, 1975). See also George Yannopoulos, "The Opposition Forces Since the Military Rule," in Clogg and Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule*, 163–90. and Theodore Couloumbis, "The Greek Junta Phenomenon," *Polity* 4 (1974): 345–74.

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received more than 60 percent of the vote in the 1981 electoral contest. The argument that about half of the Greek electorate saw the military regime, at least partially, as a foreign imposed and controlled phenomenon is hard to escape. Rightly or wrongly, many Greeks believed that the Colonels' dictatorship had its roots in the American military-industrial complex—a view shared by the essentially conservative Greek bureaucracy.[40]

The regime's willingness to sign controversial agreements with foreign armaments producers and to grant special "home port" facilities to the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. Navy—all measures that had been resisted in the past—could not but inflame the fear that the Colonels' mission had been to perpetuate the interests of the foreign military-industrial colossus. In order for the long-range goals of the Colonels to be safeguarded, the Greek people had to be indoctrinated and kept under the hallucinative effect of a social drug. For such a mesmerizer, the regime employed its "ideal"—a mixture of progronoplexia (ancestoral complex) and Christian commands. However, since the regime was increasingly seen as a surrogate of foreign-inspired interests, it is no surprise that its efforts were crowned with little success.

However, the regime's need for foreign capital to finance its modernizing objectives compelled it to intensify the campaign to promote tourism that had begun in the 1950s. But tourism, in turn, became the channel through which Greeks came into contact with the "corrupt marijuana-smoking, neo-anarchist" guests that flooded Greece, carrying with them the very "decadent ideas and customs" that the regime had vowed to eradicate from the Greek political landscape.[41] The Colonels' efforts to blend traditional ideals and modernizing objectives had thus indeed been mutually contradictory.[42]

The results of interviews with Greek civil servants also reveal evidence of the confusion, distrust, and uncertainty permeating Greek society during the years of military rule. The majority of the civil servants interviewed indicated that the praetorian rulers' objectives were unrealistic and largely irrelevant to the needs of the nation, and a significant number felt the goals and policy directives of the military regime were more ambiguous and confusing than those of its civilian

[40] This view is also partially supported by: Demetrios G. Carmocolias, "Image of NATO and the U.S. in the Athens Daily Press, 1974–1980," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 9 (1981): 229–40; and George A. Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz, "Public Opinion and Civil-Military Relations in Greece since 1974," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 4 (1981): 71–840.

[41] This statement was made by Under Secretary of the Ministry to the Prime Minister Michael Sideratos. See *Theseis Kai Ideai,* February 1970, 2.

[42] The difficulties that result from the simultaneous pursuit of such contradictory goals are well established in the literature on modernization and development. See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968); David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).

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predecessor. One civil servant commented: "The real power holders [military officers] lacked clear directions and only had circumstantial programs and perspectives." Furthermore, more than half of the officials interviewed disclosed that the frequency of informal contacts between civil servants and the military involving professional responsibilities decreased markedly. Even though the civil servants had complaints to voice they seldom did so, primarily because of fear or because they felt that voicing complaints would have made very little or no difference. Finally, the majority of the civil servants admitted that they withheld substantive information from their superiors.

The Greek military regime's failure effectively to utilize the traditional practices formula was rooted in the very nature of the military profession. Military professionalism emphasizes traditional values such as stability, hierarchy, and order. At the same time, according to Bengt Abrahamsson, it "increases the confidence of military leaders that are competent to also administer the civilian sphere. . . ."[43] However, the attempt to transplant and utilize such values in political processes and interactions becomes problematic. The Colonels' attempt to impose and maintain total control over the bureaucratic apparatus of the country was met with widespread resistance, apathy, and insubordination whenever possible. Under Papadopoulos's threat to the civil servants to "unglue themselves from the past" or face the consequences, the nation's administrators chose to take a largely apathetic attitude toward the regime's goals and policy directives, and often sought to undermine them.[44] Instead of seeking to enlist the bureaucracy's specialized knowledge and expertise, the regime changed the existing administrative norms, standards, and practices.[45] It terrorized the civil servants with threats of dismissal and generally forced the bureaucracy into a subordinate role by refusing to consult with the civil servants or listen to their complaints and recommendations. Small wonder, then, that the administrative apparatus of the country felt intimidated and consciously withdrew from its customary roles as a participant in the decision-making process and as a channel of valuable information, thus depriving the regime of irreplaceable support.[46]

[43] Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization*, 111. For a similar argument see Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 54–59.

[44] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, 2:12.

[45] For example, Anthony Downs has stated that sudden changes in administrative practices bother bureaucrats and have negative implications in organizational performance. See *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1967); Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Intergovernmental Relations in Two Government Agencies*, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).

[46] The idea that the bureaucracy holds a monopoly on information that gives them considerable political power is well established in the literature on bureaucracy. See Edward S. Flash, Jr., "The Knowledge-Power Relationship: The Council of Economic Advisers"; Morton H. Halperin, "Shaping the Flow of Information"; and Graham T. Allison, "The Power of Bureaucratic Routines: The Cuban Missile Crisis"; in Francis E. Rourke, ed., *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978).

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In sum, despite its concerted efforts to utilize traditional beliefs and practices to legitimize its authority, the Greek praetorian regime failed dismally. The reasons for this failure stem not only from the Colonels' inability to convince the Greek people that their regime's intentions had been desirable, honest, clear-cut, and attainable, but also from lack of political sophistication on its part and its inability to employ the proper persuasive tactics and strategies—both of which are outgrowths of military professionalism and its attributes.

Regime Performance

The underlying thrust of the Colonels' five-point modernization program was to demonstrate that the virtuous Helleno-Christian "ideals" were in harmony with the needs and demands of a modernizing society. The Colonels hoped that by showing an impressive performance with social and economic policies they would be able to convince Greeks and foreigners alike that their regime had the ability to govern efficiently, and that it thus deserved allegiance and popular support. Papadopoulos emphasized the importance his regime attached to its objectives by declaring that the "April Revolution has given the country the last opportunity to move forward. If the nation fails this time to make that forward leap," he warned, "it will die," and emphatically concluded, "we do not intend to let it die."[47] In short, the military rulers seem to have been aware that if they could demonstrate performance superior to that of the preceding civilian regime with regard to economic growth and social reform, this record could create a basis for legitimate rule.

The junta's designs were based on sound reasoning. It is generally believed that in changing societies if a regime can improve social and economic conditions, it can convince the population that it is worthy of support.[48] The concern here is whether the Greek military rulers were able to perform effectively and realize their five objectives—economic development, the creation of a modern bureaucracy, educational reform, the creation of a harmonious and a balanced society, and the development of a healthy political life. The junta's success in achieving each of these goals will be examined.

Economic Development

When the military came to power in 1967, they promised to "march forward . . . toward prosperity, . . . progress, . . . and just distribution of the national in-

[47] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, 1:58.

[48] For detailed treatment of Greece as a changing society see: William H. McNeill, *The Metamorphosis of Greece Since World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); and Mary Evangelidis, "Core-Periphery Relations in the Greek Case," in Dudley Seers et al., eds., *Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979).

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come. . . ."[49] The five-year development plan that the regime introduced was designed to achieve these objectives. The results, however, fell far short of the goals. During the years of military rule, the Greek economy experienced a slowdown in industry, as well as in agriculture.[50] In the industrial sector, the level and nature of investments suffered. The 18.5 percent annual target set in the regime's program as a share of private fixed capital formation in manufacturing (out of total private fixed capital formation) declined to 14 percent in 1968–69,[51] which was considerably lower than the levels achieved by other West European countries during the same period.[52] The overall fixed capital formation also experienced a slowdown, followed by an even more severe decline after 1969 in the rate of growth of investment in manufacturing.[53] Industrial exports saw a moderate increase, but as Athanasios Kannelopoulos and other economists argue, it was attributable to increases of export of aluminum products based on investments made under the civilian regime.[54]

Likewise, in the agricultural sector there was a significant drop in the rate of increase inoutput as measured by income. The average annual growth rate in income had been 4.9 percent in the decade preceding 1967. It declined to about 2.1 percent during the first four years of the junta's rule—a figure less than half of the regime's 5.2 percent projected target.[55] This marked slowdown was largely the result of reduced support for agricultural development and cannot be attributed to unfavorable climatic conditions. Total governmental investment in agriculture declined, as did budgetary subsidies intended to promote changes in the structure of crops. In 1970, the latter were reduced to a level comparable to

[49] Broadcast message by Prime Minister Constantine Kollias on 22 April 1967, printed in *Diati Egine I Epanastasistis 21 Apriliou 1967* (Athens: Servis, 1967).

[50] The official statistics provided by the military regime showed a healthy annual growth rate of over 7 percent. However, as many economists have argued, the junta juggled figures and reported erroneous statistical data to show that the economy of the country was on solid footing. This assertion was also partially supported by official statements from the Karamanlis regime, which replaced the junta in July 1974. See a report by the New Democracy Party, *Apologismos tis Kyvernitikis Drastiriotitas: 1974–1977* (Athens: Nea Dimokratia, 1977).

[51] John Pesmazoglou, "The Greek Economy Since 1967," in Clogg and Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule*, 82. Pesmazoglou's arguments are also supported in Dimitrios H. Germidis and Maria Negreponti-Delivanis, *Industrialization: Employment and Income Distribution in Greece—A Case Study*, Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Series No. 12 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1975).

[52] France, West Germany, Portugal, and Spain achieved corresponding rates of 27.0, 25.0, 17.9, and 24.2 percent in private fixed capital formation in manufacturing. See *OECD Economic Surveys: France* (1976); *Germany* (1972); *Portugal* (1976). For Spain see *OECD Observer*, No. 80 (March–April 1976).

[53] Pesmazoglou, "The Greek Economy," 80.

[54] Athanasios Kanellopoulos, "Thrylos kai Alitheia ston Oikonomiko Tomea Kata tin Eptaetia," in *Meletes Pano stin Sychroni Elliniki Oikonomia*, Spilios Papaspiliopoulos, ed. (Athens: Papazisis, 1978), 42.

[55] *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece* (1974), 31.

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that of 1966. As John Pesmazoglou has noted, the Colonels' decision to cancel private "agricultural debts in 1968 was not associated with any systematic policy designed to promote agricultural modernization and growth."[56] Instead, it appears that the initial promises constituted a calculated attempt to gain the farmers' support for the regime. Finally, the general slowdown in the agricultural sector was also associated with the "freezing" in 1967 of major components of Greece's agreement of association with the European Economic Community. This development undermined the confidence of European business executives regarding the conditions under which certain Greek agricultural products were to be exported to West European markets. The difficulties the agricultural sector experienced during the junta's reign further widened the gap in per capita income between workers in the agricultural sector and those in other occupations.[57]

The general retardation of growth in the agricultural and the industrial sectors of the Greek economy aggravated the nation's chronic balance-of-payments difficulties. From 1967 to 1973, the average annual deficit rose from 3.6 percent of the gross domestic product to 7.4 percent in 1974, a figure the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development called "very high by historical standards."[58] The public deficit increased significantly, as did tax exemptions for some of the more affluent groups.[59] In 1973, the wholesale price index shot up by 48.3 percent, while wages went up by only 16.4 percent.[60] In short, the rapid economic development that the Colonels promised turned instead into what Constantine Kalligas described as "an economic disaster."[61]

Aside from the world economic crisis, there seem to have been two reasons for this rather poor economic performance: the pressing need to produce immediate results; and the regime's decision-making methods. In order to consolidate its position and give credibility to the argument that the intervention was both necessary and justified, the junta had to show immediate economic results. To make this possible, the Colonels—regardless of interest rates—embarked on an all-out effort to attract foreign capital to be made available for beautification projects, such as parks and public squares. Investments in these areas during the years of military rule increased by 600 percent and 60 percent respectively over the previous six-year period (1960–66). This development helps explain the decrease in investment rates suffered by the agricultural and industrial sectors.[62]

Investment in such non-productive areas brought immediate economic pros-

[56] Pesmazoglou, "The Greek Economy Since 1967," 82.
[57] Ibid., 80–82.
[58] *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece* (1975), 21–22.
[59] Dionysios Karagiorgas, "Oi Oikonomikes Synepies tis Stratiotikis Dimokratias," in ibid., 25.
[60] *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece* (1975), 16–17.
[61] K. Kalligas, "O Dramatikos Klonismos tis Ellinikis Oikonomias," in ibid., 51.
[62] Karagiorgas, "Oi Oikonomikes Synepies," in ibid., 24–27.

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perity in terms of wages and benefits, but did not generate a corresponding increase in consumer goods and services. To satisfy consumer demand, the regime allowed heavy importation of food, automobiles, and other luxury items. In order to pay for the ever-increasing volume of imports, the government was forced to borrow from abroad under burdensome terms. In turn, this new borrowing contributed to the deterioration of the balance of payments, increased the country's foreign debt, and brought about a galloping rate of inflation and general economic chaos.[63]

The other reason for the regime's failure to achieve its economic objectives stems from the internal structure and perceptions of the military. Once in power, the junta attempted to bring the nation's administrative apparatus under its control. The Colonels purged the civil service and replaced officials who they considered dangerous and undesirable. High ministry officials were either overshadowed or replaced by military men or relatives and cronies of the Colonels. In addition, the regime placed a military "watch dog" in every ministry or bureau. These moves, of course, alienated the bureaucracy and, in turn, deprived the regime of technological and communication skills.[64] The comical frequency of making and breaking agreements with Litton Industries and with Greek shipping tycoons was a glaring example of inefficient decisions made without bureaucratic involvement.

The majority of the civil servants interviewed indicated that the presence of the "watch dogs" placed by the regime in all major government bureaus irritated them. In addition, more than 50 percent of the respondents viewed the regime's administrative practices, perception, norms, and standards as markedly different from those of the civilian regime, and indicated that the Colonels significantly altered the general rules of operation. Without the support and expertise of the nation's administrative apparatus, it is not surprising that the junta's policy decisions lacked efficacy.[65] Thus, the economic development sought by the regime did not materialize.

Bureaucratic Reorganization

The second modernizing objective of the junta was to overhaul the nation's administrative apparatus. "The administrative machinery," Papadopoulos declared, "has become an unbridled . . . organ that all but ceased being the servant

[63] The deterioration of the balance of payments is discussed in A. Agiopetritis, "Exoterika Dimosia Dania apo tis Epanastaseous tou 1821 Mehri Simeron," in *Statistike Melete: 1821–1971* (Athens: Ethnikon Kentron Koinonikon Erevnon, 1972), 346.

[64] That expertise is concentratead among lower echelon bureaucrats is well established in the literature. See, for example, Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organizations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).

[65] Efficacy denotes "the extent to which subordinate bodies can make and implement prompt and relevant decisions in response to internal demands and external challenges." See Eckstein and Gurr, *Patterns of Authority*, 453.

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of the public," and blamed the civilian leadership's "canvassing" interests for creating such a "hydrocephalic" civil service. "Our purpose," he concluded, "is to proceed with the catharsis of the administrative machinery so it can become an organ competent to assist in the realization of the government's program."[66]

The evidence presented throughout this article reveals that the military's perceptions, practices, and lack of flexibility rendered the not-so-efficient Greek bureaucracy a non-influential servant of the regime. This contrasts sharply with the Brazilian experience, in which the military rulers left the traditional bureaucracy intact and increasingly utilized the knowledge and expertise of the technocrats in the formulation and implementation of economic development policies.[67] The Greek Colonels, however, in their desperate search for popular support, engaged in the same nepotistic practices that they so vehemently attacked.[68] As one civil servant put it, the military "were exclusively interested in their friends only." Thus, Papadopoulos's promise to streamline the bureaucracy was never fulfilled. Instead, the administrative apparatus increased in size and inefficiency.

Educational Reform

Educational reform was the third of the Colonels' five modernizing "objectives." Before the "National Revolution," wrote Theophylactos Papaconstantinou, who next to Georgalas was regarded as the regime's second ranking ideological spokesman, "complete chaos prevailed in the nation's educational system because of the demolishing inroads of apparent reforms"—a reference to George Papandreou's 1963–64 educational reforms. The aim of the Revolution, stated Papaconstantinou, was to give the nation's education "a national orientation."[69]

As in other areas of public policy, the regime resorted to the same tactics, and made decisions that were neither consistent nor efficacious. The military rulers rushed to dismantle the reforms instituted by George Papandreou's government.[70] However, they began to reintroduce some of the same reforms shortly thereafter—only to abandon them again. During the years of military rule, the rate of increase for defense expenditures (partly a result of Greco-Turkish dis-

[66] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, 1:18.

[67] See Thomas E. Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil," in Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil*.

[68] Rodis Rouphos, "Athenian," in Richard Clogg, trans., *Inside the Colonels' Greece* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1972), 104–105; and Xydis, "Coups and Countercoups," 531.

[69] Theophylactos Papaconstantinou, *Politiki Agogi* (Athens: Kavanas-Ellas, 1970), 388.

[70] One of the first acts of the military rulers was to reinstate the use of "Katharevousa" (pure) as the official language that had been set aside by the Papandreou government to make room for "Demotiki" (vernacular). For a rare treatment of the language problem in Greece see Dimitri Sotiropoulos, "Diglossia and the National Language Question in Modern Greece," *Linguistics* 197 (1977):5–31.

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putes) was two to three times higher than the rate of increase for social welfare, education, and health programs.[71] The professed aim of the regime to protect Greece from decadent Western influences and cultural inroads directly conflicted with its attempt to promote tourism for economic reasons. Thus, while the regime proclaimed its goal of "uplifting the standard of education," its inconsistencies and frequent changes contributed to the undistinguished reputation of the Greek educational system.[72] The student disturbances of November 1973, which actually started out as a demonstration against the military regime's educational policies, sounded a death knell for any claims of progress in education.

Social Reform

The fourth grand aim of the Colonels' regime was the development of a balanced and harmonious society freed from such evils as social conflict and the notion of equality, which "ruptures societies, dissolves nations, and applies the law of the jungle." The "Revolution," Georgalas further maintained, "will strive to eradicate all social contradictions and gaps that lead to violent clashes" by bringing about a more "equitable distribution of the national wealth" between social classes and geographic regions.[73]

There is strong evidence, however, that income inequalities actually increased during the junta's tenure in office. For example, in 1973 workers' wages climbed by 12 percent while the general consumer price index rose by 16 percent. On the other hand, the net return on capital investment shot up from less than 12 percent during the years of civilian rule to the astronomical figure of 45 percent in 1973.[74] In addition, the annual rate of increase in per capita agricultural income went down from 11 percent in the years 1963–66 to an average of 6.2 percent during the period of 1966–71, while urban per capita income continued to rise by roughtly 9.5 percent during the same period. Finally, tax distribution burdens deteriorated significantly in favor of the rich and at the expense of low- and middle-income families.[75] While there are no available studies measuring the performance of the junta on regional income distribution, there are reasons to believe that the geographical regions blessed with natural tourist attractions

[71] Pesmazoglou, "The Greek Economy Since 1967," 89.

[72] An anonymous leading Greek educationist, "Traditionalism and Reaction to Greek Education," in Clogg and Yannopoulos, ed., *Greece Under Military Rule*, 137–38. Similar conclusions on this matter are also presented by Roufos, *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, 95.

[73] Georgalas, *I Ideologia*, 8.

[74] In most countries such gains during the same period (1967–73) did not exceed the 7–8 percent rate. See Pesmazoglou, "The Greek Economy Since 1967."

[75] Karagiorgas, "Oi Oikonomikes Synepies," 27–28. See also an article by the same author, "The Distribution of Tax Burden by Income Groups in Greece," *The Economic Journal* 83 (1973). Other studies dealing with the same problem include: George Yannopoulos, "Workers and Peasants Under the Military Dictatorship," in Clogg and Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule*; and an interesting but not well documented neo-Marxist analysis by Nicos A. Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships* (London: NLB Publishers, 1976).

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and the greater Athens area—where the majority of the nation's industry is located—experienced a much higher rate of growth than their more remote rural counterparts.

Again, the Colonels' failure was rooted in their inability to enlist popular support and their authoritarian decision-making style and perceptions. More importantly, the regime's lack of success in social reform had been almost a byproduct of its economic policies. The junta's courtship with indigenous and foreign enterpreneurs was intended to lead to the creation of a new economic elite supportive of the military regime. A closer look, however, reveals an internal contradiction between the regime's aims of equitable distribution of the national wealth and its immediate and long-range goals of adequate budgetary support, institutional autonomy, and protection against the outside encroachments that had prompted the 1967 coup.[76] Hence, the Colonels' failure to minimize social contradictions and bring about a harmonious and balanced society was inevitable.

Political Reform

The last and most ambiguous of the regime's modernizing objectives had been the development of a new and "healthy political life." This they named "new democracy" or "new polity." It was to have been based not on the old and decadent notion of "individual freedom," but on the sound and promising concept of "collective" liberty. Collective liberty would involve a free enterprise economy, a casteless social structure, meaningful spiritual freedom, and "true democracy" characterized by responsible, "internally democratic and principle-oriented political parties," and "a free but not immune press."[77]

Although the Colonels' concept of a "new polity" seemed unclear and, one may say, even self-contradictory, there was a clear and deliberate theme permeating the constitutional structure that the regime subsequently drafted. This theme had been nothing less than the creation of a "guided democracy," in which the armed forces would play the predominant role. In other words, the regime aspired to create the proper social and political environment conducive to the military institution's immediate and long-range professional interests and objectives. However, the junta's inability to establish a political party was made clear in an admission made in 1970 by Papadopoulos himself when he said that "the absence of a party such as Hitler had had and Mussolini had had was a weakness of the regime. . . ."[78] This inability, coupled with press censorship, the

[76] Constantine P. Danopoulos, "Soldiers in Politics: The Case of Contemporary Greece," (Ph.D diss., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1980), ch. 4.

[77] Georgalas, *I Ideologia*, 59–62. See also numerous statements and instant philosophical pronouncements by George Papadopoulos in *To Pistevo Mas*.

[78] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, 192.

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Colonels' lack of political sophistication in articulating the goals of the "Revolution," and their refusal to implement sections of their own constitution that dealt with civil and individual liberties and rights, rendered the government's objective to lay the foundations for a "new democracy" a naked mockery. Papadopoulos described the real nature of his regime's brand of "democracy" by contending that "even the shadow of martial law is more effective than the normal process of law."[79]

Rational-Legal Legitimacy

Weber's rational-legal formula rests on "the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands [such as legal authority]."[80] Weber refers to the existence of a widely accepted, constitutional framework consisting of well-defined procedures and laws that prescribe the basis of governmental decision-making and provide some sort of popular representation, enriched by a set of legal safeguards intended to protect the citizen against government excesses.

In modern times, the rational-legal formula seems to have been the most frequently used method of legitimizing authority by military and civilian governments alike. The central question, however, is whether military regimes possess the capability to use this formula to cloak their rule in a mantle of legitimacy. Nordlinger has contended that they "regularly fail to legitimize themselves with a rational-legal formula," and offered two reasons to account for the failure. The first is the authoritative and closed structures of military regimes that tend to shut off "major tenets" of the rational-legal formula, such as political competition, mass participation, and the articulation of popular demands. Even those military rulers, who do decide to go through the motions of adopting "a constitutional democratic facade" do not legitimize themselves because the participatory structures (such as electoral contests, political parties, and parliaments) that are allowed to surface are pre-determined to be subordinate and powerless gimmicks of "a constitutional-democratic fiction."[81] The second reason is also rooted in the military value system—the "military mind" and its attributes. The conservative perceptions of military rulers, coupled with their "unassailable position of power" and unwillingness to accept criticism and tolerate opposition, prevent the military from consistently conforming and abiding by the constitutional rules—including their own. This result helps explain the failure of these regimes to use traditional legal formulas.

In the example of Greece, the junta's rise to power was quickly followed by a pledge to return the country to "normal political life" at the earliest possible date. A committee of constitutional experts, known as the Mitrelias Committee,

[79] Sir Hugh Green quotes George Papadopoulos, in ibid., 192.
[80] Weber, *The Theory of Social Organizations,* 323.
[81] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 133–34.

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was charged with the task of drafting a new constitutional charter. The committee completed its work within the allotted six-month time framework and submitted a draft constitution to the military regime. The draft introduced drastic amendments in several key areas. On 11 July 1968, the government released the final draft approved by the Council of Ministers, and set 29 September 1968 as the date of a referendum in which the Greek people would be given their chance to approve the new constitution. The regime also announced that public discussion on the charter was welcomed.

Although the Colonels proclaimed their intention of allowing popular participation and criticism, in reality they made any form of meaningful discussion—let alone criticism—impossible. Under martial law, there was heavy one-sided propaganda, and a stern warning from Interior Minister Stylianos Pattakos to those who would not participate in the referendum that they "had to explain their reasons for abstention to the police in writing."[82] Understandably, the new constitution received a nearly 92 percent approval rate.

In spite of what Papadopoulos described as "a triumph . . . similar to which no previous Greek government has ever secured," the regime found it necessary to postpone implementation of all articles and provisions of the constitution pertaining to elections, political parties, and freedom of speech and other civil liberties.[83] The military leaders explained the need for these restrictions by resorting to medical terminology, arguing that the patient (the Greek people) was on his way to recovery and no one would be allowed to disturb this delicate process. Beneath the surface, however, the regime's unwillingness to put in force even its own constitutional creature indicated its profound concern that if such tenets of popular representation were allowed to operate unchecked they could have undermined the regime's position.[84]

The Colonels' distrust of all democratic processes also became apparent in the way they handled the mild criticism leveled against the government by the hand-picked mini-parliament established as an alleged first step toward "normal political life." This non-representative body—which had no more than advisory and consultative powers—criticized a government minister for failing to implement certain court decisions. Vice Premier Pattakos, who represented the regime in the deliberations of the mini-parliament, expressed the junta's wrath by shouting at the so-called legislators to "sit down, nobody has the right to criticize the administration covered by the Revolution."[85] Finally, the junta's inability to tolerate the articulation of popular demands through mass demonstrations was made ever clearer during the November 1973 student disturbances,

[82] Gregoriadis, *I Istoria tis Diktatorias*, 1:212–14.

[83] Papadopoulos, *To Pistevo Mas*, 3:84.

[84] A similar point is made in Pantazis Terlexis, "The Military and the Greek Constitution: A Comparison Between the Old and the New Document," *Western Political Quarterly* 24 (1971):449–55.

[85] Pattakos's attack on the *Symbouleftiki* (mini-Parliment) appears in Gregoriadis, *Istoria tis Diktatorias*, 2: 177–79.

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when Papadopoulos abandoned all the pretexts of gradual liberalization that had been introduced by once again imposing martial law and press censorship throughout the country.

Interviews with civil servants offer additional evidence regarding the regime's unwillingness to abide by its own constitutional rules. The majority of the respondents expressed a profound fear of criticizing the military government's decisions and refrained from complaining because they were afraid of being dismissed from their jobs. The overwhelming majority also indicated that the regime had very little regard for laws and regulations, including those introduced by the military rulers themselves.

It has been argued here that professional attributes account for the military regime's failure to utilize the potential usefulness of the rational-legal formula and that the military rulers had no intention of fully implementing the constitutional structure. The question therefore arises: Why did the Colonels bother to go through the motions of a constitutional referendum and to hold a plebiscite to "determine" the fate of the monarchy? Two reasons seem to explain the regime's actions. The junta leaders felt that the resort to popular will, even under unaccepted rules and practices of popular representation, gave the appearance of widespread support for the regime's rule and its constitutional structure. This conclusion is supported by similar findings regarding the meaning and functions of elections in communist countries.[86]

But perhaps more important for the military regime's long-range objectives was its aim to legitimize a constitutional framework that carved out a preponderant role for the military in Greece's political, social, and economic life. Articles 129–132 of the 1968 constitution, pertaining to the organization and administration of the nation's armed forces, and law no. 58, designed to further explicate these five constitutional provisions, unmistakably reveal that the regime intended to protect the professional interests of the military organization by giving it a broad and permanent role in the country's political affairs.[87] Accordingly, the military was to be governed by the commander of the armed forces, appointed by the government. The commander, once appointed, could not be dismissed. Law no. 58 states that the commander "submits through the Minister of Defense to the Supreme Council of National Defense, recommendations concerning the formation of national defense policies . . . during times of peace and war."[88] Furthermore, the same law gave the chief of the armed forces "complete jurisdiction over the administrative bureaucracy of the Supreme Council of National Defense" and under "special conditions"—the definition left to the discretion of the council—he could take over the administration of other parts of the nation's administrative apparatus. Finally, the commander was given considerable say in matters of budgetary appropriations,

[86] Frank Dinka and Max Jack Skidmore, "The Functions of Communist One-Party Elections: Czechoslovakia, 1971," *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (1973): 395–422.

[87] "To Syntagma tis Ellados," reprinted in Papaconstantinou, *Politiki Agogi*, 614–63.

[88] Quoted in George Katiforis, *I Nomothesia ton Barbaron* (Athens: Themelio, 1975), 123.

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the power to establish special schools, and the right to "select the appropriate people" to manage national defense policies.[89]

George Katiforis encapsulated the role that the military was destined to play in the political life of Greece in his comment that the legal arrangement "entirely transforms the Armed Forces into a political organization . . . . It places it at the top of the state machine and gives it the opportunity to broaden its control over the entire social organization." The armed forces, he concluded, "acquire the possibility of becoming the guiding political organization of the Greek society."[90] Given the self-serving interests of the Colonels' constitutional structure, it is small wonder that the old political leadership, the bureaucracy, and the public found additional grounds to withhold their support from the regime.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to assess the ability of the Greek military professionals as political governors to cloak their regime with a mantle of legitimacy. To examine the merits of this proposition, the article employed Weber's legitimacy formulas of charismatic leadership, traditional beliefs and practices, regime performance, and rational-legal structures. The Greek praetorian regime made a concerted effort to employ all four avenues to legitimize its rule, but failed dismally. Lack of charisma and the lack of the persuasive skills, flexibility, and political sophistication needed to link the regime with traditional beliefs and practices, combined with the Colonels' failure to achieve their objectives and their inability or unwillingness to implement a democratic constitutional structure, prevented the regime from assuming the mantle of legitimacy. The fact that the junta lasted for more than seven years was not a sign of popular support. Rather, it was manifestation of several factors: unwillingness on the part of the Greek people to fight another civil war; the fragmented state of opposition; and contentment on the part of the United States and the north Atlantic community to conduct business as usual.

The junta's failure to legitimize itself stemmed from the unique general outlook, orientations, and system of values closely connected to military professionalism. The "military mind" is a peculiar blend of both modern managerial qualities and traditional values, such as bravery, obedience, discipline, and dedication to public service. The parallel existence of these characteristics constitute the mark of good soldiery and serve the military well in their primary mission as managers of violence. However, the political arena, where a myriad of political, economic, and social issues coalesce, requires an infinitely greater degree of patience and deliberation than the strict command-obey military possess. To attempt to transplant military perceptions, standards, norms, and practices to politics presents military regimes with problems and leads to incon-

[89] Ibid., 124–29.
[90] Ibid., 131.

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sistencies and failures. Praetorian governments, as Nordlinger has noted, therefore tend to be inherently "unstable" and generally are considered "either nonlegitimate or illegitimate."[91] The Greek military regime seems to have been a good example.

The military rulers appear to have been conscious of their regime's lack of widespread popular support. In fact, this realization may well have accentuated the conflict between the two rival groups within the junta. The more moderate faction, led by Papadopoulos, apparently concluded that the only possible avenue to generate popular support for the regime—and thus to institutionalize the role of the armed forces in the political affairs of the country—would be to attempt to politicize the regime by including some of the very political leaders that the military had so vehemently denounced. Papadopoulos's decision in the summer of 1973 to appoint Spyros Markezinis, leader of the tiny Progressive Party, as prime minister, with the mandate to hold popular elections some months later, should be seen in this context. The politicization route, however, did not seem to have been in line with the views of the hardliners. Using as a pretext the student disturbances of November 1973, and led by the chief of the military police, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, the other Colonels overthrew Papadopoulos and suspended all politicization efforts. Once in power, Ioannidis and his colleagues sought to create an aura of acceptance of their crumbling government by creating a national crisis, relying on the notion that an external threat would bring about a groundswell of popular support. The elusive Cyprus problem provided an almost tailor-made issue for such an adventure. Given the immense amount of national pride hidden behind this controversy, it could very well have become an avenue of legitimacy through the traditional beliefs and practices formula. The junta sought to bring about a solution to the Cyprus problem by staging a coup d'état against Archbishop Makarios, the president of Cyprus. But, as known, the Cyprus adventure backfired and, instead of becoming the military regime's savior, proved to be its epitaph.

The Greek military government's departure from political authority on 23 July 1974 was a clear manifestation of the inability of military professionals as political governors to legitimize their rule. The Cyprus debacle simply hastened the inevitable. The findings of this article concur with the assertions that the Greek political culture and large segments of the Greek population found the military's rigid attempts to preserve public order unacceptable, and challenged their regime's legitimacy.[92] Military professionalism and regime legitimacy do not make good companions.*

[91] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, 137–38.

[92] See Henry Bienen, "The Background to Contemporary Study of Militaries," in Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization*.

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Book Reviews

Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time *by Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George. New York, Oxford University Press, 1983. 288 pp. $19.95.*

This is a short, rich book that covers the evolution of the state system over four hundred years. It focuses on the changes in the concept of the balance of power since the Congress of Vienna. The book places the cold war in its historical context while analyzing the reasons for the break-point in that conflict during the early 1960s and provides studies for such items of statecraft as negotiation, deterrence, and détente. Such an accomplishment requires encapsulating a lifetime of research and reflection. In this case two lifetimes are involved, those of Gordon Craig, a distinguished historian of international relations, and Alexander George, one of the most eminent political scientists. Both men have also ranked among the most respected teachers at Stanford University. This book illustrates why. Developed out of a team-taught course, it is a model text as well as a model of scholarly discussion.

Several themes unite the book, some obvious, others more implicit. Among the obvious is the concern for tracing the development of the Western state system and the statecraft that accompanied it. Within that discussion, they remark on the meaning of the odd fact that there have usually been five powers that are the keys to balance-of-power politics (although of course, the names of the five change over time), that the turn from state competition to state regulation marked a major break after 1815, and that the debacle of the peace settlement of Paris in 1919 must be understood as a failure to comprehend the meaning of the Congress of Vienna. In a theoretical and historical analysis, the cold war is placed in this framework. This approach allows Craig and George to make useful observations about changes in the bipolar structure that occurred after the Cuban missile crisis and the 1973 breakdowns. They see the two major alliance systems in a process of dissolution, and argue that the decentralization poses special dangers to Europe. Quoting Peter Bender for support, the authors tend to counter their

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own analysis to argue that the 1979 Afghanistan invasion marked the first time an East-West confrontation weakened rather than strengthened the respective alliance systems. Actually the 1973 troubles, perhaps even the 1956 Suez crisis (and if de Gaulle is an indication, the Cuban missile crisis), had the same effect.

More implicit themes include the growing power of public opinion after 1914 and the problems this and the appearance of multiple interest groups pose to democratic statecraft. The analysis of opinion is not as strong as other parts of the book. The discussion of its effect on Roosevelt's quarantine speech is doubtful, and the conclusions drawn from its affect on FDR's view of the Four Policemen idea in 1943 is arguable. On the other hand, the way public sentiment helped unravel Richard Nixon's détente policy is a fine, concise study.

The book is thus a model in two respects: as an instructive discussion of why the world faces the dangers of a more chaotic international system in the 1980s; and as a guide for teaching how those dangers developed historically.

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The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs *by Robert Dallek. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983. 313 pp. $16.95.*

Critics of U.S. foreign policy have long pointed to its moralizing and crusading habits, its over- and underreactions, its simplistic—even conspiratorial—views of the world, and its swings from non-intervention to intervention and back again. Explanations for these characteristics have included the psychoanalysis of leaders, the behavior of a capitalist economy, the moral-legalism or utopianism of the national approach, and *realpolitik* (which often appears regarded as somehow un-American). Dallek now offers us the "hidden side" of U.S. policy, "those subjective influences that makers and backers of foreign policy barely glimpse themselves," the "undercurrents, of mood, tone, or milieu, of a climate of feeling that almost imperceptibly insinuates itself into concrete ideas and actions" (p. xiii).

Specifically, foreign policy is the product of "emotional displacement . . . expressing unresolved internal tensions" (p. xiii). Before 1945, the necessity to relieve tensions resulting from the transformation of a rural, simple, essentially homogeneous America to an urban-industrial, complex, heterogeneous society expressed itself in a quest for democracy and social justice overseas (the war with Spain, involvement in China, and World Wars I and II). After 1945, "a more crowded, organized, and constricted society" (p. 282) led to the replacement of the previously inner-directed Americans with outer-directed conformists who "seethed with tension and anxiety" (p. 189) over their relationship to people, production and consumption. Alienated and powerless, they refused to confront the internal roots of their distress and found in the external "Communist threat" a "convenient excuse for not facing up to troubling domestic concerns" (p. xviii). America needed an enemy and confrontation.

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Dallek's interpretation, provocative as it may be, seems nebulous and unprovable. How can one persuasively present the Spanish-American War as expressing relief from the tension between modern industrial society and earlier rural culture? While Dallek's thesis is usually compatible with American democracy's requirement for foreign foes and crusades against them, is it not a bit too convenient that in the inter-war period, these tensions, supposedly yearning for expression, were compatible with U.S. isolationism? Is a statement that much of the cold war policy from Dwight Eisenhower to Lyndon Johnson was "as much a way to express and rationalize an other-directed society at home as a means to defend the national interest abroad" (p. 220) really a credible explanation?

Is foreign policy then exclusively, mainly, or only partly the product of domestic displacement? Dallek is unclear on this critical issue (assuming that there is a relationship). Intermittently, he states that strategic and other factors are involved in decision-making. But given his perspective, foreign policy basically reflects internal tensions and does not really possess a dynamic of its own. How these alleged tensions are transformed into specific policies is never clarified. Dallek quotes this author for having suggested that the political attacks on Truman after the "loss of China" prevented him ending the Korean War on the same terms that Eisenhower accepted. My interpretation focused on the political process—the liberal-conservative struggle within the Republican party, the inter-party presidential competition, and executive-legislative conflict—not on unresolved domestic tensions stemming from the passing of traditional society.

A more fundamental reservation may be offered. U.S. policy, driven by internal torment, is generally portrayed as exaggerating and overreacting to the communist threat. Soviet and Chinese policies are repeatedly viewed as defensive. The few dispersed references to the reality of the external threat in the 1950s and 1960s become lost amid specific illustrations that emphasize communist defensive motivations. The cold war emerges as virtually an American show in which poor Russia appears almost as a victim of unresolved American domestic concerns. In 1948, for instance, Dallek, finding no "objective external dangers" to explain America's "more militant foreign policy," attributes it to "sharp conflicts at home" (p. 176).

The implicit conclusion is also pessimistic: if the U.S. fails to dissociate its social dilemmas from its foreign policy, it will "*continue* to jeopardize its security and [the] peace we yearn for" (p. 282, italics added). How after 100 years are we suddenly to do so? Yet, how are we to avoid nuclear war if we don't, especially if the Soviets are also exporting their internal tensions? This last question hangs over this disappointing book, another in the post-Vietnam genre that suggests that the U.S. is the world's principal troublemaker and American self-restraint would make it a more peaceful place. America is the problem, Dallek asserts, not Russia.

JOHN W. SPANIER
Naval War College

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Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning *by Richard K. Betts. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 318 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $9.95.*

For those who think that the warning problem is an easy one and that the problem of surprise attacks is a thing of the past, this book and most particularly its first half can be recommended as a saluatory caution against overconfidence. For those who are aware of the basic issues but could use an elaborated historical and theoretical explication of the factors that make surprise still all too real a problem, the first half of the book is also worth reading. For those, however, looking for "Lessons for Defense Planning," this book is likely to prove a disappointment as it apparently did, indeed, for its author.

Betts's discussion of why surprise attacks remain a problem is relatively sophisticated. He points out that warning is useful only to the extent that it produces a timely response. Responses, however, take time and resources to implement. They also risk provoking an escalation of an unstable crisis. One must then face the problem of passing warning early enough to allow response without giving false alarms when the situation is still ambiguous—a situation sharply compounded where "rapid reaction by the victim leads the enemy to cancel the attack, thus creating the impression that the alarm was false" (p. 20). A too good intelligence service, if it does not serve a sophisticated decision-maker, can thus make itself look bad with its own success.

Unfortunately, the analysis quickly falters on what is to be done. There are some real problems here, but they are problems that Betts self-consciously is never able to come to grips with coherently. In the conclusion, Betts writes: "Most of the options available to the West for reducing vulnerability to surprise are limited by political or financial constraints. Thus the need to hedge against surprise and the capacity to do so both seem low. A skeptical reader may be irritated at being forced to wade through a lengthy discourse to come to such a limp conclusion." A reader may well be irritated.

To the extent that Betts has a prescription, it seems to be "to reduce dependence on response to warnings" (p. 312). Yet if this means having a "defensive force capable of repelling attack from its normal posture," he earlier dismisses this option as "infeasible," as impossibly expensive (p. 147).

That is the essential dilemma of response to warning: high readiness is necessary for an adequate defense but too expensive to maintain constantly. When should the warning community pass warning? When something abnormal happens? When an enemy mobilizes an increased capability to attack? Or when our intelligence determines an actual intention of an enemy to strike? The last should be most "efficient" in avoiding false alarms but also the most vulnerable to surprise—intentions are hard to assess and can be changed in a moment, too late for timely response. The problem is not that Betts doesn't address these trade-offs, rather that at various points he seems to come out weakly on both sides (such as on pp. 169 and 280).

As a whole, the book reads as if Betts started out writing it with an acute understanding of the problem and learned too late that momentum alone would not carry him through to the solution. Perhaps lack of an overall concept led to various curious anomalies: dismissal of the warning of escalation problem and a set of elaborate digressions on such

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issues as forward defense policy for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the merits of fixed fortifications in Germany, and the relative importance of Iran and Saudi Arabia. These digressions might have served as interesting applications of a coherent standard for response to ambiguous warning. In the absence of such, they only served to tangle further the thread of Betts's argument.

RICHARD BRODY
Pan Heuristics

American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus *by George H. Quester. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982. 276 pp. Cloth, $27.95; paper, $12.95.*

Of those brave souls who have tried their hand at elucidating U.S. foreign policy, particularly at explaining to students who have no personal recollection even of Vietnam, George Quester has done a more thoughtful job than most. In this book, he covers most of the fundamental post-World War II issues from the U.S. perspective—as indeed others have done. But he does so in an original way that gives the work special value.

In a format faintly reminiscent of the triptych by Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, the author tests American policy against three contending interpretations. These are: the power politics approach expounded by Hans Morgenthau; the radical cum Marxist approach usually denominated "revisionist"; and the familiar centrist "American liberal" approach. It does not give the plot away to report that Quester's preference is for the liberal internationalist interpretation as best explaining United States behavior, however eccentric, during the momentous thirty-eight years since the Axis surrendered. Unlike some others who share that conventional view, Quester deals analytically or in any event judiciously with both facts and myths. He is invariably generous with critics, and with the young Americans who have lost confidence in their government at home and abroad. But his own convictions are visible throughout.

The author's approach acquires clarity in his organization of the material. The chapter headings alone do the job. The chapter embodying the "power politics" filter defines the U.S. in the subtitle as "the same as other countries"; Quester finds it in fact better than that. The next chapter, embodying the radical critique, defines the U.S. as "worse than other countries"; Quester finds that view erroneous. The "Old Consensus" chapter heading subtitles this country as "better than" others, and Quester clearly finds that to have been the case, by and large.

Evidentiary support for the author's friendly interpretation of America's recent global past is derived from his analysis of such revisionist staples as congenital Yankee violence, dollar diplomacy, cold war culpability, and ultimately, the traumatic involvement in Vietnam that decisively fractured the postwar consensus. After conceding the partial truths to be found in the two deviant interpretations, including examples of occasional stupidity, venality, and illusion, Quester's verdict is that Americans are an essentially good and well-intentioned people who have tried to do the right thing and frequently succeeded—but who now need a reformulated vocation in the world.

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It was not obvious why in his chapter on détente the author focused on Black Africa rather than Europe or the Middle East (nor why the proofreading in the first part was so casual). But on what counts, the Quester case is persuasive, at least to this reviewer.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics *by George W. Breslauer. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1982. 318 pp. Cloth, $28.50; paper, $12.95.*

This book is a sophisticated analysis of the post-Stalinist leadership. George Breslauer, an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, argues convincingly that "building authority is not the same as consolidating power" (p. 3). Rather, the former is "the process by which Soviet leaders seek to legitimize their policy programs and demonstrate their competence or indispensibility as leaders"—without "pulling rank." The latter, "through a combination of patronage and payoff, . . . allows the General Secretary to outflank rivals and rise within the leadership" (p. 3).

The author describes and evaluates Nikita Khrushchev's and Leonid Brezhnev's attempts at building authority in a post-Stalinist consensus that sought to synthesize the conflicting values between, on the one hand, increased consumer satisfaction and greater material incentives for the masses and, on the other, heavy-industrial and military priorities. Breslauer has addressed a significant problem that had not been examined with such detailed analysis. He has carefully examined Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's speeches, which emphasized consumer satisfaction, administrative reform, and political participation, in the press and in the political journals. He then successfully presents the complex issues Soviet leaders grappled with after Stalin's death.

According to Breslauer, the Soviet political succession consists of two stages. During the first stage, the leader allocates funds into the consumer-oriented sectors (wages included) and rival leaders advance competing programs. (Here Breslauer has detected the subtle conflict between Brezhnev's and Aleksei Kosygin's positions on resource allocation and incentive policy.) In the second stage, after the power struggle has been provisionally decided and the fear of the masses subsided, the leader provides more money for the military and heavy industry. Only then is the party leader expected to come forth with a comprehensive program at the party congress, where he appears "to combine the roles of initiator and broker" (p. 287). After political manuevering, the conservative political culture, and crop failures frustrate the leader's ambitious program, an authority crisis ensues. As a result, both Khruschev and Brezhnev launched "grandiose projects of immense proportions, in hopes of either securing a quick win or creating an atmosphere of national mobilization in which the establishment would defer to their leadership" (p. 288). At both stages, the leader is attempting to build his authority under great duress.

Although the patterns of policy advocacy documented in Breslauer's book are speculative, they are highly informed speculation. And although the author has

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delineated patterns in the post-Stalinist succession, he is careful enough not to overstate his case and not to predict whether this pattern will reoccur in future successions.

In his treatment of political authority in the Soviet Union, however, Breslauer deals almost exclusively with the Soviet domestic scene. Only in the conclusion does he devote several paragraphs to international politics and how it influences Soviet domestic policy directly and the political succession indirectly (pp. 290–92). Here the author arouses the reader's interest with possible interactions and implications, especially when he implies that turning points in the Soviet political succession occur during U.S. presidential election years and inauguration years. But this hint is not enough. Khrushchev's mishandling of the Cuban missle crisis and Brezhnev's transformation of the Soviet Union from a regional power to a global power, for example, had serious repercussions in undermining or strengthening the incumbent's authority. Thus, international politics, especially volatile Soviet-American relations, play an important role in building a Soviet leader's authority. Perhaps Breslauer will consider integrating the international dimension into one of his future works. Despite this problem, Breslauer's monograph is one of the best kremlinological studies published in recent years.

GEORGE LIBER
Columbia University

Leaders *by Richard M. Nixon. New York, Warner Books, 1982. 371 pp. $17.50.*

Richard M. Nixon has published his third book since resigning from the presidency in 1974 in disgrace. In this book, Nixon has associated himself with some of the great twentieth-century leaders by providing accounts of his meetings with them. He also adds his own reflections on leadership. The result is a curious book—a scholarly work by no means, but sometimes insightful and surely grist for the psycho-historians' mills.

Nixon's portraits include Winston Churchill, described as "the largest human being of our time" (I thought that was Taft), Charles de Gaulle, Douglas MacArthur (together with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida), Konrad Adenauer, Nikita Khrushchev, and Zhou Enlai. He also offers smaller glimpses of Alcide de Gasperi, Kwame Nkrumah, Achmed Sukarno, Jawaharlal Nehru, Ramon Magsaysay, David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar el-Sadat, Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, King Faisal, Lee Kuan Yew, and Robert Menzies. Interestingly enough, there is no chapter on Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Nixon meets these leaders at airports, state dinners, summits, and at their homes. We get some small talk at the top, a few anecdotes (some are well known and have nothing to do with Nixon's encounters), and descriptions of how they treated Pat and how he treated their spouses. Nixon then backtracks for some historical information. Finally, readers are treated in some chapters to a sermonette. At one point Nixon asks (and worse, he answers) the question: What would Churchill say to us today? At another point he lets us know how Adenauer would view the world today.

What these portraits tell us about Nixon is more interesting than what Nixon tells us

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about his subjects. For one thing, Nixon enjoyed the company of elder statesmen. Often his exchange of views with them amounted to a learning experience for him, as they passed on their accumulated wisdom or judgments. The transmission process seems to be an unexplored topic for the most part, and one well worth investigation by scholars of the presidency.

Interestingly, Nixon seemed most drawn to those politicians whose meteoric careers ultimately ended in failure. His description of meetings with Herbert Hoover and MacArthur at their respective suites in the Waldorf offer insights into Nixon's own self-image. The only other politicians Nixon reserves his affections for are those who treated him kindly when he was out of power and in the political wilderness following his election defeats of 1960 and 1962.

Nixon concludes his book with a discussion of leadership and statesmanship. "We honor leaders for what they achieve," he says, "but we often prefer to close our eyes to the way they achieve it" (p. 324). What a misreading of American history: if there is one thing to which the American people *never* close their eyes, it is the manner in which their elected officials carry out their duties. As one would expect, his discussion of means and ends is yet another attempt, albeit indirect, to excuse himself for participating in Watergate crimes. Yet even Nixon concludes that a leader "must not use means that disgrace or undo the purpose" (p. 326).

If Nixon intends to write yet another book, perhaps he should address himself to Watergate. Better yet, he might apply to his own writings one of his aphorisms: "the leaders," he says, "must learn not only how to talk, but also when—and equally important, when to stop talking" (p. 332).

The book jacket provided by the publisher offers a lovely color portrait of the ex-president suitable for framing.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College, Columbia University

Franklin D. Roosevelt's Diplomacy and American Catholics, Italians, and Jews *by Leo V. Kanawada, Jr. Ann Arbor, Mich., UMI Research Press, 1982. 138 pp. $39.95.*

Adherents of the idea of a single-minded American foreign policy have long deplored the intervention of ethnic groups with foreign attachments (Theodore Roosevelt contemptuously called them hyphenated-Americans), but the importance of this element in political life has been manifest for over a century. It is potent today; it was, as Leo Kanawada asserts, important in the 1930s.

The critical question is, and was, how important? The author of this study attempts to demonstrate the vital role ethnic and religious groups have played in American history, through their power over the Congress and over the Franklin Roosevelt administration. However, the persuasive effect of that demonstration is diminished by the many weaknesses of this work.

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In the first place, the book is filled with petty errors. William Bullitt was definitely not a member of the Catholic hierarchy (p. 8). The Spanish foreign minister (p. 58) was named Alvarez del Vayo, not del Vago. Samuel Rosenman appears on p. 97 as an instrumental member of "the group" of important Zionists arguing before FDR, but on p. 105 he is designated as an anti-Zionist. The sloppiness of the prose, which seldom rises above a level of mere adequacy and frequently is so muddled as to be opaque, often results in distortions or foolishness. President Roosevelt could not have "instructed the Mexican ambassador, Najera . . . to see Cardenas" (p. 42) without resorting to a kind of bullying that was entirely out of character for the Roosevelt administration. Kanawada discusses a rather wild scheme that he refers to as "the Iraq plan—irrigating the Trans-Jordan desert" (p. 117). It would appear that the author does not understand that Transjordan was not and is not a part of Iraq. While describing this idea, proposed by Edward Norman, he remarks that "as a member of the Democratic party organization in New York City, Norman not only had close ties to the Arab leadership in the Middle East" (p. 118). There are more stunning non sequiturs in this little book than in most very long tomes.

These persistent little stupidities are vexing, and indicate a larger flaw. Kanawada explicitly stresses the original quality of his work, in that he claims to reveal a pattern of religious-ethnic influence in the conduct of American foreign policy and a perceptible effect of this influence on foreign states not hitherto realized. However, the material of this book is far from persuasive in that regard. The role of Catholic opinion, both lay and clerical, in opposing moves by this country against Francisco Franco has been well known, and in fact obvious, since the 1930s. What was not apparent at that time has been made available by scholars like Robert Dallek. Kanawada produces a convoluted conspiratorial thesis that denigrates the sincerity of the Roosevelt administration's attachment to the ideals of the Spanish Loyalists, but bases this on nothing more than Harold Ickes's diary and the fulminations of Freda Kirchwey. This book emphasizes the force of organized Italian-American pressure while mentioning but failing to consider the effect of black opinion, as a factor in respect to the Italian-Ethiopian war. Since there is no discussion of the relationship between this pressure and the critical decisions made in London and Paris (or even Geneva), the importance of American events tends to be constantly exaggerated. In fact, no American political figure was pressing for oil sanctions, just as the idea gained no ground in Britain, so that the work of Generoso Pope was not nearly as world-shaking as this book implies. So too, the meager effects of the Zionist effort, important as they seemed in 1936 and 1937 in keeping Palestine open to a small number of fugitives from Nazism, hardly justify a conclusion that "the Jewish-American community summoned its enormous strength and influence" (p. 113). The very pitiful outcome of the effort of Stephen Wise and Felix Frankfurter is apparent from Kanawada's own explanation.

This leaves the story of the Catholic church and Mexican anti-Catholic policies in the years from 1933 to 1935, the author's most convincing tale. This book shows the degree to which behind-the-scenes efforts by leading clergymen did result in quiet U.S. efforts to persuade the Mexican government to change its often fiercely anti-clerical position. There was a marked alteration after 1935, and the government of Mexico has never been so

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hostile to the Catholic church since that time. The stand of the U.S. government was arguably a factor, but the elimination from power of Plutarco Calles, the last of the bitterly anti-Catholic Mexican men of power, was the critical fact. It is hard to maintain that the U.S. was the sole or even chief cause of that.

In short, what is good about this book is rarely novel, what is novel is often foolish, and a student of American history can skip this volume very easily.

JOSEPH LOSOS
St. Louis, Missouri

Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1949–1953 *by Robert J. Donovan. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1982. 444 pp. $19.95.*

Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency *by Robert H. Ferrell. Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1983. 220 pp. Cloth, $13.50; paper, $4.95.*

With this impressive volume, Robert Donovan has now completed his history of the Truman administration. It is likely to stand for some time as the standard account. As he did in the first volume, Donovan offers a thorough, balanced, and reliable survey of both the major issues that President Truman faced in the White House and the policies he pursued to meet them. Using both documentary sources and personal interviews, Donovan succeeds in combining the methods of the journalist and the historian to give a sympathetic portrait of Truman as a dedicated leader who ultimately was overcome by events beyond his control.

Donovan is especially strong on military themes. He gives an excellent account of the interservice rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy, and he carefully documents Truman's role in the decision to cut back on defense spending in 1949. Relying heavily on recently released diplomatic and military records, Donovan deals fully with the Korean War, providing the most revealing picture yet of administration policy toward that conflict.

The book, however, is not without flaws. The very emphasis on military issues and the Korean War forces Donovan to deal sketchily with many other important matters. Thus he spends less than a dozen pages on the failure of the Fair Deal in Congress, and he treats the last eighteen months of the administration, from the dismissal of Gen. MacArthur through the 1952 campaign, in less than fifty pages. And even on the Korean conflict, the focus on strategy leads him to play down the home front and the thorny economic problems the war created.

The basic theme of the book, as suggested by the title, is also open to question. Donovan claims that after his surprising election victory in 1948, Truman was overwhelmed by events at home and abroad. Certainly Truman was not responsible for the communist victory in China, the outbreak of the Korean War, or even the hysteria of the "Red Scare." But he did contribute in important ways to the corrosive impact of these developments on his administration.

Donovan's own evidence points to Truman's complicity. Thus the author regrets that the president did not ask Congress for a declaration of war in Korea, settling instead for a

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reporter's phrase, "police action," to describe the conflict. He is equally critical of Truman's decision to pursue fleeing North Korean forces across the 38th parallel, noting that there was a consensus building within the administration to go for all-out victory in Korea even before the Inchon landing. Donovan, relying on the studies of Athan Theoharis and Richard Freeland, also points out that Truman must bear some of the blame for McCarthyism because of the excessive rhetoric he employed in selling containment to the American people. And the author, while he does not develop the issue, does admit that Truman's own fierce political loyalty led him to defend many of his appointees who betrayed the president's trust by engaging in dubious and even corrupt acts.

In contrast to Donovan's restrained and understated defense of Truman, Robert Farrell's book is an unabashed effort to rehabilitate the president's reputation. While Ferrell concedes that Truman made several important mistakes, such as his seizure of the steel industry and the H-bomb decision, the emphasis throughout is on the president's bold qualities of leadership, notably his humility and decisiveness. Ferrell does succeed in providing a long-needed brief biography of Truman, one that offers a concise, lively and provocative portrait of a controversial president.

Ferrell's only fault lies in trying to claim too much for his hero. He contends that Truman transformed the office he inherited from Franklin D. Roosevelt into the modern American presidency. It would be more accurate to say that Truman consolidated a process that began under Roosevelt as a result of new federal activity stemming from both the New Deal and World War II. It is not clear to what extent Truman was personally responsible for the growth of executive authority. Major new institutions that Ferrell cites, such as the Council of Economic Advisers and the National Security Council, were largely the product of congressional initiative.

Both authors end up praising Truman. Ferrell, citing recent polls of scholars, labels him a "near great" president, while Donovan is more restrained, pointing to "his serious mistakes" as well as to "his wise decisions" in concluding that his White House service amounted to "a most extraordinary presidency" (p. 409).

The ultimate historical verdict is not yet as certain as Ferrell maintains. Truman has risen remarkably in scholarly esteem since he left office, but contemporaries may not have been as blind as the two authors suggest. The true test of presidential leadership is rising above adversity. By that standard, Truman's record is flawed. He did preserve the New Deal from conservative counterattack and he did help forge the policy of containment in Europe. But he failed to work out a coherent Asian policy; he did not grapple effectively with the virulent anticommunism he had helped engender; and he proved unable to work effectively with Congress, in part because he had made this body his political whipping boy in 1948. As a result, he lost the confidence of the American people and left the nation in a dangerous state of division and unrest by the end of his second term.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
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The Future of American Political Parties: The Challenge of Governance *edited by Joel L. Fleishman. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1982. 174 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $6.95.*

In this American Assembly volume of five separately authored chapters, the able and thoughtful contributors address their common subject so as to produce an unusually coherent, stimulating, and well-informed study. They have a common concern for the recent relative weakness of parties in American politics, and, as noted in the editor's introduction, each chapter reflects a "realistic" view of what might be done to strengthen party roles. No author suggests the transformation of American parties into idealized European ideological types. Nor is there an acceptance of an inevitable withering away of parties, and so of American democracy. Characteristically, the authors make modest proposals for more effective parties.

Plainly, the work represents mainstream political science in other respects as well as in its professed (and, I believe, well-founded) realism. The authors, including the editor, all accept the generally pro-party tradition of twentieth-century American political science. Even before the last decades of apparent party decline, scholars in the field of American politics tended either to defend the usefulness of American historic organizations (often with a preference for some improvement), or to advocate, with intellectual vigor, the development of more "responsible" parties. It is the first strand of this pro-party tradition that the volume more nearly resembles. In the first and broadest chapter, Gary R. Orren explicitly identifies his views with those of V. O. Key rather than with E. E. Schattschneider's stronger responsible-party government model (p. 29). Significantly, both Orren (pp. 5, 24) and James L. Sundquist (p. 42) stress the old and still relevant point that the American separation of powers means that there is special need for parties to bridge the constitutional gap, even as the structure makes it difficult for parties to operate as they do elsewhere.

The authors are fully aware that lately it has been harder than ever for parties to fulfill their role in the American system. Understandably, therefore, they address their proposals mainly to means for reducing some of the recently developed disadvantages. One is the post-1968 presidential nominating procedure, under which organizational leaders have evidently lost influence in choosing party candidates. In three different chapters, by Orren, Sundquist, and Pope McCorkle and Fleishman, similar arguments are presented for the Hunt Commission recommendation, now adopted by the Democratic National Committee, that the presidential nominating convention should include uncommitted delegates selected because of their public offices or party leadership positions (pp. 35–36, 68, 167). The same authors also want more delegates selected by caucus and fewer in primary elections (pp. 37, 68, 166).

A second kind of proposal advanced more than once in the volume concerns campaign finance. Based on the premise that American party organizations have, over time, become less consequential fund-raisers than individual candidates and political action committees, it appears possible to attempt to arrest if not reverse such a trend by legislation specifically favorable to parties. Some such legislation already exists in limited form. The successful Republican committee fund-raising of the last six years, while hardly simp-

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ly a result of the legislation, shows that party organizational revival through campaign financing is indeed feasible. The Robert J. Huckshorn-John F. Bibby chapter reveals a good deal about the recent Republican experience, particularly in the way that the national party has helped state party organizations. F. Christopher Arterton, along with providing a most useful analysis of 1980 campaign finance data, specifically discusses the opportunities for increasing party financial roles by legislation and other means. Arterton emphasizes that a party, by thus helping its candidates, might subsequently exert more influence over their office holding behavior, but he is also careful to note, in line with the realism of the book, that such influence is well short of the kind of control that might have accompanied an older organizational domination of the nominating process (pp. 132–33).

LEON D. EPSTEIN
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The President as Policymaker: Jimmy Carter and Welfare Reform *by Laurence E. Lynn and Dave deF. Whitman. Philadelphia, Pa., Temple University Press, 1981. 351 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $12.95.*

This is a stirring and detailed account of the development of the Carter welfare reform proposal and its subsequent demise. The authors draw heavily on the case study they developed for use at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The book highlights the nature of the policy process by weaving a story based on accounts of a diverse group of actors, from top presidential aides and Cabinet officials to mid-level civil servants and outside lobbyists. Although summary discussions of the substantive issues in welfare reform come out through the statements of participants and through some interpretation by the authors, there is no attempt to provide an in-depth and authoritative analysis of the problems with the existing welfare system and the best ways to improve the nation's income transfer system.

Instead, the authors' primary objective is "to develop insights into how presidents can perform their policymaking role in such a way as to create the greatest chance of success for their initiatives" (p. xi). While the authors do come up with insights, they are not entirely convincing in drawing lessons from the case regarding presidential policymaking. No explicit discussion of these lessons appears until the last 18 (of 280) pages of text. At this point, the authors can make several interesting points, but are unable to subject each to close analysis. Their conclusions on the lessons for presidential policymaking rest on selected references to their case study and to other instances of presidential leadership. There is little discussion of the trade-offs among alternative approaches to policymaking or of why other conclusions might be incorrect, unimportant, or superfluous.

Consider one example. As the authors point out, even after President Carter clearly chose a jobs-related approach, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) staff worked to preserve their own negative income tax approach. In my view, their ability to bring their HEW superiors along mired down the entire process in an

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unnecessary debate that ultimately left the president with a plan that was politically unattractive. Why did the president let this happen? Was it his failure to articulate an overall philosophy, to put more responsibility in the hands of presidential aides, to resolve conflict within his adminstration, or to develop policy within a political context?

Lynn and Whitman point to all of these factors without demonstrating which (if any) were ultimately responsible for the defeat of the initiative. Perhaps only one of these failures was really the significant one. The authors do not recognize other possibilities, such as the focus on the idealized reform proposal instead of on understanding existing realities. In fact, this misplaced emphasis caused real difficulties when trying to reconcile the vast projected costs of adding cash assistance for two-parent families with the reality that most were already eligible (under the unemployed father provisions of Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC-UF]) at little budget cost.

Finally, the authors do not examine whether following a previously successful pattern could have undesirable consequences. For example, developing policy within political realities may force a choice over which coalition to satisfy before deciding which policy one wants.

In spite of their limited analysis of this episode's lessons for presidential policymaking, Lynn and Whitman make an important contribution to the history of both the Carter administration and the efforts to reform welfare.

ROBERT I. LERMAN
Brandeis University

The Science Race: Training and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers, US and USSR *by Catherine P. Ailes and Francis W. Rushing. New York, Crane Russak and Co., 1982. 254 pp. $22.50.*

Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology *by James R. Killian, Jr. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1982. 315 pp. $8.95.*

Both of these admirable books, differing in style and viewpoints, are concerned with the status and prospects of the United States in a world increasingly dominated by science and technology. On 4 October 1957, the launching of Sputnik alarmed the American public, alerted the international scientific and technological communities, roused the politicians, fascinated the world, stirred the press, stimulated the columnists, and elated the Soviets. It spurred President Eisenhower to action in order to reassure the public. Sputnik also resulted in science and technology being introduced—after a seven-year delay—to an intimate, systematic role at the very top level of policymaking in the federal government.

A quarter of a century later, English remains the only language to have been spoken on the moon, but science education has been in an accelerating decline in the United States. In the Soviet Union (and in Japan) its emphasis continues, and progress is striking. But

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meanwhile in the United States, science advice no longer reaches the president directly from his own Science Advisor, and his own President's Science Advisory Committee, but only after filtration through the While House staff and the Office of Management and Budget.

Science instruction in the elementary schools in the United States has almost disappeared. In the secondary schools, the quality of science and mathematics teachers continues to deteriorate, as many of the best move to better paying, and perhaps more alluring, jobs in industry. So speaks F. James Rutherford, chief education officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a former assistant secretary in the U.S. Department of Education, who recently wrote in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (April 1983) that college "undergraduates are not choosing to prepare for careers in teaching science or mathematics, the schools aren't hiring science and mathematics teachers, and the system is simply winding down." In the universities, graduate education suffers, as B.S. degree achievers in engineering and computer science go directly to high-paying jobs in industry, along with enterprising faculty members. Thus, the seed corn for the next generation of researchers and teachers is being consumed. The developing vacuum may create opportunities for qualified women and minorities. Recent growing awareness encourages hope of increased federal funding. The Soviets try harder. Mathematics is stressed in primary and secondary schools. For decades, they have been committed to achieving science and technology primacy, for economic, political, and military reasons.

Ailes and Rushing describe and quantify the training and utilization of scientists, engineers, and technical personnel in the Soviet Union and in the United States. They utilize extensive material exchanged during 1973 through 1979 through the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Science and Technology Exchange Program. Official data have been enriched by informal conversations in the U.S. and the USSR. The Soviet "Plan-Directed Economy" is compared with the U.S. "Market-Oriented Economy." All levels of the educational structures, systems, and emphases are described and the populations of scientists, engineers, and technicians are enumerated. Utilization of these specialists in research and development sectors of education and of the economy are discussed. Data are presented on the mobility of scientists and engineers in the United States, both in fields of activity and geographically. Comparable information for the Soviets is pauce; but the authors' observations are stimulating and plausible.

Eighty tables and charts, an extensive bibliography, and a concise index support and supplement Ailes and Rushing's cogent, clear, credible, and timely text, published through the Strategic Studies Center of SRI International.

Killian's lucid analytical memoir will be valuable to political scientists, historians, intelligent concerned citizens, new or aspiring policy-level public servants, and academic students of science policy. It begins with Sputnik and President Eisenhower's prompt revitalization of the presidential science advisory organization into the design approved by President Truman in December 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War. Killian, an engineer and not a Ph.D. scientist, was then president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Widely acquainted and respected among scientists and familiar with the

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federal government organization, he was Eisenhower's inspired choice to be his science advisor, supported by a distinguished President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which included I. I. Rabi and several others carried over from Truman's committee.

Drawing heavily on Detlev Bronk's definitive history (*Science*, 1974) for background, Killian describes his own and PSAC's activities during his one and one-half year tenure in 1957–58, and comments briefly on science advisors who succeeded him. Spurred by the powerful and distrusted Soviets coming up from behind, supported by the confidence of Eisenhower and the mood of the American public, and inspired by the opportunity for public service, Killian and PSAC with its associated panels were remarkably productive. Thirty-seven major reports were issued during the period, and they strengthened government policy effectively over a spectrum ranging from outer space to submarine weaponry, and from military technology to civilian defense and arms control. Killian concludes with cogent and timely exhortations on the support of education, on the ever-present need for a superior intelligence organization, and on the necessary involvement of science and technology in the formulation of White House policy over a wide range of issues that radiate extensively from the sharply military focus of decades ago.

The Science Race is a sobering status report on a competition in which the United States, the leader, is in danger of being overtaken for want of long-term national educational policies and emphases. *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower* is at once a historical document, a practical guide for the future, and a charming and revealing personal memoir. Both books are recommended.

WILLIAM T. GOLDEN
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Dynamics of Global Crisis *by Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1982. 248 pp. Cloth $18.00; paper, $7.50.*

The world no longer works the way it is supposed to, and these four men want to know why. Their objective is to apply a global analysis—an understanding of capitalism as a world system—to the current crisis as a way both of putting it into context and of developing some projections for the future. The contributions are extremely uneven, but the overall result is positive.

The book is actually four moderately long essays with an all too brief introduction and a conclusion that disappointingly only sketches the theoretical differences among them rather than building on them. There is no question that a much more significant work would have been produced had the authors merged their contributions or at least provided the reader with a more detailed and serious attempt to draw out the implications that follow from their differences. Instead there is more of an "instant" book, an effort to reach an audience as soon as possible. Yet the crisis will be around long enough for a more sustained treatment to have been worth it.

Samir Amin provides an outline of the questions that he feels are worth addressing

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about the current crisis, such as the meaning of already existing socialism, the proper strategy for the Third World, and the increasing tensions between North America and Western Europe in the first world. Unless one has read Amin before and is willing to put up with his corrections of previous statements he has made, one is likely to become intolerant of the elliptical and sketchy treatment offered here. Amin's chapter is so idiosyncratic and poorly organized that it cannot offer much of a diagnosis. It is the outstanding weakness of the book.

Andre Gunder Frank provides the most pessimistic analysis, one that not only condemns the path taken by the advanced capitalist countries, but that also shows the failures of Third World strategies and pitilessly examines the bitter fruits of state socialism. There is not much theory here, more a catalogue of woe. In spite of awkward prose and a tendency to cram as much detail into a sentence as is humanly possible, Frank is ultimately convincing in his pessimism. The truth of the matter is that the Eastern bloc came to rely on Western economic growth as did the Third World. So long as the "enemy," U.S. capitalism, remains mired in stagnation, the nationalist fervor, religious extremism, and untoward militarism of recent years is likely to continue.

The most thoughtful contribution to this book is provided by Giovanni Arrighi, whose topic is essentiallly the decline of U.S. hegemony over the world economy. Arrighi writes lifelessly and has a proclivity to overcategorize, yet he has taken his assignment seriously and offers the reader not only some suggestions about why things have come to where they are, but also some suggestions about what might result from it. The basic thrust of his argument is that expansionary macroeconomic policies work perversely when oligopolistic pricing is endemic. Consequently, efforts on the part of governments to return to the heady days of the 1960s merely intensify the stagnant conditions of the late 1970s. At some point, Arrighi concludes, a political solution involving a new social contract between labor and capital will replace efforts to rely on a "free" market that no longer exists. I do not share Arrighi's sense that liberal corporatism is on the agenda of change, at least in the United States, because I am unimpressed by the ability of state managers to overcome an ideological preference for laissez-faire. Nonetheless, I feel that Arrighi has identified the major issues and treated them well.

Wallerstein's contribution to the present book is the most enlightening. I cannot in this space summarize the many nuances of his approach, other than to say that in his opinion there is a long-term decline of the capitalist mode of production and a more immediate economic and social crisis that can be resolved. The downturn in production currently being experienced might not persist (Wallerstein is more optimistic on this point that I would be), but little can reverse the secular trends inherent in a system characterized as one economy divided into many states. The clarity of Wallerstein's presentation is remarkable and some of his predictions surprising—for example, a West European-Soviet "alliance" against the U.S., Japan, and China. If a test case were needed as to the current applicability of world-system analysis, Wallerstein's brief chapter would be all that is needed.

Overall, I think that sufficient problems remain in attempting to grasp the nature of the current crisis. These four authors, in my opinion, have a tendency to try and explain everything, cramming into their analysis Islamic fundamentalism and apolitical privat-

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ism, along with insufficient demand and protective tariffs. They all too often turn *Business Week* on its head, accepting as face value a conservative interpretation of labor productivity or government spending and then giving it a Marxist twist. There is, especially in Arrighi, too much reliance on Marx and too little on an attempt at an original synthesis, though all the authors rightly give substantial credit to Joseph Schumpeter. But as a first attempt at a global explanation of what is undoubtedly a global phenomenon, this book should be read. It should serve as an important corrective to explanations that restrict their analysis of the crisis to events taking place in any one nation-state rather than in the world economy as a whole.

ALAN WOLFE
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South Asian Security After Afghanistan *by G.S. Bhargava. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983. 198 pp. $23.95.*

This interesting monograph purports to be a study of south Asian security questions in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As it stands, it is more an attempt to examine Pakistan and Afghanistan as they struggle maintain their identity and independence in the face of epoch-making changes. India is never seriously investigated, although its role in the south Asian drama is threaded throughout the volume. The author, an eminent Indian journalist and scholar, appears to have strong feelings about Pakistan's foreign policy and how it might be shaped to cope with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He is clearly distressed by past Pakistani performance, and he is convinced Pakistan's present leaders are doing no better than their predecessors. One enormous obstacle in the fashioning of a more creditable foreign policy, according to the author, is Pakistan's loosely defined but nonetheless continuing dependence on the United States. The U.S. did not protect Pakistan from adversity in the past, and it is not likely to improve on its record in the future. This theme is repeated over and over as the author describes the history of Afghanistan and how it has affected the subcontinent, particularly in the northwestern quadrant, which today is occupied by the Pakistani nation.

The author implies that Pakistan's anxieties about India's aggressive intentions are unfounded. By the same token, Pakistanis are overreacting to developments on the other side of the Khyber Pass. Instead of assuming a belligerent posture, the country would be better served if its leaders came to terms with the realities of power in the region and made the necessary adjustments. While he reserves criticism for all the parties in the equation, the author would appear to point to the United States as the major source of instability in south and southwest Asia. The United States has even less reason than Pakistan to fear the changes now transforming the area. Adjustment, not resistance, is required to ensure an overall equilibrium. The author seeks to identify all the publicized scenarios and all the "worst case" probabilities, including one that posits an aggressive Soviet Union, determined to establish global hegemony by breaking out to the Indian Ocean, seizing the Persian Gulf, and severing the industrial world's energy supply. The

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author sees little possibility of such a thrust and would encourage discarding the grand theory. Sustaining such notions can only plunge the world into deeper pitfalls.

It is never clearly explained why the Soviet Union decided to use the Red Army in Afghanistan. Much as the author would like to dispel Pakistani and American concerns, he acknowledges that the Soviets had real reason to be disturbed by occurrences in Iran, as well as in Afghanistan. The Muslim population of Soviet central Asia could become troublesome and, given their rapidly inceasing numbers, the Soviets no doubt felt justified in acting forcefully to put down the resistance to the "Marxist" regime in Kabul. The author dwells at some length on the Pakhtunistan question and concludes that "normalization" of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan would contribute to reconciling rival ethnic claims in Pakistan, and would thus ease the tension on the northwestern frontier. Moreover, by recognizing the new realities in the region, Pakistan can contribute to the peace programs.

The author adopts the notion of "Finlandization" for Afghanistan, although he notes the necessity for modification. If accomplished, he believes the Soviets can withdraw their forces from Afghanistan and allow the country to build "its policies on the principle of deference to Soviet interests, a price that most countries in the vicinity of powerful neighbors pay in effect for good neighborliness and regional peace" (p. 184). Here too is the not-so-hidden agenda for the Pakistanis. It is apparently the author's contention that Pakistan, like Afghanistan, must come to terms with its larger neighbors if it wishes to maintain its integrity and find tranquility in this world. Although unstated, the "Finlandization" of Afghanistan would also require the "Finlandization" of Pakistan, except that in the latter India would play a larger role than the Soviet Union.

Although the author notes in his introduction that he has no intention of exploring domestic conditions within the countries of the region, and in large measure holds to his intention with reference to India, it is curious that he chooses to ignore India's timidity in dealing with the Soviet Union. Considering that India is the only Third World country with diplomatic leverage in Moscow, it would be interesting to understand why India is so reluctant to play a more direct political role in mediating the crisis in Afghanistan. If the author had dwelled on what India can do, given its resources, to adjust rival differences in the region, readers would find something more of a prescription. As it stands, however, the book will offer few, if any, new insights into the problem of south Asian security in the 1980s.

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U.S. Economic Policy toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Meeting the Japanese Challenge *by Lawrence B. Krause. Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 98 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $5.95.*

The Eastasia Edge *by Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent E. Calder. New York, Basic Books, 1982. 296 pp. $14.95.*

The United States faces a serious challenge to its continued economic strength from the fast-growing and successful nations of Asia. Japan is the most important of these nations, and by now most Americans are aware of Japan's economic prowess, even if they do not drive a Toyota or watch a Sony. Beyond Japan, however, is a group of other Asian nations that, because of their high growth rates, productive populations, and stable polities, could become potential economic rivals to the United States. The underlying concern of both books is what the U.S. should do about this emerging challenge.

Lawrence Krause, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has written a short but cogent book about the opportunities and challenges facing the United States in Asia. He develops two important themes. First, he stresses the need for the U.S. to be more sensitive to and actively involved economically with the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The ASEAN countries, which are already the fourth largest trading partner of the U.S., are among the fastest growing countries in the world. Krause makes good sense when he argues that the U.S.'s ability to understand these nations more clearly and to respond to their needs and aspirations will signal its future effectiveness throughout the developing world. Greater attention to ASEAN will also help the U.S. compete with Japan, which is now the region's dominant economic power.

The notion of a "Japanese challenge" is the second major theme developed in the book. Several writers have recently noted in a general way the problems posed by Japanese competition; Krause states the issue more starkly and succinctly than most. He argues that if Japanese industry is able to beat American companies in the high technology and high value-added sectors, the U.S. will be left to produce goods for which there is lower demand and less profit. In addition to relegating the U.S. to a reduced standard of living, such an outcome will undermine the economic base supporting American global political and strategic responsibilities. Krause writes: "If world order and peace depend on the United States taking a superpower role, it must have a superpower economy to support that role" (p. 3). If American companies are to become more competitive with Japanese companies, and if the U.S. government is to match Japan's concern for export competitiveness, both must pay more attention to ASEAN. As Krause notes, the United States's ability to compete with Japan in ASEAN "has implications for meeting the Japanese challenge throughout the world" (p. 3).

The bulk of the book is devoted to an analysis of American economic relations with the ASEAN countries, with special emphasis on how the U.S. position compares with that of the Japanese. Krause presents a brief review of the development of ASEAN and an analysis of the association's trade and development policies. He notes that although the ASEAN countries are heavily dependent on Japan, it is precisely because of this

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dependence—and a fear of overdependence—that ASEAN desires closer relations with the United States. Krause then analyzes the pattern of U.S. merchandise and service exports to ASEAN countries and American direct investment in the region. Surprisingly, he finds that one bright spot in this interaction is the strength of American high technology exports to most of the ASEAN states. In general, however, Krause believes that American firms are hampered in their dealings with the ASEAN countries by U.S. government tax and export license provisions and by specific legislation, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

As one of the major conclusions of the book, Krause recommends the revision of American policies and laws with an eye toward making American business more competitive overseas. He also recommends that the U.S. formulate policies to deal with the specific problems of regions such as ASEAN and the Caribbean "without greater concern for their effect on global structures than that felt by other countries" (p. 67). He feels that if the U.S. shows reduced concern for the maintenance of global institutions such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), other nations (especially Japan) will be forced to carry more of the international burden. Presumably, however, if Japan is to assume greater international responsibilities, it will need an even stronger economy. In sum, this is a stimulating book that should help draw American attention to an increasingly vital region of the world.

Roy Hofheinz and Kent Calder take the notion of an economic challenge from Japan and extend it to all of East Asia. They make the sweeping assertion that the states of Asia that are part of the Chinese-culture area of the western Pacific—China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—have developed political and economic systems superior to those of the West—hence, the "Eastasia Edge." The social systems of these states, according to the authors, have a "peculiar strength and resilience" (p. viii) that has enabled them to build elaborate authority structures and to gain the respect and deep loyalty of their populations. The political systems of these East Asian states have in turn produced economic systems that combine the subordination of individual interests to public interests, hard work, respect for education, and intimate business-government ties. Together, they pose an economic "threat" to the United States and the West generally.

Unfortunately, the evidence amassed by the authors fails to substantiate their claims. They speak of the threat posed by all the states of East Asia, yet most of the examples they provide concern Japanese computers. They argue that Japan is emerging as the world's dominant economic force—a plausible claim—but they insist China is economically just as threatening. They contend that East Asian states are "mobilized" for economic and political war with the West (p. 237), but it is difficult to see how a democratic Japan could be mobilized in the same way as the communist countries of China and North Korea. In short, the threat from East Asia is not as compelling, and the countries of East Asia are not as similar or as integrated, as the authors argue.

Despite the weakness of its main thesis, however, the book contains much useful information. There is a strong chapter on the financial systems of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, and another on the various strategies used by these countries for technology

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development. There are also interesting case studies of the Japanese project to develop large-scale integrated microchips, the Middle East construction projects of the Korean firm Hyundai, and the Singapore government's social security system.

In short, the book is on relatively solid ground when describing economic institutions in specific countries, especially the capitalist ones. However, the authors lose credibility when they move from discussing the success of a single country to assertions about the Asian region as a whole.

TIMOTHY J. CURRAN
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Limited Nuclear War: Political Theory and War Conventions *by Ian Clark. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982. 266 pp. $22.50.*

The initial reaction to this book is one of profound frustration. The subject is critically important and the author is bright, well-informed, and articulate. Yet the whole is something less than the sum of its parts. The problem can be clearly perceived by using the author's own words. He starts with the exciting prospect offered in this sentence: "It is the intention of this study that it review in wide-ranging terms the evolution of thinking on limits to war, starting from a conviction that political philosophy should have something to offer on the great questions confronting us" (p. 6). Two hundred thirty-eight pages later the reader learns: "In the last analysis, political philosophy provides no adequate chart for selecting a course between the Scylla of limited war and the Charybdis of nuclear holocaust" (p. 244). As more quantitative political scientists might note, there is value in a "null hypothesis" but usually one does not write an entire book to establish one. Although the book seems to suggest its own irrelevance there are, in fact, many useful insights and profound analyses along the way that make it worth reading despite its conclusion.

The study is organized around two principal questions: What is limited in limited war and what effect does the introduction of limits have upon an understanding of the nature of war? In examining the first question, the author offers convention A, which argues that war can be limited by defining the process of war, and convention B, which limits war by limiting the amount of damage done in the war. To focus the discussion of the second question, three models are suggested—the champion, the charity, and the city-swapping models. The relationships among these conventions and models is not always clear, but they are intended for heuristic reasons and not as rigorous concepts to be made operational.

The main part of the book begins with a discussion of two components of the just war doctrine: *jus ad bellum*, which specifies the just ends of war; and *jus in bello*, which identifies just means of conducting war. This chapter is followed by a selective historical one that provides examples of limits to war fitting within the convention A and B guidelines. The third chapter is an unsatisfactory survey of political theorists, including Plato, Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Clausewitz and what they may or may not have

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said about limited war. An indication of the problem here is given in the author's own words: "There are at least three areas, discussed by Machiavelli, that could be perceived as being related to a theory of limited warfare, although it is not suggested that Machiavelli himself articulated such a doctrine or that he would be at all sympathetic to many of the ideas associated with limits to war" (p. 71). The reader justifiably wonders whether what follows says more about Clark than Machiavelli.

The next chapter more fully develops the three models introduced earlier by examining historical events and commentaries on these three ways of limiting war. This is followed by the most useful and rigorous chapter, which analyzes theories of nuclear war limitation presented by numerous strategists since 1945. The discussions in this and the succeeding critical chapter make the book worth reading because they do a thorough job of discrediting those theories and pointing out the wishful thinking implicit within many of them. The main problem here is that the most important point receives very short notice. The author raises that point when he notes: "Perhaps the main objection that is raised against the prospect of successful limitation of nuclear war is the possibility of Soviet non-reciprocation" (p. 219). However, this observation then only receives four pages of discussion, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has specifically denied the efficacy of such a concept and therefore it is highly unlikely even if the United States can figure out some rational way to limit nuclear war that both countries will do so simultaneously. Nevertheless, the rest of the discussion in these two chapters is worth the price of the book alone.

PHILIP W. DYER
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The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future *by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1982. 446 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $9.95.*

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., finds the prominence of doctrine in U.S. foreign policy a "unique, important, and in many ways mystifying, phenomenon" (p. 8). After a brief introduction he lays out in eight chapters the major doctrines associated at one time or another with U.S. policy. These go all the way back to the Monroe Doctrine enunciated in 1823, move forward to the Open Door Policy (reduced to a doctrine by Henry L. Stimson in 1931), and are rounded out by the succession of cold war doctrines handed down one each by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter, and two by President Johnson. A concluding chapter offers a general appraisal.

Most readers coming to the book out of curiosity about the American love affair with doctrines will leave it in frustration. This long and often plodding account neglects the issue of the allegedly unique place of doctrine in U.S. policy. It is constantly puzzling in its assessment of the importance of doctrine. After surveying a great deal of material spanning a century and a half, the reader will still be as mystified as even Crabb seems to be by the American doctrinal fetish.

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Historians will pronounce Crabb's treatment of the most thoroughly studied doctrines—those of Monroe, Stimson, and Truman—a good deal less deft than the texts and more specialized surveys from which he has borrowed. Some may find Crabb's description of the more recent doctrines, still largely beyond the pale of serious historical study, a helpful preliminary overview, while others of a more churlish or fastidious nature will dismiss as superficial Crabb's evaluation, with its severely if unavoidably circumscribed body of evidence and limited perspective.

Students of current policy will also be in for a disappointment. They are likely at first to be pleased by Crabb's studied effort at examining each doctrine systematically, but then to become progressively more uneasy over the mechanical comparisons he proceeds to draw, the failure of any compelling generalizations to emerge from those comparisons, and finally the limp concluding injunction to build future U.S. doctrines on "sound diplomatic principles, based upon an informed and correct assessment of external events" (p. 437) without specifying how the U.S. is to accomplish this feat.

This work asks a fascinating and important set of questions. Are Americans really unique in their seeming obsession with docrine? Comparative work, nowhere in evidence here, would help answer that question. Are Americans more doctrinaire on international questions than on domestic ones (as Crabb argues), or do the same liberal values that direct them at home also guide them aboard (as Crabb also suggests)? These links between cultural values and foreign policy assumptions and behavior remain an important topic of investigation, though one little advanced here. Finally, was the handing down of doctrine, especially during the cold war, a form of public theater intended to mobilize a somnolent public, undercut troublesome dissent, impress foreign observers, draw attention away from domestic problems, or enhance historical reputation? Access to the official record and a more sophisticated and consistent conception of the role of public opinion than Crabb employs would take readers a good way toward an answer. In the mean time they can be grateful to him for at least pointing to the right kind of issues.

MICHAEL H. HUNT
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The American President: Power and Communication *by Colin Seymour-Ure. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 190 pp. $22.50.*

This is an interesting little book that looks at the power of the presidency from the perspective of communication. In the manner made familiar by Richard Neustadt's work, Colin Seymour-Ure argues that the president's power hinges on his ability to communicate effectively. This ability is seriously impaired, in the author's view, because presidents lack full control over their communications.

The book—the author calls it a long essay—is well written and shows a good grasp of the literature on the presidency. Since it is written by a Briton, well known for important political communication studies, one hopes for some new insights, à la Tocqueville. But one hopes in vain; the book has very little new to say, except for drawing enlightening

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parallels between communication powers of executives in presidential and parliamentary systems.

The book begins with an examination of the part communication and secrecy play in acquiring, using, and losing power in different types of situations. Potential failure always looms large. For example, presidential attempts to structure the perception of reality may be frustrated by the media. Presidential efforts to create a crisis atmosphere may flounder, as happened with respect to energy problems in the Carter years. The president may give orders to carry out specified activities. These orders, too, may be ignored. He may seek to mobilize public opinion, but it may be to little avail. He may try to cloak activities with secrecy, but leaks may force disclosure. Incoming communications may be equally flawed. The president may hear from the wrong people, receive reports that dangerously distort perspectives, or he may not hear at all, missing essential information.

Examination of the interrelation of power and communication is followed by a review of the avenues open to presidents for ordinary and symbolic communications. Using examples from recent presidencies, Seymour-Ure shows that there are many channels, but none are completely under the president's control. His advisors may speak in ways which sap his power. The media are apt to undermine his authority. He may be forced to speak out when he would prefer to remain silent. His most serious lack of control comes when others associate him with policies and perspectives that do not reflect his views. His powers of denial are practically nil. The institutional structure created to keep his image bright and to control his public communications cannot overcome the obstacles to presidential control inherent in the American political system.

The book ends with an analysis of the communication styles and perspectives from which various presidents have viewed political communication. Among the presidents, Eisenhower, a casual communicator, and Nixon, a conscious manipulator, are singled out for special scrutiny. Seymour-Ure concludes that presidents use the power of communication with varying skills. But, on balance, the checks and balance principles, so apparent in other parts of the constitutional system, also works to weaken presidential control over communications. By contrast, executives in parliamentary systems can wield communications far more effectively as an instrument of power.

Seymour-Ure tells his story gracefully and interestingly. His book also contains an insightful review of the presidency literature, assessed in terms of its effectivness in dealing with communication factors For all these reasons, the book should be welcome in the classroom. For readers who are unfamiliar with the communications approach to power and politics, *The American President: Power and Communication* provides a pleasant and profitable way to join a knowledgeable author on a quick journey of exploration.

DORIS A. GRABER
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Running in the Red: The Political Dynamics of Urban Fiscal Stress *by Irene S. Rubin. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1982. 171 pp. Cloth, $30.50; paper, $9.95.*

In this study of the circumstances underlying fiscal stress in a medium-sized midwestern city, the author seeks to assess the relative importance of propositions derived from three theoretical perspectives. These are identified according to the emphasis placed on economic change (migration and tax base erosion), internal control of the budget process (bureaucratic growth), and institutional change (political vulnerability).

Following a brief summary of the main propositions that evolve out of each perspective, the author proceeds to assess their relative significance in explaining events that took shape during the 1970s. Information is drawn from budget documents, interviews with key officials and administrators, and first-hand observations at budget hearings and review sessions.

Among the contributing factors to the city's fiscal stress, the author identifies three factors: a failure at the strategic planning level properly to assess the fiscal consequences of areal expansion in response to out-migration of middle-class taxpayers; a breakdown in managerial control in the budget process; and a lack of expertise in labor negotiations. Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of external forces tends to be discounted as a major factor in the city's deteriorating fiscal conditions. Inflation during this period is judged to have been a manageable problem and federal aid is seen as cutting both ways—adding to the resource base, but complicating the budget process because of a lack of expertise in managing such assistance.

As to the relevance of alternative theories of urban fiscal stress to the specific events in the case-study city, the author concludes that while each fit approximately, causal linkages manifested themselves in quite subtle ways. For example, immigration of minorities did contribute to fiscal stress, but mainly through demands for increased police protection by homeowners and merchants. Bureaucratic growth was also a contributing factor, evidenced mainly through increased professionalism resulting in a more expensive but not necessarily larger bureaucracy. There was also evidence of political vulnerability, mainly in the increased power of unions as a source of political support for a city council that lacked party-based support.

While the long-term fiscal outlook for cities must be reckoned in a broader federalism framework, this study points up the role the cities themselves play in determining their future. By helping to clarify that role, particularly their need for clearly articulated strategic- and management-level decision-making in planning and budgeting, this book makes a useful contribution to the urban policy literature.

CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR.
Ohio State University

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The Politics of Congressional Elections *by Gary C. Jacobson. Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1983. 216 pp. $7.95.*

From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary *by Louis Sandy Maisel. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1982. 173 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $6.95.*

Gary C. Jacobson has taken on the ambitious goal of explaining what goes on in congressional elections and understanding how these elections are connected to other aspects of American political life. A careful review of the recent literature about congressional candidates, campaigns, voters, the influence of national politics, and the politics of Congress, coupled with original data analysis from the 1978 and 1980 American National Election Studies, competently fulfills that aim. However, this is not just another literature review text about congressional elections. There are two aspects of this book that make it worth reading: its theme (which is employed both as an organizational tool and as a perspective for analysis); and Jacobson's penetrating analysis of congressional voters in Chapter 5.

Jacobson suggests that there is a linkage between the way Congress is elected and the politics and capabilities of that institution. To unravel that linkage (and to organize the text), Jacobson examines congressional elections "from different perspectives while attending throughout to the interconnections between them" (p. 5). A challenging theme emerges from this process, summarized by this writer as follows: good congressional politics does not lead to good public policy. In fact, there is a Congress that is *responsive* but not *responsible*. As Jacobson puts it, there is a "fundamental flaw in the kind of representation produced by electoral politics: great individual *responsiveness*, equally great collective *irresponsibility*" (p. 189). There are simply no incentives in the electoral process that enable Congress to meet fully the policy challenges currently confronting the nation. As a result, Jacobson concludes that the United States may need a strong president for national leadership, "since the Congress is, by disposition and structure, incapable of providing it" (p. 183). Jacobson thus presents a sobering and pessimistic conclusion.

These points are made well in the final chapter. However, the linkages that exist between congressional elections and congressional politics are not pointed out as clearly throughout the book. To be sure, Chapter 7 does attempt to make this connection systematically by borrowing heavily from the rich insights of David Mayhew, yet even here the connections seem cursory. Despite this shortcoming, Jacobson does review (even if briefly) most of the major arguments that delineate the relationships between congressional elections and changes in committee membership and authority: the fragmentation of Congress; the pursuit of particularism; the tendency to serve the vocal and organized; the reluctance of Congress to engage in hard legislative work; the bent towards symbolic politics; the inability to build coalitions; changes in the issues on the national agenda; and the role of presidential leadership.

This book is also worth reading for Jacobson's analysis of congressional voters. It is often argued that voter familiarity with a candidate and the advantages of incumbency explain constituent voting decisions. Jacobson, however, concludes from his analysis of

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the 1978 and 1980 House elections that these two variables are merely "surrogates for voters' evaluations of the candidates" (p. 104). Public image matters, not only because it increases name recognition but because voters do evaluate incumbents. As a matter of electoral strategy, incumbents are better off appealing "for support on the basis of their personal virtues and services to the districts and its inhabitants, rather than on their party, ideology, or policy stances" (p. 111). What is a challenger to do? A winning challenger should maximize his or her familiarity and contact with the voters, but also focus on the issues. Jacobson finds that the voters react to winning House challengers much like they do to candidates for open seats and to Senate challengers. These elections are different from incumbent elections because policy issues and ideology plays a larger role. This paradox in voting behavior is because of differences among the candidates and the electoral context that their strategic decisions create rather than differences in the pattern of voting behavior. This is but one of a formidable number of insights Jacobson provides for the reader.

In 1978, 962 candidates ran in contested primaries for a major-party nomination for Congress—795 of them were defeated. If Jacobson convincingly argues that general congressional elections matter, then Louis Sandy Maisel keenly highlights the poverty of insight that characterizes the current understanding of the congressional primary process. Maisel, a government professor from Colby College, ran in the 1978 Democratic primary for the First District of Maine. He lost. This book, which provides a systematic account of the campaign process from the decision to run to the cleaning out of the loser's headquarters, is Maisel's effort to explain why he should have know all along that he would lose.

While at times the book reads like the confession of a political scientist who "dared" to be political, Maisel's careful reflection and subsequent research (including original survey data from 250 other successful and unsuccessful candidates across the country and 39 interviews with these candidates in 19 different districts) makes this much more than a personal saga of failure. Instead, readers are given some fascinating insights about the political behavior of individual candidates, practical strategic advice, and commentary about the quality of the primary process.

As to the behavior of individual politicians, Maisel found that they have an "incredible ability to delude themselves about their own chances" (p. 23). Even if this were not the case, though, he illustrates throughout the book that there are a number of important decisions (like the decision to run, the expenditure of campaign resources, and general strategy) that are made "based on totally inadequate information" (p. 10). This argument does not speak well of the capacity or willingness of these politicians to be Downsian rational actors. Yet Maisel provides some strategic advice: know who your opposition is; do not try to run your own campaign; develop and nurture a strong contingent of volunteers; don't expect much help from your party; and be wary of "outside" professional campaign consultants and media advisors. Finally, on the quality of primary elections, Maisel gives two important conclusions. The malaise that is characteristic of American voting behavior generally is particularly evident in congressional primaries. But perhaps voter disenchantment is somewhat justified by what Maisel typifies as the "exceedingly weak" field of primary candidates. This characteristic may be yet another way in which (follow-

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ing Jacobson's suggestion), individual candidate behavior shapes the pattern of voting behavior.

Readers are left with the worrisome and intriguing sense that had Maisel read this book before he ran for Congress in 1978 he still would have lost. He concedes as much: "I maximized my votes and could not have won" (p. 1). What Maisel has really explained is why he (and 795 others) lost, but not how he (or they) might have succeeded. Success seems quite variable, perhaps escaping the search of political scientists for universal principles. He writes: "Particular circumstances, not general guidelines, determine who wins those elections that are hotly contested" (p. 127). Politics still seems to be more art than science (p. 120). As a first look into the "art" of congressional primaries, this is a book to be read by the scholar as well as by those interested in taking the first step from obscurity.

MARK P. PETRACCA
Amherst College

The Abortion Dispute and the American System *edited by Gilbert Y. Steiner. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1983. 103 pp. $6.95.*

Many scholars, journalists, and other observers of the American scene have perceived the dispute over the legality of abortion as the most divisive political issue of the present time, and have been worried about the distorting effects of so emotional a controversy on the political system. In 1982, the Brookings Institution decided to hold a symposium to discuss the impact of abortion politics on American politics. The system in the United States is designed to moderate and compromise differences, but abortion is an issue on which views are often held with such passion that even the possibility of compromise is rejected.

To focus discussion on this question, Brookings commissioned papers on different aspects of abortion politics—the Supreme Court's role, congressional procedure, the presidential appointment process, and electoral politics. The papers, short, well written, informed, and provocative, form the main portion of this book. They conclude that for all its rhetoric and explosiveness, the abortion battle has not been more destructive than others in the past. It has in fact stayed fairly well within the capability of the political system for handling conflict. In the first essay, by Lawrence M. Friedman on the Supreme Court's 1973 abortion decision, the author concludes that *Roe* v. *Wade* was not an extreme, unprecedented decision, but rather was built on legal principle, was explained in traditional legal language, and did not involve an unusual departure from the Court's accepted role. Roger H. Davidson's "Procedures and Politics in Congress" finds that Congress failed to face up responsibly to the abortion issue, but that this result might have been expected. On the appointing process, G. Calvin Mackenzie finds that the influence of the abortion issue ought to be minimized because it has potential for disturbing the delicate and complicated interaction of individuals that is the essence of the appointing process. John E. Jackson's and Maris A. Vinovskis's paper on elections and single-issue politics points out that no one really knows where the center of gravity is in

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public opinion about abortion, but that the impact of the abortion issue on electoral politics has been grossly exaggerated. All in all, these writers conclude that conflict over abortion will probably not destroy the republic.

A fifth selection, added as sort of an end-piece to the book, describes the destructive results that followed attempts to enforce the prohibition of liquor, but fails to develop parallels between the moral crusade against liquor and that against abortion.

I found two insights in these writings intriguing. The first, raised by Friedman, is the notion that the Supreme Court probably saw *Roe* v. *Wade* as a family planning decision, rather than as a judicial legitimatization of the sexual revolution, and thought that family ties would be strengthened if women could decide not to bear unwanted children. Secondly, Jackson and Vinovskis note that there is a statistically significant relationship in public opinion data "between religiosity and abortion attitudes" (p. 71).

Family and religious attitudes are the underlying issues in the abortion dispute. The symposium does not address either of these directly, although Friedman points out that one of the Supreme Court's roles is the uprooting of old myths, fictions, and stereotypes that remain embedded in the law long after any relationship to reality is gone.

The explosiveness of the abortion issue lies exactly here. Traditional views of the family, supported by both religious and political institutions, have been threatened by the legalization of abortion. When the old Protestant consensus on these bedrock values was unsettled, the shock waves were strong enough to rattle even the most stable political mechanisms.

EVA R. RUBIN
North Carolina State University

Representation in State Legislatures *by Malcolm E. Jewell. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1982. 204 pp. $18.00.*

Malcolm Jewell has written an extremely interesting and useful book. Based on in-depth interviews with 221 state legislators in 9 states, Jewell explores the variety of ways in which legislators seek to represent their constituents. The author conceptualizes representation in four broad dimensions—communication, policy responsiveness, service responsiveness, and the allocation of resources for the district. He details how a variety of legislators view these aspects of their representational role. Jewell explores variations in legislative representational styles by looking at differences in the background and personal characteristics of the legislators, and variations in the traditions, population composition, and legislative structures of the states themselves.

The book is valuable for several reasons. Jewell, without providing an overarching theoretical framework, does explore various meanings of representation and essentially adopts the Hanna Pitkin view that representation is based on acting in the interests of those represented and on being responsive to the constituents so that if conflict between their views and that of the legislator occurs, good reasons exist for the legislator's view. Along the way, Jewell discards the distinction between representatives who are delegates

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and those who are trustees and the distinction between those with district rather than statewide focuses for their actions, arguing persuasively that these distinctions are not terribly helpful in understanding the actual representational behavior of legislators.

His work is also valuable in linking his findings on state legislators with previous research on representational roles of members of Congress. He explores in some depth the trade-offs between policy specialization and attention to constituency service. He argues that fulfilling service needs is an intrinsic part of representation, but that students of the subject do not know enough about whether this role specifically accrues political advantages, whether it undermines the policymaking function of legislators, or whether it increases or decreases public support for the legislature as an institution. Clearly more research on these topics is needed.

Jewell's chapters on policy responsiveness and how representatives think through choices they make are well done. He certainly is not the first to point out that representational behavior varies from issue to issue, that representatives always consider constituency interests but in some cases these are irrelevant, and that in general public opinion on issues is nonexistent or extremely ill informed. Nevertheless, his careful weaving together of extended quotes from legislators, discussions of previous models of issue representation, and his own analyses makes these very illuminating chapters.

The weaknesses of the book include an absence of a tighter link between findings and theory, and a lack of systematic analysis that could have been useful at points. For example, how does service orientation relate to other characteristics of the legislator? Are those with constituency service orientations less likely to be interested in issues? While the author identifies some trends and tendencies, sometimes one wishes for more. Of course, a focus on only a few legislators in each of a relatively few states leads to the question of how typical his subjects were. Nevertheless, his choice of states was well thought out (or at least well justified) and encompasses quite a range of legislatures based on legislative professionalism and state characteristics.

Despite these reservations, the book is extremely valuable. Its contents should be widely read and will serve as a starting point for future research.

SUSAN WELCH
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States

by Ira Katznelson. New York, Pantheon Books, 1981. 267 pp. $17.50.

In his latest book, Ira Katznelson clearly establishes himself as one of the foremost urbanists writing today. Much recent writing on urban matters has been narrowly focused on particular institutions or policies. Katznelson's book, by contrast, is a sweeping panorama of the urban experience in light of class relations, capitalist development, and social history, in the broadest sense. It is simply a stunning book.

Katznelson's basic thesis is simple but powerful. It is that in the United States, unlike Europe, workplace concerns were sharply divided from homeplace and community con-

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cerns. In Europe, where one finds a melding of the two, there are strong working class parties and sharp forms of class opposition. In America, where one encounters the division of work and community, there is a lack of political coherence and clear working class division. From the urban point of view, what develops is a series of narrowly focused worker neighborhoods that are insular and resentful of outsiders. These are the urban trenches of Katnelson's title. Yet much of American political life has been built in the trenches. The great urban machines flourished by providing services to and receiving support from the denizens of the trenches. And the national political parties became decentralized as they built their way up from the trenches level.

In developing his conception of urban trenches, Katznelson artfully weaves together social theory with a historical analysis of political development in Western democracies—a tall order.

What is unclear from Katznelson's account of urban neighborhoods and city trenches is what he takes their strengths and weaknesses to be. This is a timeless question, and it is an important one. Some of the strengths of urban neighborhoods as supportive cohesive living arrangements clearly derives from their narrowness, insularity, and fear of strangers; the mere words "ethnic neighborhood" make this aspect of the issue plain. At the same time, urban trenches clearly have impeded the growth of working class consciousness and have fragmented politics and policy in the city.

The second half of Katznelson's book is a rich case study of the evolution of the city trenches on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. In particular, Katznelson is concerned with the assault on the trenches represented by black demands on the political and social order in the 1980s. Katznelson sees these demands as combining work and community concerns, and thus threatening the established pattern of class relations and urban living in American cities. Katznelson chronicles with care the efforts of the Lindsay administration to make government more responsive and bringing government closer to the people. He sees these efforts, such as the urban action task force, as efforts to get blacks and Hispanics to fit into standard "trench politics." To the extent that these City Hall efforts were effective they were, in Katznelson's view, essentially conservative efforts to put unruly minority demands back into the conventional "pluralistic box" of narrow allocations for many claimants. In my own view, community control initiations and the like had mixed if not conflicting purposes, and I believe some City Hall reformers thought that with community control they were creating a radical change in urban government. In any case, this is a legitimate matter of debate and dispute and I have no strong objection to Katznelson's more cynical view of reformist policies emanating from City Hall.

In all, Katznelson has written a marvelous book that is "must" reading for urbanists, as well as for students of American government more generally.

DOUGLAS YATES
Yale University

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Uncle Sam's Private, Profitseeking Corporations: Comsat, Fannie Mae, Amtrak, and Conrail *by Lloyd Musolf. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983. 126 pp. $18.95.*

With this slender volume, Lloyd Musolf adds to the expanding shelf of books by him on the subject of public enterprise. This time, Musolf examines four important commercial enterprises established by the U.S. government: the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat); the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); and the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). The author's aim in this book is to understand what expectations policymakers have as they employ the concepts of privateness and profitseeking in a quasi-governmental context.

Working largely from congressional hearings and from other documents in the public record, Musolf tries to discern what decision-makers in Congress and the executive branch had in mind when they fashioned each of the four enterprises and how their intentions and expectations may have changed over time. The spareness of his conclusions befits the rather narrow scope of his inquiry. Essentially, he concludes that policymakers' expectations "were strongly affected by changing circumstances" (p. 112). In other words, the gradual accumulation of experience with this particular genre of hybrid organizations from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s led to changes in government officials' attitudes toward this organizational form. This is hardly a startling revelation. Surely policymakers' assessments of organizational arrangements and their likely consequences are always shaped by the weight of experience and by changing conditions.

The real contribution of this book is that for each of the four enterprises he examines, Musolf provides some well-written, illuminating analysis of the ways in which the concepts of privateness and profitseeking were considered and incorporated by policymakers. One can only wish that Musolf had expanded the scope of his inquiry and applied his evident skills as a researcher to answer some of the questions to which his book implicitly gives rise. Readers are left in the dark on a number of points. Although Musolf discusses extensively the policy rationales underlying these organizations, he says relatively little about the politics of organizational creation. It would be instructive to know more about the dynamics of the coalition-building process in each of these cases and about policymakers' perceptions of the political costs and benefits of their decisions (not simply the policy costs). Moreover, readers are left without any clear ideas as to the ways in which policymaking for the private, profitseeking corporations is different from that for other government corporations or public enterprises. In the absence of good empirical inquiries into these kinds of questions, students of public enterprise will remain unable to strike a balance between minutiae and overgeneralization, and unable to generate the kind of sensible, middle-level generalizations that are badly needed in this area.

In spite of its limitations, however, this is a well-crafted, creditable piece of work that fixes Musolf's place high on the slowly growing list of scholars providing insights into government enterprise.

JOHN T. TIERNEY
Boston College

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The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct: An Economic Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations *by Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 195 pp. $29.95.*

Why does fiscal adversity nearly always result in greater centralization of responsibility and authority in an organization? How does turnover in the legislative or executive branches affect bureaucratic responsiveness to the preferences of Congress or the president? Where might budget cuts lead to an increase or produce a more than proportional reduction in organizational output? What do process theorists (such as Joe Bower) mean when they say that organizational policies are determined by the distribution of power within organizations? Applying economic analytics—utility maximization, methodological individualism, partial equilibrium, and the like—to intraorganizational exchange, Albert Breton, Canada's leading political economist, and Ronald Wintrobe derive plausible and original answers to these and other questions about the supply behavior of bureaucracies, both private and public. Indeed, the challenge of their deductions to what organizational theorists and economists believe comes too frequently and too plausibly to be ignored. In particular, they demonstrate that the informal organization and the accumulation and exchange of trust on which it is based is not an irrational realm, but is amenable to understanding via the methods of economics.

At the same time, I should note that this work is not entirely flawless. In the first place, the analysis is somewhat inconsistent from chapter to chapter as the authors shift their perspective—from partial to general equilibrium, from perfect information to rational expectations to adaptation and "muddling through," from the statics of property rights to the dynamics of organizational evolution—to fit their conclusions. In turn, these conclusions are very likely biased by the authors' own experiences. It is interesting that Breton and Wintrobe fault Gordon Tullock, William Niskanen, and Anthony Downs, to name a few, for their parochiality, but fail to recognize it in themselves. For example, they do not distinguish between political managers and sponsors, as Niskanen does. This approach may make sense under a cabinet government, but it is not necessarily correct.

They also stress the contribution formal controls can make to organizational efficiency in the public sector; Niskanen for example largely overlooks them. Why? Perhaps because in Canada formal controls are largely nonexistent whereas in the U.S. they are extensive and fairly sophisticated. Niskanen takes their existence as given and stresses the fact that in the absence of some basis of comparison, such as that provided by interbureau or program price comparison (or competition), they are not very useful. Again, it seems likely that the value of price competition is lost on Breton and Wintrobe because it is so much rarer in the Canadian governmental context than in the American. Of course, experience works both ways. The power of Breton and Wintrobe's analysis derives from their emphasis on the informal organization—the exchange and accumulation of trust. The importance of trust is far more evident in Canada than in the U.S. "government of strangers."

In addition, Breton and Wintrobe do not seem to have read very much about organizations before they started writing. Given the thrust of their argument, I found striking the

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omission of any mention of George C. Homans, Andrew Stedry, William Ouchi, James March, or the entire literature on business policy and strategy. What they did read was not always read carefully. For example, they claim that Niskanen asserts that government is too big because bureaucrats are revenue maximizers. I seriously doubt that Niskanen would categorically state that government is too large, although he might prefer it to be smaller. According to Niskanen, government tends to oversupply largely private goods and to undersupply largely public goods, but the net effect of these two tendencies is not unambiguous.

On a more substantive level, Niskanen clearly demonstrates that under specified and not impossible conditions, revenue maximization is perfectly consistent with welfare maximization. In his model, revenue maximization and monopoly supply are necessary but not sufficient conditions for government oversupply of largely private goods. A second and critical condition is that demand is mediated through Congress, and that the structure of congressional decision-making biases its decisions towards high levels of supply. This is, of course, also a characteristic of cabinet decision-making in Canada. The difference is that in Canada, each "oversight committee" has a single member—the responsible minister.

Despite its inconsistencies, the authors' sometimes immodest claims of originality, and their rather cavalier treatment of other authorities, this is a very good book. However, I expected it to be better than it is.

FRED THOMPSON
Columbia University

The President and the Public *edited by Doris A. Graber. Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982. 310 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $7.95.*

This book faces a problem endemic to all attempts to take independently produced research articles and integrate them cohesively into a book. In some instances the methodology behind the findings is editorially scanted so that there are some interesting conclusions but it is not clear how strong the data base behind the conclusions actually is. In others, readers find a relatively careful exposition of the research methodology only to find that, for example, the application of a local public opinion survey has major limitations when generalizing the findings to the president and "the public."

The faults are not necessarily to be found in the specific chapters, which are principally, if not exclusively, drawn from research papers given at various political science conventions. Individually they are quite good. Lawrence D. Longley's chapter on the gains or losses by minorities from an Electoral College format or a direct election formula is interesting and provocative, but somehow does not seem to fit with the other pieces. The chapter by Martha Joynt Kumar and Michael Baruch Grossman is good but familiar, having appeared two years ago in a book by the same authors.

While most of the chapters have something of interest to say, those by Cliff Zukin and Scott Keeter, Zukin and J. Robert Carter, Jr. and by Lee Sigelman contribute the most.

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The effort by Zukin and Carter to break down presidential popularity into meaningful subgroups for precise study is an incisive move that is clearly in the right research direction—and long overdue.

The chapter by Sigelman is short but a real gem. It is an insightful and provocative look at the interpretation of survey research and how careful one must be in using such data for purposes of sweeping generalization. This chapter should be read by all political scientists and journalists who have a genuine interest in understanding the complexity and meanings of public opinion.

The editor, Doris Graber, has made a valiant effort at tying things together, but these articles seem to resist the effort. The scope of the book is broad; the focus of each chapter is, with a few exceptions, narrow. While there are major problems with these kinds of chapters in the building of a reasonably unified book, a number of the chapters make good reading even if they have already reached a large part of their relevant audience. The subject of the book—linkages among the president, the media, and the electorate—is an important one, but the book's format prevents a sustained focus of the many interlocking threads that need more systematic study.

RICHARD L. RUBIN
Swarthmore College

The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary *by Michael J. Perry. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982. 241 pp. $24.00.*

Michael J. Perry, a law professor at Ohio State University, joins in this closely reasoned book the Ely-Berger-Rehnquist-Choper-Bork-Bickel-Fiss-Monaghan-Tushnet-Wechsler dialogue on judicial review and the case for and against judicial activism. Mark Tushnet generously suggests that Perry's book is "the most significant contribution" yet offered in this ongoing discussion, the code words for which are "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism."

The Supreme Court engages in interpretive review "when it ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference to one of the value judgments of which the Constitution consists" (p. 10). Interpretivism requires the Court to decipher the textual provisions that are the embodiment of the determinative value judgment. Conversely, the Court engages in noninterpretive review when it determines constitutionality "by reference to a value judgment other than one constitutionalized by the framers [even though] the Court may explain its decision with rhetoric designed to create the illusion that it is merely 'interpreting' or 'applying' some constitutional provision" (p. 11).

The legitimacy of interpretive review was established by John Marshall. But noninterpretive review has long been challenged as subverting the democratic system of electoral accountability. Perry initially joins the challengers, asserting that there is no textual or historical justification for judicial policymaking. But, he continues, there may be a "functional" justification, if noninterpretive review "serves a crucial governmental function

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that no other practice realistically can be expected to serve, and if it serves that function in a manner that somehow accommodates the principle of electorally accountable policymaking" (p. 24).

In Chapter 4, which Perry calls "the heart of this book," he does in fact find a persuasive functional justification for noninterpretive review with respect to human rights issues—such as freedom of expression, equal protection, and substantive due process. He contends that such review is reconcilable with democratic, electorally accountable policymaking, because the judiciary is subject to significant political controls.

Surprisingly, Perry does not rely on the amending power, the appointing power, impeachment of judges, or the judicial budget as effective political controls. Rather, the source of significant political control over the judiciary is the legislative power of Congress, and specifically, the power to define and to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the original and appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.

This position puts Perry at odds with most proponents of judicial activism. He admits that he is not happy about this conclusion, and would be very unhappy if any of the current jurisdiction-limiting bills in Congress were adopted. But he cannot see how noninterpretive review can otherwise be reconciled with the principle of electorally accountable policymaking.

In arguing for noninterpretive protection of human rights, Perry's principal whipping boys are Robert Bork, Raoul Berger, and William Rehnquist, all of whom argue with varying degrees of heat that interpretivism is the only legitimate role for judicial review. Perry also rejects as unpersuasive John Hart Ely's limited noninterpretive theory of "participational" review, which permits judicial policymaking in freedom of expression and equal protection cases, but excludes substantive due process justifications.

In a final chapter, Perry supports with some passion the recent judicial movement toward protection of "marginal" persons, principally inmates of prisons and mental institutions, where he finds his noninterpretivism to be particularly well justified. In general, he believes that constitutional policymaking by the judiciary "has served the American polity as an agency of ongoing, insistent moral reevaluation and ultimately of moral growth" (p. 163).

C. Herman Pritchett
University of California, Santa Barbara

Economic Effects of Social Security *by Henry J. Aaron. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 84 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $5.95.*

This book was initially presented as invited testimony to the National Commission on Social Security Reform and is a thorough review of the economic literature, often contradictory, indicating what economists know or (in most instances) do not know about the impact of Social Security on savings, labor supply, and income distribution. Another title for this book could be "The Difficulties of Using Economic Research to Guide Policy

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or Distinguish Between Competing Economic Theories—A Case Example Involving Social Security."

In a lucid and eminently readable style for the non-expert, the author presents the three major competing theoretical views about how individuals look into the future and make economic decisions regarding work effort and consumption (or savings). Using these theories and given the parameters of the current Social Security program, a prediction about the impact on labor supply and savings is derived from each model.

Historically, gross saving since 1930 and personal saving since 1947 have shown no trend. Labor force participation for young women has increased significantly. For young men and older women there has been no discernable trend, and for men nearing retirement and older men labor force participation rates have declined significantly.

With that background, the author summarizes the major empirical studies that supposedly shed light on the question of the impact of social security on savings. The conclusion is abundantly clear that these studies have failed to determine the impact and are not likely to do so even with better data. The author then asks a very relevant question. Why should we care? To the extent that personal saving needs to be increased, many other policy options exist to effectuate that result.

The difficulties of ascertaining the impact of the Social Security program on labor supply are clearly identified. Program parameters such as the earnings test, availability of dependent benefits, actuarial reduction factors, interaction with the Supplemental Security Income program and private pension programs, and the recomputation of benefits provision, make empirical research extremely difficult, especially since these features have undergone frequent legislative changes. Furthermore, a researcher has neither the ability to reconstruct at a point in time the present value of different retirement and earning choices facing a potential retiree, nor the confidence that the individual is fully aware of these choices or their economic consequences.

The section on income distribution involves less analytical uncertainty. The economic status of the elderly has improved substantially over the past fifteen years and is now comparable to that of the general population. Social Security played an important role in that improvement.

Overall, this book is important and valuable, particularly for the policymaker. But the review of the known and the unknown does leave some puzzles. The dramatic decline in the labor force participation of older men is undoubtedly explained in part by a combination of Social Security, rising real incomes, and private pensions. Because these phenomena are highly correlated, the proportion of the decline to attribute to each factor is impossible to determine. Nevertheless, since policy discussions often focus on measures to increase work incentives, I wish the author had addressed the relationship between increasing employment of older workers and the employment of younger workers. Furthermore, would policy measures designed to increase the employment of older workers necessarily lead to less governmental outlays?

Since economists do not have the definitive answer about saving or labor supply behavior and because the legislative review of Social Security focuses on how large the program is and to whom it distributes benefits, the economist can and should provide more evidence concerning such questions as: How good a deal is Social Security com-

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pared with savings in the private sector? What is the relationship between the return on a mature pay-as-you-go system in relationship to after-tax rates of return in the private sector? Does this deal vary with respect to earnings levels or other characteristics of individuals? These questions will undoubtedly guide policymakers in the future, and the author could have presented more insight into this area.

WENDELL E. PRIMUS
Committee on Ways and Means,
U. S. House of Representatives

The Political Cartoon *by Charles Press. Rutherford, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982. 395 pp. $37.50.*

After squinting at the 250 reproductions in this book, I reached for a tissue to clean my glasses. But when no amount of wiping brought the plates into focus, I realized something was wrong. *The Political Cartoon* is a collection of smudges, some of them so blurred as to be illegible. These include a Garry Trudeau "Doonesbury" (p. 333) drawing and a Beardsleyesque drawing of Britannia by *Punch* artist E. T. Reed (p. 73).

Indecipherable reproductions, however, are only one offensive aspect of this slapdash book. Charles Press's commentary manages to obfuscate an art form that at its best is distinguished by its clarity and simplicity. The author writes English as if it were his third language. What can Press possibly be striving to articulate with such gibberish as "the frisbeelike existence of the flower kids of the underground" (p. 182) or "it has become far-out mod to be acid" (p. 135)?

Press's commentary rambles without focus from the sixteenth century to the present. His organization of historical data is garbled not only by his inability to compose sentences, but also by his political prejudices. In an arbitrary manner, Press attempts to categorize cartoons by the political systems under which their creators draw—authoritarian, totalitarian, and democratic. Press does not admire cartoonists who lavish their vitriol on "democratic" systems, and from this chauvinistic viewpoint, he launches a ludicrous attack on the work of George Grosz, the leading German political cartoonist in the decade after the First World War.

While many artists and art historians (myself included) consider Grosz's drawings and lithographs to be among the most forceful and moving examples of graphic commentary produced in this century, Press sneers at them because Grosz's aim "was to destroy a democracy" (p. 132). Press treats the Weimar Republic, renowned for its decadence and corruption, as if it were Athens. He is so eager to write off work he finds "ugly" (p. 133) that he ignores its historical context, inventing a fantasy Weimar where Grosz's caustic portrayals culd be considered inaccurate.

Press further describes Grosz's meticulous line as "uncontrolled" and "insane" (p. 77), two adjectives more suited to Press's own narrative, which often contradicts itself and is riddled with factual errors. For example, in an early chapter, Press points out that "the United States awards Pulitzer Prizes to some of the most biting cartoon critics of its in-

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stitutions" (p. 57). Later, however, he agrees with cartoonist Pat Oliphant's perception that the prizes are awarded to flag-waving claptrap. He berates the Pulitzer committee for "the disservice they perpetrated on cartoonists for 45 years, making them parade around in costume for a prize" (p. 201).

Poor Press—the man cannot seem to get anything right. He gives Jeff MacNelly a comic strip called "Shoes" (p. 213) (the actual title is "Shoe") and also claims Bill Mauldin moved to the *Chicago Sun-Times* in 1962 and "has stayed there ever since, spending a good part of his time in Arizona" (p. 311). Mauldin has in fact resided for the past ten years in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

The Political Cartoon fails at both show and tell. It might have succeeded if Press had worked on it with a fact checker, a translator, and an optometrist.

M. G. LORD
Long Island Newsday

The Employment Revolution: Young American Women of the 1970s *edited by Frank L. Mott. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1982. 243 pp. $25.00.*

The National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) undertaken by the United States Bureau of the Census involved nationally representative samples of four major demographic groups at transition points in terms of labor market behavior: young men and women (14–24); mature women (30–44); and older men (45–55). This book focuses primarily on the sample of young women born between 1943 and 1953.

The main objective of the book is to examine how and why women make labor market attachments. However, the book provides much more by examining some of the factors influencing their educational careers, as well as their marital and childbearing patterns. In their focus on the critical points in a young women's life, the authors have made imaginative use of other NLS data to provide their analysis with a family and a period context. A subset of women with brothers sampled by NLS was examined for insight into sex differences in educational progress and career orientations. A subset of young women with mothers in the sample of mature women was chosen to explore the effect of a mother's work orientation on her daughter's work experience. In addition, changes over a decade (1968 to 1978) in the labor force attachment of married women aged 30–34 were examined by comparing the behavior of the oldest women in the young women sample in 1978 to the youngest women in the mature sample in 1968.

The authors apply a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of women's labor force attachment, focusing on the ways in which the family and social context condition the effect of economic factors on women's decisions. The importance of parental encouragement to educational success is highlighted. It was disappointing, however, that the data from the mature women's sample were not included to examine the factors influencing changes in women's educational success between the two cohorts.

Setting women's labor force decisions in the context of their mothers' experience and attitudes, the authors find that the economic model works best in explaining the behavior

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of daughters whose mothers' attitudes towards work were least traditional. Women who showed strong work attachment at critical life cycle points, such as at first marriage and first birth, were found to be systematically different from other women maintaining long-term attachment to the labor force. Comparing older and younger women, it was found that the effect of education on labor force participation has grown stronger over time, a finding the authors interpret as evidence of the reinforcing effect of changing attitudes.

Downward revisions in fertility intentions between 1973 and 1978 were more likely to occur for women with extensive prior employment, with highly significant effects only in the case of women with two or more children. The authors interpret this as evidence of the continuing importance of the two-child norm. With respect to nuptiality, the authors find that women who experience marital breakup are not different from other women in important economic characteristics. However, the question of whether prior work experience, other things being equal, increased the probability of marital breakup was not explored.

This book only touches the surface of the vast wealth of data embodied in these longitudinal surveys. However, it provides a good introduction to the material and a particular perspective on the importance of the societal and familial contexts within which decisions are made. However, with attitudes changing rapidly, such a perspective provides a limited ability to forecast future changes unless the determinants of attitudinal change can be modeled. Although many factors come into play, it is clear that, in such a dynamic model, economic factors will be seen to play a major role.

CYNTHIA B. LLOYD
United Nations

Right-Wing Women *by Andrea Dworkin. New York, Coward-McCann, 1983. 255 pp. Cloth, $14.95. (Perigee, paper, $6.95.)*

Among books written by men, some of the grimmest are thought to be the most profound, but women's pages, like women's faces, must eternally smile. Sunniness is feminine, argument is not, particularly when it reaches conclusions upsetting both to our emotions and to our politics. Hence a lot of readers who backed off from Andrea Dworkin's previous disturbingly accurate books—*Woman Hating, Our Blood, Pornography: Men Possessing Women*—are not going to enjoy her brilliant, compelling analysis of the Right's appeal to women.

The American Right today, she argues, is "controlled almost totally by men but built largely on the fear and ignorance of women" (p. 34). That fear is primal—fear of uncontrollable, unpredictable male violence. In a country where a woman is raped every three minutes, that fear is also real and abiding.

The Right offers women form: "a simple, fixed, predetermined social, biological, and sexual order" (p. 22). Vowing to protect the home and woman's place in it, the Right offers shelter, safety, and a set of rules that men too agree to observe. It even offers love: the love of a husband and the love of Jesus.

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The Left has no better program. As radical women learned in the 1960s, leftist men also see women as a class set apart by sex. They differ from rightist men largely in that they "value whores too much and wives too little" (p. 68). No wonder countless women believe quite correctly that they are safer on the Right. There they are more valued in the home—for their sex, labor, and reproductive capacity—than they are in the job market. For protection they trade subservience. Through conformity and manipulation—called femininity, total womanhood, motherly love—they convert subservience into a life's work, a purpose. They become "perfect foot soldiers" (p. 35) of the Right.

Right-wing women fear and oppose all that threatens this accommodation. They oppose abortion not because of any fetal Fourteenth Amendment rights (after all, women aren't protected by the Fourteenth Amendment), but because abortion makes promiscuity easier, devalues the "good" woman, and negates the only leverage women have (pregnancy) to make men accountable for what they do to women. Right-wing women are not beguiled by feminist talk of "controlling our own bodies." Since they have only sex to trade for shelter in marriages that legalize rape, they *know* who controls women's bodies. They also hate homosexuality because, quite simply, it makes women all but obsolete—except for their child-bearing capacities.

Now new technologies (such as artificial insemination, *in vitro* fertilization, and cloning) will put child-bearing also under the control of men. It is no coincidence that the new birth technologies are opposed chiefly by the Right. Nevertheless, in their anxiety about abortion, right-wing women would hand over to the state the power to determine when life begins. That acquiescence (again to men) may well be their undoing, marking the final obsolescence of women.

In the meantime, Left and liberal women, half blind, strike compromises. They campaign, for example, for equal pay, a seemingly moderate reform that Dworkin sees as truly revolutionary and "impossible," since equal pay would free women from sex labor, from their essential identification as a sex class (p. 67). Feminists may fight valiantly for a single standard of human justice, but they remain powerless. Only the Right offers temporary safety—pending the eventual obliteration of women.

Dworkin elaborates these hard truths with admirable grace and wit. She is one of the most fearless and tough-minded feminist theoreticians writing today, and this is her best book.

ANN JONES
New York City

Workers, Jobs and Inflation *edited by Martin Neil Baily. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 365 pp. Cloth, $31.95; paper, $12.95.*

This book provides a state-of-the-art analysis of the actions, reactions, and interactions between the labor market and inflation in the 1970s and touches on a great many policy issues. Much of the book is directed to model-building and econometric analyses, topics that lie beyond the ken of this reviewer and, probably, most readers of this journal. But

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the penultimate sentence in the volume suggests that this problem may not be serious here: "Unfortunately the growing sophistication of both theoretical and econometric models . . . has not been met with an increase in the number of data sets of the type required for the estimation of these models" (p. 357). If the economies of the advanced industrial nations are characterized by substantial discontinuities, the gap between models and data may never be closed.

The interactions among workers, jobs, and inflation began in 1965, when prices began to take off. Prior to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the dominant views included: Keynes's perception that during depressions, wage reductions to restore equilibrium were not a good mechanism; the theory of the Phillips curve trade-off between unemployment and inflation (as the jobless rate was reduced, more pressure was exerted on prices to advance); and the recognition of the advantages that accrued to both trade unions and employers from higher wages and greater stability in employment. The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in the Kennedy administration considered 4 percent unemployment as an interim and 3 percent as the long-term goal for macroeconomic policy. Parenthetically, Robert Gordon believes that the CEA erred and that the noninflationary unemployment rate was never below 5.1 percent after 1954 (p. 145).

All of the authors and discussants try to explain a relatively new phenomenon—high unemployment side by side with high inflation. There is no consensus, but the weight of opinion disagrees with the view that the labor market was so tight after 1965 that it resulted in a wage-price spiral.

One chapter (p. 243 ff.) deals with Canada and presents the following factors to explain the worsening Phillips curve: a marked liberalization of unemployment insurance that encouraged persons to live off transfer benefits if and when they left or lost their jobs; a marked rise in the minimum wage; and the unionization of public sector employees.

Many of the same reasons, with additional factors such as contract bargaining, the growth of the off-the-record economy, and a preference for part-time employment, are advanced to explain the worsening Phillips curve in the U.S. It must be remembered, however, that unemployment rates of 7 or even 8 percent in the late 1970s equates in some analyst's view with 4 to 5 percent in the late 1960s, when fewer women and youth, who conventionally have high unemployment rates, were in the labor force.

But, as noted earlier, the dominant view did not hold that the primary cause of the inflation was the tight labor market. Robert Gordon stresses the "shocks" to the price system in the 1970s—in particular in oil and other raw materials. Gordon and others tried to answer a related question: How much of the inflation could be ascribed to an accommodating monetary policy? As one might guess, there was no agreement.

Readers must move beyond the confines of the academic and ask what policymakers can extract from this collaborative effort to help them fashion more responsive macroeconomic and employment policies. This book suggests that the recent double-digit inflation was not created by a wage-price spiral. But the authors offer little illumination of and even fewer directions for the three dominant policy issues in the employment arena: the unconscionably high rates of unemployment among minorities that have existed for decades; the mounting plight of the large numbers of displaced blue-collar

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workers in the industrial heartland; the steps the U.S. must take as a nation to provide employment opportunities for all who are able and willing to work. Another volume of comparable intellectual quality is needed to address these issues.

ELI GINZBERG
Columbia University

Blacks and the Military *by Martin Binkin, Mark J. Eitelberg, et al. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1982. 190 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $7.95.*

The primary concern of this volume is the impact of the shift to an all-volunteer army on the racial composition of the armed forces. Despite predictions that the end of conscription would not appreciably alter the racial composition, the proportion of blacks in the military doubled between 1970 and 1980. In setting the scene for discussing changes in the racial makeup of the military, the authors review the history of the role of blacks in the United States military and present a broad treatment of the changes in the types of youth who have donned uniforms before and after the draft was eliminated.

In this thorough analysis, great care is taken to present alternative perspectives. Thus, charges that the absence of a draft is discriminatory since service is avoided disproportionately by whites are discussed, as is the alternative view, which contends that the benefits provided by the military are such that attempts to limit black enlistments to a percentage equal to their share in the population indicates bias. Similarly, the authors present alternatives on issues such as the possible consequences of unemployment rates, pay raises, educational benefits, and a national service requirement on racial enlistments.

The authors consider a number of assertions made concerning the effects of the rise in the percentage of blacks in the military. To the extent that they are available, research findings are presented bearing on charges that black soldiers might be unwilling to stand against black rioters, that the volunteer army is less competent than its predecessor, that an army unrepresentative of the nation it is to defend may lack cohesion, and so forth. In the final chapter, the evidence for various assertions is reviewed, and the authors call for more research in the areas where data are skimpy.

Extensive longitudinal data are presented on the numbers of black officers and enlisted personnel by service, the scores of inductees on standardized testing instruments, and the distributions of blacks in the population and across specialties in the service. Also drawn on are attitudinal surveys of black and white military personnel designed to indicate reasons for volunteering.

While the increase in blacks in the service is critical if it in any way weakens Americas defense (a proposition held in some quarters, but not subscribed to by the authors), the likely reading audience of this book is narrow. It will be read primarily by specialists on the military. Since the final chapter is a particularly thorough review of the contents of the book, a less specialized audience can learn much from a short investment of time.

The one weakness in the presentation is a tendency toward repetition. The reader is reminded repeatedly that the representation of blacks in the military is seen by some as a

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problem, and that high unemployment in the early 1980s reversed the trend of rising black enrollments, to cite two examples.

CHARLES S. BULLOCK III
University of Georgia

The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War *by Stanley I. Kutler. New York, Hill and Wang, 1982. 285 pp. $16.50.*

Eschewing the common pattern of "master theories," Stanley Kutler has instead attempted to illuminate the character of the loyalty-security demands of the 1940s and 1950s by focusing on eight discrete case studies, running from "Tokyo Rose" to John William Powell. Aided by the Freedom of Information Act, the tracks compulsively left by file-filling bureaucrats, and the eagerness of private citizens to tell their stories, Kutler has pieced together a gripping and meticulously documented account of political authority used capriciously or vindictively. Occasionally, he fails to grant the initial plausibility of a governmental concern and suspicion (as when Beatrice Braude was discovered to have an apparently close association with a proven spy—the latter was wearing Braude's clothes when arrested). But he persuasively argues that the continued suffering of these individuals at the government's hands can not be justified.

In rejecting master theories, Kutler has probably provided the most accurate account to date of the way the American political system operates under the pressure of tense international relations and domestic suspicion. The system is simply too complex and diverse to be captured by theories of paranoid style, working class authoritarianism, or manipulation of cold war consciousness. Instead, Kutler shows a variety of actions: an entrepreneurial endeavor of journalists, and later of politicians, to get "Tokyo Rose"; the power drive of Senator Pat McCarran, for whom Professor Owen Lattimore was convenient fodder; the bureaucratic instinct for territorial control that gained for Ruth Shipley and Frances Knight, through years of careful expansion, a "Queendom" (Kutler's term) of control over the issuance of passports. Nevertheless, one wishes that Kutler had made some greater attempt to draw conclusions and lessons from these cases beyond his slender preface and epilogue. He does not even indicate why he chose these particular case studies.

Kutler does, however, allude to a distinctive characteristic of this period of oppression; it operated primarily from pockets of relatively autonomous power, pockets that developed with the rise of the modern, fragmented, bureaucratic state. The problem, it is tempting to conclude, suggests a solution in the revival of the nondelegation doctrine. Most effectively, this could be employed along the sliding scale model that the Supreme Court articulated precisely in response to the problem of the vast discretionary authority affecting individual rights, exercised in this case by the Passport Office (*Kent* v. *Dulles*, 357 U.S. 116 [1958]); that is, the closer governmental action circumscribes a constitutional principle, the more specific must be the legislative grant of authority. Still, it would be wrong to see in the nondelegation doctrine a panacea. For while the doctrine would

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return authority to a more majoritarian political process, and by requiring clarity, encourage responsibility and reflection, there still are, as Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist*, no. 63, "particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion . . . or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn." Through progressive reforms, American representative institutions have grown so close to the people that it is unreasonable to expect them, as Hamilton wished, "to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves."

STANLEY C. BRUBAKER
Colgate University

Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal *by Beate Kohler; translated by Frank Carter and Ginnie Hole. Woburn, Mass., Butterworths, 1982. 281 pp. $59.95.*

One of the hazards of writing on south European politics is the danger of publishing a year or so too early. Beate Kohler's detailed, skillful study, titled in its original German *Political Upheaval in South Europe*, comes one upheaval too soon. If Kohler, head of the political science department at the Darmstadt Technische Hochschule, had waited until this year, the book could have analyzed the coming to power of socialists in all three countries. Who would have suggested ten years ago that two large welfare states of northern Europe (Britain and West Germany) would now be dominated by conservatives, while the right-wing authoritarian systems of southern Europe would be governed by democratically elected socialists?

The work, one of the Butterworths European Studies edited by François Duchêne of the University of Sussex, provides a magisterial overview of the literature with emphasis on parties and governmental institutions in the 1970s. The twenty-page bibliography has combed the literature in five languages for all relevant studies.

Spain, Greece, and Portugal form a rather neat unit for study. Long praetorian societies on Europe's southern tier, they all emerged from authoritarianism at almost the same time—Spain in 1975 (Franco's death), Greece in 1974 (the Colonels lost nerve facing Turkey), and Portugal also in 1974 (military coup). Within a year or two, all were functioning democracies, two of them initially dominated by center-right parties (Spain and Greece), the third by democratic socialists (Portugal).

The Kohler book is a country-by-country review with few generalizations or comparisons. That is left to the reader. Yet some juicy generalizations are there to be made. The large center-right parties of all three (Democratic Center Union in Spain, New Democracy in Greece, and the deceptively named Social Democrats in Portugal) were all faction-ridden vehicles for charismatic chiefs (respectively, Adolfo Suárez, Constantine Karamanlis, and the late M. de Sá Carneiro) that fell apart with the leader's departure. Replacing them—and here Kohler is just able to insert the results of the 1981 Greek election—are large and comparatively cohesive socialist parties. Felipe González's Spanish

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Workers' Socialist Party (PSOE) took 46 percent of the Spanish vote in 1982; Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 48 percent in Greece in 1981; and Antonio Soares Carniero's Socialist Party (PS) 36 percent in Portugal in 1983. González and Soares, both tutored by the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), are quite moderate; Papandreou is rhetorically radical but in practice cautious.

In these three countries one can see the emergence of "two-plus" party systems. The social forces that support the parties are quite similar in all three. Most descriptions of one system could stand, with only name changes, for the other two. It is perhaps just as well that Kohler has not undertaken such comparisons, for it leaves something for the rest of us to do. *Political Forces in Spain, Greece and Portugal* provides excellent source material for further comparative analysis. Unfortunately, its astronomical price may limit its influence.

MICHAEL ROSKIN
Lycoming College

The Mediterranean Basin: Its Political Economy and Changing International Relations *by Glenda G. Rosenthal. Woburn, Mass., Butterworths, 1982. 146 pp. $39.95.*

This short survey is unique as the only attempt to treat the greater part of the Mediterranean basin in terms of international economic and strategic interrelationships. Very brief in length, it is also distinctly limited in range. The most important country of the Mediterranean basin—Italy—is excluded because Italy is a part of Europe by belonging to the European Community and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, the entire subject of domestic politics and national systems, together with their influences on political economy and international strategy, is largely excluded in favor of concentration on international economic and strategic relations, even though the middle portion of the book is given the inflated title of "The Mediterranean Political Economy."

The work is composed of three sections. The first and briefest treats the impact of European Community enlargement on Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia, the three countries that would be most affected by the inclusion of Spain and Portugal. The second part discusses West European-Mediterranean basin interrelations in the key areas of agricultural production, the international labor market, and oil and gas exports. The third and concluding section treats aspects of strategic relations, primarily those dealing with the two superpowers and the tangled controversy involving Greece, Turkey and the United States.

The strength of this volume lies in its survey of West European-Mediterranean economic relations. A considerable amount of specialized data has been assembled to illustrate a lucid analysis of those areas selected for study, and this exposition will be of undoubted value to students.

The thesis of the book is "that the main trend in Mediterranean Basin relations is one of 'Europeanization' " (p. 136). It is undoubtedly valid with respect to economic relations,

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but considerably less so with respect to political and military affairs. The general emphasis on international trade proves excessively reductionist or at any rate inadequate fully to sustain the conclusion. Thus, the author is in some danger of repeating the analytical fallacy of Fernand Braudel's classic work on the sixteenth-century Mediterranean, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, which postulated fundamental unity at the very time that the area was being polarized into two antagonistic cultures. Though no such dire dichotomy is being established at the present time, the profound political and cultural differences between and among the various states and peoples of the Mediterranean littoral require direct analysis before arriving at overarching generalities.

Though the author emphasizes the development of a situation of interdependence between the European Community and the Mediterranean basin, she admits in her conclusion that this tends to be more a matter of economic dependence on the part of the latter than of equivalent mutual need. In characterizing the international ambitions of West European states, readers are told that they are "now neither more nor less imperialistic than the Soviet Union and the United States" (p. 140), a proposition at best incomprehensible and at worst inane. As for policy prescription, she seeks to draw out the aspects of mutual interest for both areas, and proposes somewhat vaguely the importance of forming a more organized regional interrelationship that would promote peaceful development in the Mediterranean while easing international tensions. However desirable in the abstract, this notion seems too vague and undifferentiated a proposition to have much in the way of practical application. As in all comparative studies, it is important to give appropriate weight to differences as well as to parallels and similarities.

STANLEY G. PAYNE
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Unions, Change and Crises: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy, 1945–1980 *by Peter Lange, George Ross, and Maurizio Vannicelli. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1982. 295 pp. $35.00.*

This work is the first of two volumes from the Harvard University Center for European Studies on the question of the strategic responses of European trade unions to changing economic and political environments. The aim of the study is at once historical and theoretical: the authors set out to provide a capsule history from 1945 to 1980 of the French and Italian trade-union movements; and they seek to derive from this history a general theory of trade-union behavior.

Their theoretical ambition is to refute the conventional wisdom on the subject, which, in both its "liberal optimist" (Clark Kerr, Ralf Dahrendorf, S. M. Lipset, et al.) and in its Marxist variants, is unable to make sense of the specific development of French and Italian trade unionism. Both of these currents of thought tend to assume that a "logic of industrialism" imposes itself on capital-labor relationships ("economism") and that there exists a historical trajectory leading all countries to an identical set of those relationships

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(termed, bizarrely, "historicism"). The historical essays focus on those features of French and Italian trade-union experience that highlight the shortcomings of these modes of analysis and suggest an alternative.

Ross's essay on France, for example, argues that the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT)'s responses in the 1970s to capital's efforts at "restructuring" must be understood in the context of France's relatively underinstitutionalized mode of collective bargaining, of a long-standing practice of state intervention in industrial relations, of a CFDT too weak to challenge the dominance of the CGT, and of a CGT still linked in quasi-transmission-belt fashion to the French Communist Party (PCF). Out of this particular combination of environmental constraints and ideological commitments has come the strategic response of the predominant wing of the French trade-union movement: "maximalism." This orientation links the possibility of advancing working-class interests to the rise to state power of left-wing parties capable of altering the logic of capitalism to the advantage of the working class—and to the relative neglect of trade-union initiatives based in the marketplace or in trade-union/governmental bargaining.

Similarly, Lange and Vannicelli find that in the case of Italy a constellation of ideological factors, intra- and inter-union relationships, and the Socialist Party's participation in governments since 1963 has engendered a uniquely Italian trade-union strategy—even though the objective economic givens have been largely the same in France and Italy. The greater autonomy of the Confederazione Generale Italiana de Lavoro (CGIL) from the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the Left's commitment to a strategy of broadly based social alliances, and the greater competitive pressure applied by the non-Communist Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) have all contributed to a greater emphasis in Italy on decentralized, marketplace initiatives combined with high-level confederation/government negotiations for the sake of general socioeconomic reform of the country—what the authors term "interventionism."

It is to the authors' credit that they remind us once again that, contrary to the vision of "liberal optimists," the course of trade-union movements does not lead inevitably to depoliticization, an acceptance of the capitalist framework, and a focus on narrow, sectoral, "bread-and-butter" issues. On the other hand, even the most superficial observer of French and Italian affairs is well aware of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the heavy theoretical guns the authors bring forth in order to explain the differences between the French and Italian cases (an "actor-centered model and exchange theory"), do little more than restate the obvious. Rather than concentrating so much on showing that unions are collective subjects endowed with a perspective affecting union strategy, the authors might have addressed the question of whether the "maximalist" and the "interventionist" strategies actually led to very different results. One suspects that adverse labor-market conditions (the "objective given" the authors are so concerned to devaluate) have largely flattened out the differences.

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DePaul University

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France in the Troubled World Economy *edited by Stephen S. Cohen and Peter A. Gourevitch. Woburn, Mass., Butterworths, 1982. 199 pp. $39.95.*

As this collection of nine essays makes clear, the restructuring of the French economy sought by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond Barre in the 1970s was one that would maintain the essence of what Gourevitch, in the opening essay, describes as the French version of growth-oriented statist Keynesianism. While the French economy needed restructuring to reposition itself in an international environment considerably more hostile than the one that had seen rapid French economic growth in the 1960s, the state was not to wither away. Indeed, as Stephen Cohen in his review of industrial policy, and Cohen, James K. Galbraith, and John Zysman in their paper on monetary and credit policy, make clear, the Barre modernization of the role of the state involved no net shrinkage of its role in directing the economy, merely a withdrawal from some areas while it expanded elsewhere.

Dirigisme remained very much alive, but was accompanied by a neo-liberal attitude towards layoffs in such sectors as steel and textiles, and a monetarist approach to unemployment, inflation, and exchange-rate policy. The Giscard-Barre stress on nuclear power (40 reactors planned for the Rhône alone!), armaments exports, and enough agricultural exports to pay the oil bill were policies that could only be pursued while the real price of oil was rising, British and West German taxpayers were prepared to finance the Common Agricultural Policy, and the French Left remained disorganized after the 1978 elections. Restricting itself to recession-management, pruning excess capacity from clapped-out industries, and using a tight monetarist-inspired monetary policy to produce a strong franc no matter what the unemployment and redistributive effects, the Barre program offered no change in the fundamental structures of French society. This, in fact, is the common theme running through these papers, written while that government was still in office.

The volume includes three excellent industry studies of agriculture, textiles, and oil by John T. S. Keeler, Lynn Krieger Mytelka, and Harvey B. Feigenbaum, respectively. Policies towards the Third World, particularly the effort to diversify ties away from Africa after the first oil shock, are examined by Miles Kahler. George Ross's paper provides a description of the strategies followed by the two main trade unions, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and the Confération Française Democratique du Travail (CFDT), in the period up to the 1978 election and thereafter. This paper, along with Mytelka's textile study and the Cohen, Galbraith, and Zysman paper on credit and industrial policy, are particularly rewarding. The co-editors have added a postscript to update the volume outlining the early Mitterand policy.

Can Socialists find salvation in devaluation and austerity? The current dilemma of the Mitterand government will be much on the minds of readers of this collection. Unlike its neo-liberal predecessors, the present French government has been forced onto a path it did not seek after its earlier expansionary policies became too expensive in terms of France's foreign exchange reserves. There may be some lessons for the Socialists in this little volume of papers from two conferences held in 1980 that detail the choices made by Giscard and Barre in France before neo-liberal politics reached its heyday when Ronald

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Reagan and Margaret Thatcher took office. One lesson has already been learned. Expansionary macroeconomic policies in an open economy at a time of slow global growth is not the way to defend ambitious social changes. The French governments of the 1970s did not have such ambitions. Their task was much easier.

SEAMUS O'CLEIREACAIN
Columbia University

Participatory Pluralism: Political Participation and Influence in the United States and Sweden *by Marvin E. Olsen. Chicago, Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1982. 318 pp. $24.95.*

If there is one area in which American political scientists excel, it is the study of political participation. By contrast, they rarely relate their findings to the distribution of political power in other capitalist democracies. In this work, Marvin Olsen, a sociologist, attempts to link participation to power in America and Sweden. He takes seriously the idea that political alienation is caused by political powerlessness and, to his credit, he offers frankly prescriptive recommendations designed to empower people by facilitating participation. Unfortunately, Olsen does not transcend the studies he criticizes. In the end, this book is really two poorly integrated works: the first, a modest contribution to the literature on participation; the second, a poorly conceived theoretical argument that reflects the same inattention to the realities of powerlessness that Olsen finds so troubling in the literature he criticizes.

The author begins in the right place. As he notes, the debate between advocates of "participatory democracy" and "sociopolitical pluralism" is seriously flawed. The former fail to specify how participation can be achieved in modern industrial societies; the latter do not recognize that electoral democracies are easily manipulated by elites. He attempts to reorganize this debate by creating a third model, "participatory pluralism," based on the idea that activity begets activity, or what he calls the "social mobilization thesis": participation in intermediate organizations increases political participation. He tests this thesis by analyzing how and why people in the United States and Sweden are mobilized into politics. His survey evidence moderately supports his claim. A multivariate analysis of the social contexts of political participation in Indianapolis indicates that social activity does affect levels and kinds of participation independent of class, education, and political orientation. He also supplements Norman Nie and Sidney Verba, who have covered much of the same ground with a national study, by distinguishing between "active" (organizational, partisan, and governmental) and "passive" (cognitive, electoral, and expressive) forms of participation and demonstrating that education is most important in stimulating the latter rather than the former.

Olsen demonstrates that involvement in intermediate organizations tends to breed further political involvement across classes, education, and income levels. The problems occur when the author attempts to apply these findings and to develop a model for empowering people through social mobilization. While the goal is commendable, the model

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is confused and naive. In this model, individuals participate according to their knowledge and interests in small groups within functionally specific (such as communications and education) organizations. These groups control the larger social organizations from the bottom up. The state is limited to making critical policy choices through a Congress composed of representatives of the various functional collectivities. Policies are, in turn, implemented by individuals, groups, and organizations in the private sector.

There are two problems here. First, Olsen synthesizes a host of competing and contradictory ideas and traditions, ranging from Guild Socialism, through pluralism, to the conservative political and economic theories of Robert Nisbet and Peter Drucker, without attention to their radically different implications. More important, Olsen simply asserts that social mobilization and political participation in his model society will empower individuals. The discussion of state-society relations is not specific. The impact of individual participation in groups is considered in isolation, without an analysis of the internal dynamics of corporations, unions, and professional associations or the political and economic environments in which they operate. Olsen assumes but does not demonstrate that this society will be free of class and power inequalities and of the economic constraints that limit the freedom of political leaders in capitalist democracies.

The argument rests, finally, on Olsen's assertion that bureaucracy in general and the state in particular are the principal obstacles to empowerment. A study of elite attitudes in Sweden illustrates this proposition. Alternative analyses of the role of the state in that society are not considered; the impact of the Social Democrats on the distribution of power is unexamined. At bottom, Olsen remains trapped within the debate he originally sought to recast. Focusing narrowly on participation, he fails to consider the structural, institutional, and ideological bases of power. As he charges his critics, he leaves the realities of powerlessness in Sweden and the United States unaddressed.

CHARLES NOBLE
Rutgers University

Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy and the British State *by Andrew Gamble. Boston, Beacon Press, 1982. 279 pp. $15.75.*

During the postwar years, Britain has enjoyed a remarkable period of material growth, measured in absolute terms. But during this period Britain has also suffered a remarkable rate of economic decline, measured in relative terms. At a time of much swifter and more comprehensive international communication, it is this sense of comparative failure that has eroded British self-confidence and led to a widespread recognition of the United Kingdom, at home and abroad, as a problem country. This failure to deliver the economic goods as effectively as other countries has led not merely to dissatisfaction with successive British governments, but also to a more fundamental questioning of British methods and institutions.

This diagnosis has been common ground for commentators of both right and left for

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some time. Indeed, it is one of the features of this book that so much of a critique from the far left is acceptable, or at least stimulating, to a reviewer who by no means shares that standpoint.

The essence of Gamble's assessment is that British economic dominance in the last century was achieved through the country's integration into the international economy, and that Britain's progressive decline over the past hundred years is to be attributed to the country's failure to disentangle itself from its international commitments when these had ceased to be a net benefit.

Free trade was the mechanism by which British preeminence was secured in the nineteenth century. It was worth Britain's while to make its markets freely available to the goods of other countries because British manufacturing was so competitive and because British military strength was sufficient to force other countries to open their markets and to keep the sea lanes open for international trade. But free trade was no longer in Britain's interest once it faced the competition of commercial rivals, like Germany and the United States, that it could not coerce into reciprocity, and once the competitive advantage of British manufacturing was not so evident.

Yet, Gamble maintains, Britain was not prepared to loosen its attachment to the international economy even when it ceased to be in its own interest. Belief in freedom of trade and the virtues of the international monetary system were too deeply ingrained. To make matters worse, Britain had added foreign political and military entanglements to its economic commitments. As a result, there has not been the political will to embrace the radical solutions either of Joseph Chamberlain's tariff reform in the early years of this century or of the Left's alternative economic strategy today.

It is when he moves from diagnosis to prescription that Gamble is least persuasive to someone who does not share his political standpoint. He is critical of the Thatcherite solution without caricaturing it. He is not unfair to the centrist economic policies of the Liberals and the Social Democrats. But it is only when he discusses the alternative economic strategy of the Left that a tone of enthusiasm enters his writing.

He shows himself to be aware of the political obstacles to implementing such a strategy, but not of its fundamental flaws. No matter how one may draw up the balance sheet of Britain's involvement in the international economy over the past 150 years, it is scarcely credible that Britain's fortunes could now be revived by being insulated from its pressures and disciplines behind a protective wall of import and exchange controls.

It would be still less likely that the economic policy of the Left could be the path to national regeneration if the opportunity of splendid isolation were to be used for massive extensions of public ownership, central planning and coordination of the economy, much greater redistribution of wealth, ending or drastically curtailing many of the activities of the City of London as an international financial center, and subordinating management to new forms of industrial democracy. Yet Gamble believes that "the strategy as it stands is a quite consistent response to the problem of British decline and the failings of its industry and the growing unemployment and social distress which are occurring."

Nonetheless, even those who cannot come to the same conclusions as Gamble may still

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benefit from his wide-ranging critique. This is a work of analysis from a left-wing standpoint, not a polemic.

GEOFFREY SMITH
The Times (London)

The Politics of Economic Modernization in the Soviet Union *by Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1982. 215 pp. $19.50.*

The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management: Socioeconomic Development and the Search for Viability *by William J. Conyngham. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982. 332 pp. $34.50.*

These two books assess measures to modernize the Soviet economy and state. Everyone recognizes that lower economic growth in the USSR has made greater efficiency highly desirable for the Soviet regime. The real issue has been what political interests might be infringed upon in pursuit of which reforms. How much can outsiders know about this crucial matter, constrained as they are by managed access to Soviet political actors?

Erik Hoffmann and Robin Laird have studied the open Soviet literature on the "scientific-technological revolution" (STR), and they have found many individuals they call "economic modernizers," who turn out to be affiliated with a wide variety of academic and bureaucratic organizations. Yet despite the claims of Hoffmann and Laird, in no independent sense do modernizers form a group at all. Conservative modernizers recommend automating and rationalizing existing structures and emphasize closer integration of the Soviet economy with Comecon and other soft-currency markets. "Liberals" are prepared to risk greater involvement with the West to further technical progress, arguing than the USSR can play off advanced capitalist partners and thus preserve its independence and advantage. A few radical dissenters would say that progress requires decentralization of power. Dissent like this, however, while doubtless affirmed by quite a few Soviet intellectuals in private, has not been permitted in official publications since the heady days of 1956–1966 in such journals as *Novy Mir*. Today, the majority view expressed in public is that the advance of science and technology will make Party mediation over parochial technical elites more necessary than ever. Aside from diehard Stalinists and romantic nationalists—regrettably, not examined by Hoffmann and Laird—it would seem that every Soviet policymaker embraces some kind of "scientific-technological revolution" for some purpose or other. The differences in emphasis and direction usefully analyzed by Hoffmann and Laird do not correlate with bureaucratic position or socioeconomic interest. Some of their authors favor regional science-production complexes; some want a greater role for economists (Stalin forbid!). But no consensus or alignment emerges on such concrete (and dubious) ideas. Some Soviet intellectuals welcomed détente; others opposed it. But this is hardly news.

So Hoffmann and Laird do not and probably could not establish economic modernizers as a "policy group" with respect to any definite reform program in the USSR. Because of the economic modernizers' divisions and vagueness, they even fall short of being a "tendency of articulation" in Franklyn Griffiths's sense.

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Unfortunately for researchers, current Soviet politics–while involving more elites in the policymaking process than under Nikita Khrushchev – has become both less open and apparently less doctrinaire and partisan on the inside. No one has raged against "steel-eaters" in public for a long time now. To date, Iurii Andropov has adopted Brezhnev's habit of moralistically nagging individuals without confronting definite groups. All this leads to a dreary incrementalism, which, however, does impart a mild legitimacy by cooptation, as Hoffmann and Laird say. The case study of a minor foreign trade reorganization in 1978 is analyzed largely without reference to manifest policy groups or, indeed, the "scientific-technological revolution." Such case studies could have been documented more fully during the late 1950s.

More substantial but different in focus is William Conyngham's book, his second on Soviet industrial management. Conyngham points out that the STR is sometimes invoked in Soviet writings to predict more centralism and technocracy. Other times, it seems to point to greater delegation of authority and wider participation. Soviet officials like D.M.Gvishiani have enthusiastically adopted American notions of cybernetics, critical path methods, and the like as an alternative to classical, prescriptive management theory. Naturally, Soviet authorities have wanted to adopt quantitative techniques but without the culturally tainted bourgeois positivism and psychological reductionism. Several major research and training institutes are devoted to such borrowing and adaptation. Much of Conyngham's work is a detailed description of technocratic enthusiasms (like comprehensive computerized planning) that dissipated by the late 1970s, often because of technical difficulties or ideological opposition equally predictable from the start. Ad hoc Party and ministry meddling in the affairs of production units continues as before.

Conyngham bases his negative assessment of Soviet management reforms on numerous articles of *samokritika* (self-criticism) published in Soviet journals. He mostly discounts the self-praise also abundant there. More regrettably, Conyngham's book does not draw on first-hand contacts or interviews such as enrich David Granick's works on East European management. Conyngham's reading of Russian works is prodigious, given the deadening quality of most of them, but his treatment of subjects apparently beyond his expertise is sometimes sketchy and would be puzzling for the non-specialist. On the other hand, the specialist without Russian would be served better elsewhere in some cases. Alfred Zauberman or Judith Thornton is a surer guide to mathematical modeling; Joseph Berliner, to microeconomic reforms. Little overall argument develops through the catalogue of failed programs. But for those few of us who must know the details of administrative reforms, the reporting here is the best I know of. This journal's readers will probably be most interested in Conyngham's description of the 1973 reform of economic ministries, notably the establishment of intermediate bodies with responsibilities for technological policy. Ministries have been slow to concede any authority to these new bodies; nevertheless, enterprises have lost yet more of their promised autonomy. Administrative costs, it need hardly be added, have gone up.

MARTIN C. SPECHLER
Harvard University

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Security in the Persian Gulf: Modernization, Political Development and Stability *by Avi Plascov. Totowa, N.J., Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1982. 183 pp. $10.00.*

Avi Plascov has produced a useful and scholarly guide to the sources of domestic conflict and instability in the Persian Gulf states. In the third of a four volume series (published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London) on security in the Persian Gulf, Plascov develops his thesis that in the process of introducing modernization to societies that generally lacked the political, social, and economic base to withstand such massive changes, the gulf states inevitably encountered extreme difficulties. This process of modernization often confronted ruling regimes with challenges to their legitimacy, causing political disintegration and aggravating the intro-societal pressures that were already very great.

Several chapters are quite illuminating and provide a rich description of the political and social landscape. In particular, Chapter 3, "Sectarian and Ethnic Strife," presents an excellent discussion of the struggle between the Ba'ath leadership in Baghdad and the Shi'ah minority, a conflict encouraged and aided by the fanatical Shi'ite regime of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. There is also a fairly comprehensive discussion of Kurdish separatism in the gulf, including an illuminating analysis distinguishing between the Iran example, where the predominantly Sunni Kurds oppose a ruling Shi'ite mullah, and the Iraq example, where Kurds challenge the iron reign of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party.

Chapters 2 and 7 are perhaps the most disappointing. In Chapter 2, Plascov attempts to describe the reactions of various Islamic movements to the modernization trends in the gulf. Since this section relates most directly to the author's thesis, one would expect an analytically rigorous presentation. The scholar will be less than satisified. Plascov's description of the Iranian example is superficial and incomplete. The author misses an opportunity to present a strong historical case that would document the peculiar concentration of stresses producing the Iranian revolution. There is little evidence that Plascov has probed beneath the surface to explain the unique religious and political circumstances that precipitated the Shah's fall from power.

Chapter 7, "Politico-Military Relations in the Gulf," is a disappointing collection of brief essays focusing on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, and Iraq. The Saudi discussion is most disappointing and includes no analysis of the role of outside powers in the Saudi military establishment. Considering the enormous role of the United States in this regard, the ommission is quite surprising. Similarly, there is no mention of a 1979 agreement among Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to establish an $8 billion arms industry in the UAE. This agreement is important because it represented the first serious attempt by the gulf states to create an indigenous Arab arms production capability. Most surprising (and due possibly to the publication date of the book) is the absence of any discussion of the creation of the Gulf Cooperative Council, inaugurated at the January 1981 Islamic Summit, to establish an institutional framework for a mutual defense and economic alliance among Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE. The council was established at the urging of Saudi Arabia. By creating a regional

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defense alliance, the gulf states signaled their fear of any superpower involvement in the security affairs of the gulf.

Nonetheless, Plascov's study warrants close attention by scholars and non-experts alike. Its strength lies in its detailed presentation of a very complicated subject in a sophisticated, systematic manner. It should be read as a primer for those interested in gaining an insight into the labyrinthine complexity of the political and social institutions in the Persian Gulf. Scholars, however, will be disappointed by the superficial treatment that sometimes characterizes the discussion.

JED SNYDER
The Wilson Center

Apartheid: The United Nations and Peaceful Change in South Africa *by Özdemir A. Özgür. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Transnational Publishers, 1982. 240 pp. $25.00.*

It is highly fitting that the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa be studied in detail. South Africa remains the only member of the U.N. at which mandatory sanctions have been directed and at which a sustained effort has been made on the part of the U.N. to alter its domestic legal structure. Özgür's book does provide this much-needed detail.

The body of the book is divided into three sections. The first outlines what the author calls the "conflicting standards." This includes the various U.N. documents on racism, especially the Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and, in contradiction, the legal and applied forms of apartheid. The second section of the book is called "Action-Reaction," and deals with the U.N. resolutions on apartheid from 1946 to 1980 and with South Africa's answers. This section explains what are probably the thorniest issues the U.N. must confront when dealing with apartheid: deciding whether apartheid is simply a breach of human rights or whether it is also a threat to international peace (thus leading to a more active role for the Security Council); and the obstacles posed by the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter. The third section of the book is entitled "Effect," and is an attempt to measure the impact that U.N. actions have had on apartheid. This is done in short order, as Özgür quickly reaches the obvious conclusion that U.N. actions have had a "marginal" effect.

If the book had ended at this point is would have been measured a failure since it presented a erudite exposition, but one with few attempts at penetrating analysis. The all-too-brief conclusion of the book, however, salvages it. Here Özgür is at his best as he argues that the vested interests of the United States, Great Britain, and France have rendered the Security Council impotent on the issue of apartheid, thus forcing the General Assembly to play the major role. In the General Assembly, the propensity to concentrate solely on the human rights aspect of apartheid has allowed South Africa to

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utilize the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter with some success, and has thus prevented the U.N. from mobilizing all of its potential resources.

While Özgür's book will undoubtedly become a standard work on the relationship between the U.N. and South Africa, the truly salient issues are tantilizingly dangled rather than explored in detail. Since, as the author notes, the real impact of the U.N. on apartheid has been limited, what is important is what these attempts can tell us about the U.N. itself. As one example, the conflict between peaceful change—which is mentioned in the book's title—and the General Assembly resolution endorsing armed struggle is explored only superficially. In the end Özgür passes lightly over the most central issue of all: the difficulty of dealing with an instransigent opponent while armed only with moral suasion based on world public opinion and prestige. While other forms of power can sometimes have the desired effect even when used clumsily, moral suasion demands the utmost delicacy and selectiveness. It must be used in the right amounts, at the right time, and preferably in conjunction with other forms of power. Sadly enough, when dealing with apartheid the U.N. has not exhibited a talent for this, and thus has, as Özgür notes, relegated itself to a minor role.

STEVEN METZ
Towson State University

Japan's Wasted Workers *by Jon Woronoff. Totowa, N. J., Allanheld, Osmun and Co., 1983. 296 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $10.95.*

Originally written for the Japanese public, this book is primarily a collection of ideas already in print. It aims to show the weaknesses of the "less-than model companies that make up the vast mass of corporate entities" (p. 6) in Japan, and to show areas in which reform is being considered.

Woronoff offers the Western reader a counter-position to works praising Japanese efficiency, loyalty, and harmony. This same counter-position already exists in the English language literature. The advantage of this book is that it brings together several aspects of the position, while relying on sources not readily available in English. It is a journalistic rather than a scholarly presentation. It will be beneficial to persons interested generally in contemporary Japan, such as people in business, beginning students, those interested in women's roles, and instructors who may assign this to students. As such, it is a useful, provocative addition to the literature. In particular. Woronoff's presentation of Japanese white collar workers (the "salary man") as bureaucrats and his stress on inefficient use of personnel may interest the non-specialist.

However, this book has several problems. Many of the sentences seem to be direct translations of the Japanese original. Even more serious is the presentation of undefined Japanese terms. For example, the term *ringisho* appears on page 28, but is not explained until page 32. Other terms are never explained. What is meant by the "Patty-and-Jimmy generations" (p. 73), or a "box store" (p. 167)?

The style is often pedantic and too presumptive. For example, Woronoff illustrates the

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menial nature of women's work by suggesting that there is not too much difference between selling a cabbage in a shop and selling clothes in a boutique. He does not indicate why it should be more desirable to have a "man's job" selling heavy machinery. Nowhere does he relate the consumer's expectations of high-level service to the competence and knowledge required of sales personnel.

One is often unsure of Woronoff's prescriptions. He points out, for example, that it may be frustrating for a high school graduate to receive less pay than a college graduate with less seniority. Would he base wages on seniority? What then is the incentive to go to college? Or is he merely pointing out that it is difficult for someone who has joined the labor force after high school to obtain a college education and equal opportunity for promotion at a later date?

In spite of its weaknesses, this is an extremely useful book. It raises questions relevant not only to Japan, but to other societies as well. What are the real links between what is taught in the education system and the skills required by society? What should be the underlying principles of equity? How can developed societies deal with unemployment and aging?

Along more concrete lines, the book warns against wholesale adoption of management and labor practices from Japan. It suggests that office and factory have to be separated and that much can be learned from the latter, but not from the former. Finally, it warns against a Japan "mystique" and reminds readers to keep their eyes open.

In sum, the book does what it sets out to do. It examines the underside of the Japanese employment system today. Unfortunately, its style and prescriptive nature leave the reader wondering for which audience it was really written.

ANNE E. IMAMURA
University of Maryland, College Park

Federalism and Federation *by Preston King. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1983. 159 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $6.50.*

This little book by a political scientist at the University of New South Wales purports to apply logic in an analysis of the concept of federal union. Logic dictates to him that he regard in the first part of the book the "ism" of the concept—that is, federalism—and that he consider in the second part of the book the expression of the concept as an "institutional arrangement of fact" (p. 21)—that is, federation. He attempts to lay bare the meaning of the terms themselves. In short, he undertakes a linguistic exploration of the two ideas. "No description of reality," he asserts, "can proceed beyond the bounds of language . . ." (p. 11). It is thus a carefully written book from beginning to end, a book not to be read quickly or lightly.

He explores both the centralist and the decentralist thrusts of federalism. Chapter 3, on "Centralist Federalism," relies heavily on *The Federalist* (perhaps an Australian can be forgiven for ascribing credit for the "recommendations advanced by 'Publius' " to Alexander Hamilton "as assisted by James Madison and John Jay" (p. 24). In any case, King

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makes clear the dilemmas the authors of *The Federalist* faced in having to reconcile the concept of sovereignty with divided power by level on the one hand with government on the basis of consent on the other. But he does not rely solely on Hamilton and Madison. He leads the reader as well through the relevant works of C. H. Saint-Simon, J. Hennessy, Lionel Curtis, and William Riker as he seeks to develop the "centralizing ideology" (p. 37).

He then turns to decentralist federalism and to the theorists of that position, P. J. Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and John Calhoun, to make the case for a number of centers of power instead of a central one. He recognizes that the arguments for decentralized power can all too easily become arguments for anarchism—indeed, he frankly equates the doctrine of decentralist federalism with that of "political anarchism"—an equation he finds "genuinely engaging and desirable" (p. 51).

Finally, he puts the case for "Federalist Balance"—the "view of federalism as a form of contractual arrangement" (p. 56), this time without drawing extensively on the contributions of others. It is his conclusion as he ends his reasoned examination of the idea that "Federalism, conceived as anything other than a 'weak' ideology of balance, is not very satisfactory" (p. 67). But at least, considered that way, it presupposes constitutionalism and the latter's acceptance of federation as the concrete political manifestation of federalism in practice, and so he devotes most of the rest of the book to federation.

There is a problem with defining federation, not only because the nature of a federation, after it is established, frequently changes, but also because a federation can be consistent with any of the types of federalism (p. 75). Moreover, it is hard to find what distinguishes a federation from any other state. In the end, he is forced to rely on empirical analysis, buttressed by reference to Riker's and T. M. Franck's work, and to define federation in terms of what might be called "conditions of emergence" theory and to classify federations along a "unitary/confederal/federal" continuum.

Another problem with federation King tackles is that of the necessary degree, if any, of democracy required in a federation. Though he finds that the degree varies widely, it turns out that a federation inevitably qualifies democracy by the felt necessity in them all to entrench the position of the "constitutive territorial units" (p. 88) by such devices as bicameralism, with equal representation in one of the chambers, division of powers, and "properly constituted trans-regional judicial powers or procedures (sometimes including referenda)" (p. 107). But the concept of federation, he finds, stops short of providing the option of contracting out or of secession. As his analysis draws to a close, King concludes that the degree of centralization or decentralization in a federation is not as important a concern as the fact that both federalism and federation contribute to the welfare of the people by forcing politics to take place within constitutional forms. He writes: "The federal variety of constitutionalism, despite all of the misunderstanding often associated with it, does represent a coherent and tried expression of political sovereignty" (p. 148).

As noted earlier, this is not an easy book to read, despite its brevity and the care King takes to define terms. He writes tightly and packs each page with references to the works of others or with his own extended reasoning, both of which make for slow going. But he is obviously a master of the literature and the practice of federalism and federations. His is a book one thinks again about both the "ism" and its institutionalization and leaves

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them less sure than they were when they started that they know much about either. His bibliography is superb, and the index is a model of its kind.

RICHARD H. LEACH
Duke University

Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939–1943 *by Sarah Meiklejohn Terry. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983. 394 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $15.00.*

This is an excellent study of the grand design devised for postwar East Central Europe by General Władysław Sikorski, prime minister of the Polish government in exile, 1939–1943. The essentially constructive design, which confutes the image of suspicious negativism historically attached to the London Poles, had three interdependent objectives: a Polish-Czech federation strong enough to resist Germany and the Soviet Union; the enlargement of Poland to the Oder and Western Neisse rivers (disproportionately emphasized in the subtitle but not the text); and an indispensable rapprochement with the Soviets, for which Sikorski was prepared to make some territorial compromise in the east if necessary.

Sarah Meiklejohn Terry identifies the Soviet military crisis from July–December 1941 as Sikorski's only real opportunity. In December, he visited a briefly cordial Stalin who had not yet vetoed the federation, and who now suggested negotiations hinting vaguely at Soviet territorial accessions with compensation for Poland at Germany's expense. But Sikorski missed this chance, preferring to wait until Polish forces then forming were fighting alongside the Red Army. Within days Moscow was secured, the United States was in the war, and Stalin no longer valued the London Poles. His actions thereafter clearly signified an intention to impose his own terms. Terry argues that Stalin was abetted toward this end during 1942 by a formidable list of lesser gravediggers: General Władysław Anders, the army commander, who disobediently withdrew the Polish army from the Soviet theater; the intriguing Russophobe Polish politicians who hobbled Sikorski's authority and initiative; President Edouard Beneš of Czechoslovakia, who succumbed to Moscow's siren call and sabotaged the federation from June 1942; the Anglo-Americans, who were anxious not to upset Stalin; and even Sikorski himself who, understandably but fatally, failed to press his case with sufficient vigor and clarity at key moments. She concludes that the design was a lost cause well before the Katyn discoveries and Sikorski's own death, under mysterious circumstances, in 1943.

Terry blames the British and Americans for allowing the Soviets "virtually by default, to become the sole arbiters of Central Europe's future, not in 1944 and 1945 as a result of military occupation, but in 1941 and 1942 even before the tide of war had turned in their favor" (pp. 321–22). But, even assuming that effective leverage existed, the Anglo-Americans were restrained by three thoughts: that the Germans were "the sole arbiters" in 1941–1942; that Stalin might well, if alienated, have salvaged a deal with Hitler along lines for which 1917–18 and 1939–41 offered various well-remembered precedents; and

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that, from an alternative perspective, the Soviets were paying the butcher's bill for the supremely desired, but as yet unassured defeat of Germany. To such transcending considerations, along with much admittedly callous indifference, the Polish question was subordinated, or rather, put on the shelf. Tragically, when the Allies did take it up in 1944 and their inhibitions had less force, Sikorski was gone. While his successors played out their scapegoat role, the Lublin regime achieved the Oder-Neisse line, but in a context that served Soviet rather than Polish interests.

In a book that carefully blends history and political science, Terry effectively demonstrates that there was in 1941–42 a responsible Polish option for postwar Eastern Europe. She exposes the myth, carefully fostered by émigré and communist alike, that Sikorski wanted to recreate the cordon sanitaire. His failure makes a sad but fascinating and important story that is enhanced by the author's obvious intelligence, literary skill, and scrupulous scholarship, and also by the highest standards of publication.

FRASER HARBUTT
Emory University

The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East *by Mahmoud Riad. London, Quartet Books, 1982. 365 pp. $25.00.*

The ability to speak directly and movingly to the public and elites in the West was undoubtedly the greatest achievement of Anwar es-Sadat. From the Knesset platform in Jerusalem in 1977, Sadat presented the Arab case to Israel and the Western world and opened the high political drama that eventually produced the American sponsored Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. While the Israelis and even the Americans responded to Sadat's grand initiative with a multitude of contending and conflicting voices that defined and ultimately protected their interests, Sadat alone was heard as speaking for the Arabs. That essential aloneness weakened the Sadat peace and ultimately destroyed Sadat himself.

In his diplomatic and political diary, Riad, Egypt's foreign minister from 1964 to 1971 and secretary general of the Arab League from 1972 to 1979, explains the origins and consequences of Sadat's isolation. His account lacks that powerful personal charm that allowed Sadat's words to cut through barriers of Western prejudice and ignorance. For that reason, Riad's book will probably have all too little impact in the West. That is unfortunate, for Riad tells us the things we do not want to hear but need to know.

Essentially, this sober and wise Egyptian diplomat makes four points. First, the fear of Israeli expansionism in the Arab world is real and justified. The Camp David peace has neither contained the forward Israeli thrust nor the Arab fear of it. Second, Arabism as a deep cultural and historical reservoir remains the greatest resource with which to counter Israeli power. Egypt, in its flawed peace with Israel, is rediscovering its own Arabism. Third, the question of Palestine is at the heart of Arabism. For all its betrayals by Arab regimes, it lies quite beyond the manipulative reach of Arab elites. Finally, the Arab refusal of external displacement and domination, in the first instance directed against

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Israel, means that the Soviet Union is assured a future in the Middle East. The American failure to secure for Sadat at Camp David the necessary modicum of justice for the Palestinians guarantees that much.

But if these are the broad outlines of Riad's message, it is the details that are most arresting. Riad explains how Nasser's early reluctance to engage Egypt's slender resources against Israel gave way before the devastating Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955. The distortions of Egypt's experience under Nasser, both the excessive reliance on the Soviets and the inflated role of a corrupted Egyptian military, are seen by Riad as flowing from this externally imposed imperative to concentrate on building the army. Such a view reserves to Nasserism much of its original appeal. In the West we have been too eager to bury Egypt's Nasserist past, a past that had pan-Arabism at its core.

Riad's account makes clear that there was no graver mistake made by Americans at Camp David, and not least by President Carter himself, than the underestimation of Egypt's Arabism. If there was any real sense of how dangerously vulnerable Egypt's president had become as a result of the concessions he made on the Palenstinian issue, it was ignored. When Carter ultimately failed to deliver on both the promised moderate Arab support and the West Bank settlements freeze, Sadat's position was made untenable.

The present American confidence that, despite the betrayal of Sadat, the Egypt of his successor has no alternative but to continue in the Camp David path is explicitly challenged by Riad. The Soviets, as he sees it, were originally pulled into the region by Nasser to serve Egyptian and Arab interests. Riad's view of Egypt's recent history preserves just enough of the Nasser legend to make it perfectly clear that his concluding call on the Arab world for "the development of our own self-power and . . . the closing of our ranks" (p. 340) is a warning directed against the American superpower.

RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER
Williams College
The American University in Cairo

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

Assessing the Impacts of Technology on Society *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Washington, D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1983. 80 pp. $9.00.*

Congressional District Atlas: Districts of the 98th Congress *prepared by Robert D. Hamill, Ernest Swapshur, and Dan N. Harding. Washington, D.C., Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1983. 335 pp. $12.00.*

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1983, 2 vols. *compiled by Gale Research Co. Detroit, Gale Research Co., 1983. 1,492 pp. $66.00.*

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The Europa Yearbook 1983: A World Survey, 2 vols. *prepared by Europa Publications. London, Europa Publications, 1983. 3,710 pp. $210.00.*

The Falklands Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook *compiled by Raphael Perl with Everette Larson. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1983. 722 pp. $45.00.*

Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, vol. 7: Korea and China (in 2 parts) *edited by John P. Glennon, Harriet D. Schwar, and Paul Clausson. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 1983. 2,091 pp. $30.00.*

Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954, vol. 11: Africa and South Asia (in 2 parts) *edited by John P. Glennon et al. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State, 1983. 1,917 pp. $31.00.*

Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700 *edited by Richard Dean Burns. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio, 1983. 1,311 pp. $135.00.*

Handbook for Women Scholars: Strategies for Success *edited by Mary L. Spencer, Monika Kehoe, and Karen Speece. San Francisco, Americas Behavioral Research Corp., 1982. 141 pp. $10.95.*

Military Spending: Facts and Figures, Worldwide Implications and Future Outlook *prepared by Wassily Leontief and Faye Duchin. New York, Oxford University Press, 1983. 124 pp. $25.00.*

The Municipal Yearbook 1983 *edited by Mary A. Schellinger, et al. Washington, D.C., International City Management Association, 1983. 460 pp. $52.50.*

OECD Economic Surveys 1982–1983: Denmark *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Washington, D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1983. 58 pp. $4.00.*

OECD Economic Surveys 1982–1983: France *prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Washington, D.C., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1983. 84 pp. $4.00.*

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Pan-European Associations: A Directory of Multi-National Organisations in Europe *edited by C.A.P. Henderson. Beckenham (England), CBD Research Ltd., 1983. 426 pp. $135.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41: 1917 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983. 582 pp. $30.00.*

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Poland: Genesis of a Revolution *edited by Abraham Brumberg. New York, Random House, 1983. 322 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $7.95.*

The Soviet Army 1939–1980: A Guide to Sources in English *edited by Myron J. Smith, Jr. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio, 1982. 551 pp. $26.25.*

Soviet Foreign Policy Today: Reports and Commentaries from the Soviet Press, 1st ed. *edited by Fred Schulze. Columbus, O., Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1983. 165 pp. $12.00. ($8.00 each for orders of 5 copies or more).*

The State of Black America 1983 *edited by James D. Williams. New York, National Urban League, 1983. 390 pp. $14.00.*

State Elective Officials and the Legislatures 1983–84 *prepared by the Council of State Governments. Lexington, Ky., Council of State Governments, 1983. 126 pp. $15.00.*

Unnatural Deaths in the USSR 1928–1954 *edited by Iosif G. Dyadkin. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1983. 63 pp. $6.95.*

1980 U.S. Census Population and Housing Characteristics, 5 vols. *edited by Thomas R. Gay and James D. Shaffer. San Diego, Calif., National Decision Systems, 1982. 1,135 pp. $395.00.*

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1983 *edited by Robert Wesson. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 534 pp. $44.95.*

The Year Book of World Affairs 1983 *edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983. 312 pp. $42.00.*

Correspondence

What In the Name of God Is Strategic Superiority?

To the Editor:

Barry M. Blechman and Robert Powell, in their article "What in the Name of God is Strategic Superiority?" (*PSQ* 97 [1982–83] 589–602), reveal a technical flaw of comprehension and posit a rather hasty thesis.

First, the authors describe the evolution of the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD) between the United States and the Soviet Union (p. 590), and suggest that strategic superiority on the part of either side would be an in-

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significant indication of that side's thus allegedly superior war-fighting capability, or of its usefulness at all (p. 602). This vague contention, as presented, is erroneous. The authors assume that any hypothetical conflict between the superpowers would occur as a "worst-case scenario" (in the usage of the formal terminology), and thus as a full-blown exchange. In such a case, it is true that nuclear superiority might mean little at the end of a total nuclear holocaust. However, the present possibilities of nuclear exchange between the superpowers do not by any means rule out limited exchanges. A serious consideration of potentialities for this latter group of scenarios reveals that indeed some superiority, whether in numbers or in technology, may be of service to the stronger side.

Secondly, the central theme of the essay—that it has not been demonstrated that past American nuclear superiority has been of utility—is without merit. The Cuban missile crisis is probably the best example of such utility. The American superior position, while not the only factor, was no doubt conducive to Khrushchev's eventual acquiescence.

JOHN MACLEOD
Traill College, Trent University

Dr. Blechman and Mr. Powell reply:

It is not entirely clear to us that Professor Macleod read the article that we believe we wrote. The central theme of the paper he read is that strategic superiority "has not been of utility." The theme of the essay we think we wrote is very different. The theme in fact is that even if one discounts the historical complications, which we outline, and concludes that American nuclear superiority was useful in ending the Korean War, this conclusion does not support the contention that nuclear superiority is useful in the present era, when both sides have nuclear capabilities secure enough to withstand a first strike and to devastate the opposing society in retaliation. To quote from the article: "Whether a *success* or a failure in 1953, these threats have little, if anything, to do with the usefulness of nuclear superiority in the present era" (p. 601).

The article Professor Macleod read also suggests, in his words, that "strategic superiority on the part of either side would be an insignificant indication of that side's thus alleged superior war-fighting capability . . . ." The essay we think we wrote is not so flawed. Strategic superiority may be a significant indicator of a state's war-fighting capability. But this misses the point. In the present era of secure nuclear capabilities, it is the usefulness of a war-fighting capability that is problematic, not what indicates the existence of such a capability.

BARRY M. BLECHMAN
Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies
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

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

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

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